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Driven  by  fast  changes  in  global  dimensions,  industry  in  Europe  has  to  master  difficult 
transition processes. It has 
* to regain and to secure competitiveness and to further proceed to technology intensive and 
knowledge-based production; 
* to  strive  for  environmental  sustainability  and  to  develop  economic  solutions  for 
environmental and social problems; 
* to  develop existing markets in new directions and create new  markets in order to  secure 
employment and growth in Europe. 
Competitiveness means more than labour cost and exchange rates 
Competitiveness of industry is dominating debates on European economic development In 
the  past this  notion  has  been defined by  factors  like growth  of GDP,  labour costs,  trade 
balances and exchange rates. Meanwhile it has turned out that competitiveness also includes 
a number of other factors such as: 
* motivation, education and values; 
* quality of management, skilled labour and social organization of industry; 
* technology-intensive and knowledge-based production; 
* quality of interaction of politics, business and interest organizations. 
Economic development is  no  longer a matter of single enterprises or industries but rather a 
joint venture of society as  a whole.  Setting favourable trends and reversing unfavourable 
trends needs strong cooperation of political and economic actors with a long-term orientation 
to  solve problem of future sustainability.This also demarcates a new philosphy of growth: 
Instead of speculating about the limits of growth we  have to aim towards problem-
solving growth. This  philosophy  applies  to  environmental problems  as  well  as  to  social 
problems. VI 
Problem  solving  growth  can  only  be  achieved  by  making  use  of the  best  technology 
available. Complexitiy of knowledge and its conversion into new products needs a continuous 
process \vhich not only challenges science but also the social organization of the innovation 
process. 
Strategies of problem-solving growth also have a global aspect.  A major goal of industrial 
policy  and of industrial  activity in  the  advanced countries must be  to  enhance a  type of 
global production which guides investments and technological knowledge to the developing 
countries. 
Active policies to encounter exhaustion 
Europe's advanced industrialized societies are threatened by the exhaustion of their economic 
opportunities. To tum the tide an active approach is necessary. 
Exhaustion, i.e. an unbalanced relationship between production capacities and demand is not 
only due to the maturity of markets. Today, the situation is aggravated by the rapid growth 
in newly industrializing countries and rationalization processes in the developed economies. 
The findings  of the  FINE-studies  suggest that  this  will  lead  to  structural  unemployment 
opening up a vicious circle: Long term unemployment imposes increasing social costs on the 
economy and result in declining demand, in tum enlarging the gap between the production 
potential and market volumes. 
In order to create new economic opportunities, a strategy of diversification is needed, where 
enterprises use their potentials, particularly their know-how and technological competence 
and the skills of their workforce, to develop new products for new markets. This opens up 
chances to transfer labour from declining to new business  .. 
Technology-led  diversification  is  a  strategy  which  follows  the  logic  of capitalism.  It 
attempts  to  develop  new  products  on  the  basis  of  the  technological  knowledge  and VII 
competence of a firm and its personnel. Success of technology-led diversification  strongly 
depends on companies' ability to translate problems, needs and demand,  which so far have 
not been satisfied economically or for which better economic solutions may be developed, 
into new products. This is what we call the socio-technological approach to diversification. 
Yet,  diversification remains a difficult, costly and risky undertaking. Major barriers are: 
* to combine creative marketing with  long-term R&D; 
* to reorganize fitms' structures and collaboration between firms; 
* to  orientate financial strategies at long-term goals; 
* to enlarge the  time horizon of finns' planning; 
* to introduce new dimensions of enterprise culture which give up the narrow definition of 
enterprises. 
Given these problems, support by public policy is important So far, public policy in Europe 
has a strong tendency to react on the decline of nationally relevant firms  and industries in 
terms  of  protectionism.  Little  attempt  is  made  to  mobilize  their  potentials  for  the 
development of new products and markets and to tum to  a "new" quality production: 
For industry in Europe, the important strategic problem is to develop a competitive edge in 
a quality economy. This means to combine: 
* high quality of goods in response to customers' demands; 
*  low degree of standardization and high degree of customization of goods; 
* fast adjustment of products to diversified and changing demand; 
* a fast adjustment of products to the highest  state of science and technology; 
* inclusion of a strong service component. 
The conclusion of all this is simple: It is crucial to be quick in translating needs into demand ·-
and to be highly fexible in product as well as process development. VIII 
Technology plus organisation makes productivity 
As  we  are  moving  towards  a  knowledge-intensive  economy,  new  market  structures  and 
organizational paradigms, there are enormous creative potentials to be mobilized. Successful 
strategies  have been developed in the context of anthropocentric production systems (APS), 
that is  of advanced production systems which combine computer-based technology with 
intelligent organization and skilled work. 
Education and training programmes are essential to modernize work. Advanced production 
systems put new demands on human qualifications and the development of new skill profiles. 
It is  a mangement problem then,  to  keep  the balance between technological innovation, 
organisational design and the resulting transformation of skill profiles. 
The ability of modem production systems to  adjust to changing demands and to  switch to 
new  value-added  business  is  also  dependent  on  the  successful  management  of external 
relationships. The use of interfirm cooperation offers two advantages: firms stay "lean" and 
flexible, and they have  access to  scarce resources which enables them to deal with highly 
complex  requirements.  This  is  of particular  importance  for  small  and  medium  sized 
enterprises. 
Innovating the innovation system 
European industry is used to apply the best available  technology to their products and to ad-
just their products to  the new and better technological solutions. This kind of technological 
competence does  not necessarily mean that Europe is also  leading in  the development of 
technology. European industry does not have a leading position in the most important tech-
nologies,  particularly  in  the  so-called  core-technologies.  Beside  this  weakness  in  core-
technologies strategic shortcomings are to  be seen in: 
*  deficits in systematically building up on technological linkages; IX 
* a technological  ~~fundamentalism  .. rating the scientific quality of technological solutions as· 
an end in itself; 
* an  inefficient innovation management resulting in long lead-times and commercialization 
problems. 
Development  and  application  of technologies  is  not  only  a  scientific  or  technological 
problem,  but just as  well  an  organizational  one.  It requires  close  collaboration between 
scientists, producers and users. 
In  Europe,  networking  and  collaborative  research  is  only  poorly  developed.  European 
innovation  management  is  often  technology-centered  and  neglects  economic  and  social 
dimensions of innovation. Approaches to  new technologies are based on specialization and 
competition  of individual firms.  They  are  biased towards  technological  breakthrough and 
neglect synergies. 
This requires a new pattern of innovation, which combines technological breakthrough 
and the fusion  of different technologies in  a process of continouous improvement.  The 
crucial point is to organize cooperation across whole production chains i.e.  across, different 
fields of research and different branches. 
For future competitiveness in Europe it will be important to develop an innovation regime 
which  organizes  the  entire  process  - from  basic  research  via  the  development  of new 
technologies  to  application  in  products  - in  a  way,  that  societal  needs  can  be  quickly 
transfotmed into new products and markets. This has a number of implications e.g. : 
* the scarcity of resources requires a more efficient setting of priorities; 
* R&D  projects  must  be  embedded  in  any  long-term  strategies  and  cooperative 
arrangements; 
* R&D  has  to  go  along  with  qualification  of  the  labour  force  and  organizational 
development. X 
National policies and regulatory differences, regional disparities and cultural diversity have 
consequences  for  the  "environment"  of innovation  in  Europe.  National  achievements  by 
themselves are not sufficient to remain competitive in a globalized economy. An innovative 
climate within the Community needs cooperation  and a high degree of flexiblity. 
Strategic concepts for the future of industry in Europe have to reconsider the notion of 
growth and competiveness. Growth will  not be achieved by  more of the same, but by 
new products, contributing to the solution of societal needs. Competitiveness will not be 
achieved  by  strategies  of  automation  but  by  reorganizing  production  structures. 
Endeavours to regain a competitive edge will  have to focus on the potentials of social 
organization. 
What  is  required  in  the  end  is  a  new  understanding  of  division  of labour  and 
cooperation of social, political and economic actors to overcome the mismatches between 
growth and employment, societal needs and economic rationality, isles of growth and· a 
sea of poverty. 
The following policy recommendations can be formulated as a result of the research: 
Reshaping the welfare state 
The European social charta has  to  be decided very urgently in order to  secure an adequate 
social framework for industrial development. Working conditions should not be applicable as 
a competitive arguement. 
European initiatives for high productivity 
The Commission of the European Communities and governments of the member states of the 
communities  should  promote  a  joint  initiative  of  employers  and  unions  to  increase 
productivity in European industry. 
An initiative for intelligent production systems 
The  commission  of the  European  Communities  should  further  enhance  development  of 
anthropocentric production systmes and combine  thi~ with a systematic effort to design and XI 
implement  in  European  industry  intelligent  production  systems  with  open  and  flexible 
boundaries. This should be combined with a systematic effort in vocational and professional 
training. 
Centers of  excellence 
The Commission of the European Communities should establish centers of excellence for 
research  which  necessitate  broad  interdisplinary  approaches  and  integration  of scientific 
knowledge and practical experience. 
Centers of excellence should be established for a limited period (probably 10 years) and be 
organized as joint ventures of public research institutions  and private firms.  Private fmns 
should be involved by delegating staff and by actively participating in pilot projects. 
Regulations should be made which define intellectual property rights of participants and still 
secure  openess  to  participation  at  any  time.  Competing  centers  of excellence  should be 
admitted and even enhanced. 
Reorganizing the Communities RTD policy 
The Community programmes for research and technical development should be forcefully 
shifted to  the establishment of networks for fast development and wide application of new 
technologies in widely defined fields.  Goals and activities should be openly defined. 
R&D programmes could center around certain technologies, such as opto-electronics. In this 
case,  they  should consider the  whole  technological  "food-chain".  Programmes could also 
center around certain problems, such as recycling of automobiles, and they should include all 
relevant technologies. 
In such programmes should not only deal with technical, but also with economic and social 
aspects of the relevant technologies or problems. XII 
Initiating a new techno-culture 
In order to improve development and application of new technology, the Commission of the 
European Communities should initiate a society wide discussion on technology. 
The aim of the discussion should be to design efficient regulation and an efficient security 
system for the development of new technologies, particularly of bio-technology. 
The discussion could be organized by intensive hearings of the Commission with industry, 
unions and the relevant social interests. It could be convened by an independent committee. 
Introducing dynamic regulation on environment 
The Commission of the European Communities and national governments should develop a 
dynamic form of environmental regulation. For a longer period of time, regulation.should in 
advance define rising environmental standards. This should be continuously perpetuated. The 
basis for the definition of standards should be the projections of technological development. 
Environmental targeting of  public procurement 
The Commission of the European Communities and national governments should support 
trigger development of capacious markets for environmental products by means of public 
procurement. 
More  specifically,  European  and  national  regulations  should  determine  that  public 
procurement projects have to meet high environmental standards. These standards should be 
dynamic in order to induce a technology push. 
A European R&D-programme for an environmental industry 
The Commission of the European Communities should initiate a large-scale R&D programme 
on environmental technology and development of relevant markets. The programme should 
support networks and centers of excellence focusing at major environmental problems, such 
as recycling and waste reduction for major industrial products. XIII 
Three measures to support diversifiCation 
In  order  to  support diversification  of industry  to  new  activities  and  new  markets,  The 
Commission of the European Communities should introduce the following measures: 
1  Financial support for declining industry should only be given under the condition that the 
relevant firms offer a programm for the development of new business and the creation of 
new jobs for the workers. National subsidies should be subject to the same condition. 
2  Public support for development of technology should be linked to the condition that R&D 
activities are combined with activities for development of new products and new markets. 
3  The Commission should create a programme for financial support of development of new 
markets by means of venture capital and long-term loans. Preferably, such a programme 
should be performed as  a joint venture with  the  European banking  industry  and thus, 
stimulate development of new banking business. 
Networks for socio-technological diversification 
In order to develop new markets and new economic 'oppottunities, The Commission of the 
European Communities should establish networks for socio-technological diversification. 
One  type  of network  should  be  oriented  at development  and  wide  application  of core-
technologies  and  should  be  organized  along  technological  chaines  and  potentials  for 
technology  fusion.  Particularly  impo1tant technologies  are  bio-technology,  new materials, 
microstructure technology and communication technology. 
Another type of network should focus  at economic solutions of environmental and social 
problems  and  should  include  actors  from  a  variety of different fields  in  knowledge  and 
technology.  Particularly they should include experts in technology, organization and regu-
lation. Major targets should be material flows, recycling, emmissions and waste. 
Initiating collaborative efforts 
The Commission of the European Communities should strongly support collaboration among 
SMEs and SMEs with large enterprises. For this purpose, RTD programmes as well as other XIV 
programmes  offering  financial  assistance  to  fmns  should,  if possible,  have  a  rule  for 
inclusion and collaboration of SMEs. 
Creation of  nuclei for regional economic expansion 
The  European  Commission  should  initiate  collaborative  networks  as  a  nuclei  for  the 
development of poor regions. The task of the network should be to design and implement a 
programm  which  supports  investments  of large  and  strong  international  corporations  in 
lagging regions by heavy subsidies and combines this  with measures· to  build an adequate 
infrastructure and a network of domestic SMEs around this investment. Part 1: 
The Future of Industry in Europe 
Main Results 2 
The  economic  and  social  foundations  of the  European  societies  are  threatened  by  two 
developments,  namely  high  structural  unemployment  and  deterioration  of environmental 
conditions. These developments also endanger the viability of industry in Europe. 
In order to successfully cope with these  problems and to  secure its viability,  industry in 
Europe has to undergo fundamental change. Most importantly, it has 
* 
* 
* 
to develop new economic opportunities, 
to shift to an environmentally sustainable production, and 
to implement new production systems. 
This requires  new technological solutions and  a  high degree of innovation.  Far-reaching 
changes in European innovation regimes are nessecary. 
Not less important is  high  competitiveness and adaptability  of industry.  However,  short-
termed and short-sighted concern with competitiveness may encourage action which endangers 
of long-term viability of industry. 
Competitiveness and adaptability of industry in Europe are closely related to  the welfare 
system. Important aspects of this system, the relationship of work and welfare in particularly, 
need to be scrutinized. 
Fundamental change in industry and development of strategies and structures needs strong 
support by public policy. This is hardly possible without developing new forms and strategies 
of industrial policy. 
Economic opportunities: The key issue 
To develop economic opportunities is the major challenge to advanced industrialized societies. 
Economic opportunities, that is opportunities for profit, growth and above all employment, 
are shrinking both in industry and services. These problems may not yet be manifest in all 3 
sectors of industry, but nevertheless they need careful attention. Developments leading to ex-
haustion of markets can already be observed in a number of industries. Reversing these trends 
and building up altetnatives will take time. 
Box 1.1:  Economic opportunities: The issue in a nutshell 
Econon1ic opportunities are likely to shrink on a global scale. The major challenge for industry 
in Europe, thus, is 
*  to develop markets in new directions and to create new markets, 
*  to develop new economic solutions to social and environmental problems in order to secure 
a sustainable and vital economy and, 
*  to rapidly develop and exploit a new technological base for thes·e purposes. 
In the past, exhaustion of economic opportunities primarily has been associated with mature 
markets, that is markets with stagnating demand and low technological innovation. While this 
is  the  case  in  some  areas,  exhaustion  is  increasingly  due  to  the  growth  of world-wide 
capacities in industry and services, which is often not matched by corresponding growth of 
absorbing capacities of markets. This is aggravated by newly industrializing countries, where 
mass income and domestic markets grow much slower than production capacities (OECD; 
1988b,  1991a;  United Nations,  1990).  This is why they push forward on foreign  markets, 
mass markets and quality markets alike. 
Exhaustion  is  already  evident in  a  number of industries.  In  plastics,  steel  and  air trans-
portation, for example, global production capacities already exceed global demand. Computers 
are another prominent example which demonstrate that exhaustion is not confmed to tradi-
tional industries or to low-tech industries, but hits modem high-technology industries as well. 
We  assume that more  industries  are facing  similar developments.  Accordingly,  losses of 
economic opportunities in some industries are unlikely to be compensated by corresponding 
gains in other industries. 4 
Fig. 1.1:  Sources of exhaustion 
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In a worst case scenario, we have to assume that this  will lead to massive unemployment in 
Europe.  Since many years  already,  employment in  the industrialized countries is growing 
much  slower  than  GDP  and  capital  investment.  Excessive  capacities  and  exhaustion  of 
economic opportunities may dramatically alterate the decline of employment. 5 
Fig. 1.2:  Growth  of GDP,  capital  investments  and  employment  in  industrialized 
countries 
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We are not speaking here of cyclical changes in employment, but of considerable structural 
unemployment A declining number of highly skilled workers produces an increasing amount 
of goods and services, whereas a growing part of the population is excluded from regular paid 
work (CEC, 1989). 6 
The threat of  massive unemployment often motivates policy makers to take refuge to publicly 
finance jobs and training activities as  a bridge back to  regular employment. Yet, this is a 
strategy  to  cope  with  cyclical  unemployment  but  not  with  substantial  structural  unem-
ployment. 
In view of a severe threat of exhaustion and related structural unemployment, an active ap-
proach  to economic  opportunities  is  necessary.  A  set of strategies  ranging from  product 
innovations or changes in design which significantly improve the functional, social or aestheti-
cal value of products to  development of new products and new  markets  have to  be im-
plemented. The aim of industry in Europe must be to rapidly diversify in new businesses and 
markets. 
In Europe and the United States, enterprises usually diversify in a particular way. They buy 
other fmns and use theses acquisitions to develop business activities in other markets. With 
few exceptions, this strategy is simply a reshuffling of assets from one enterprise to another. 
In order to  create real  new economic  opportunities, a  different type of diversification  is 
needed. Enterprises have to use their potential, particularly their know-how anp. technological 
competence and the skills  of their workforce,  to  develop new products for new markets. 
Along with this, the workforce has to  be transferred from declining to new business. 
This type of diversification is successfully applied by a number of Japanese companies. They 
have developed a type of diversification which is technology-led and attempts to develop new 
products on the  basis  of the  technological  knowledge and competence of a  fmn and its 
personnel.  This may be confined to  new applications of existing technology,  but usually 
includes broadening and development of the technological base. An illustrative example for 
this case is the development of R&D in Japanese textile industry. (Kodama, 1991)
1
• 
1  Interesting cases of such a diversification strategy are finns like Nippon Steel and Kobe Steel which have 
managed to reduce their traditional business considerably and to secure employment and returns by deve-
loping new business.  · Fig. 1.3:  R&D profile of diversification in Japanese textile industries 
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Success of technology-led diversification strongly depends on companies' ability to identify 
problems,  needs  and demands  which  so  far  have  not been  satisfied or for  which  better 
economic solutions may be developed. This may be called the socio-technology approach to 
diversification. 
A socio-technology approach to diversification combines two strategies:. 
* A systematic exploitation and development of companies' technological base, and know-
how of human resources, and 
* a systematic orientation towards social needs and societal problems which are hitherto not 
satisfied by economic measures. 8 
The aim is to develop a technological solution for such needs and problems which may be 
translated into a marketable product. This requires 
* a combination of a creative marketing with long-termed R&D; 
* to  overcome  organizational  impediments,  such  as  segmented  structures  or a  lack  of 
collaboration across firms; 
* to handle high uncertainty concerning the application of technology and the translation of 
needs into demand; 
* high investments in both marketing and R&D; 
* to think far beyond the usual time horizon of fmns' activities; and last not least 
* a reorientation of European and American enterprise culture and the related definition of 
enterprises. 
European industry has its stronghold in traditional markets, and fails to invest timely in new 
fields of business and technologies. Accordingly, only few have developed new products and 
markets
2
• 
This is evident when you look at patent data. European industry has problems to catch up 
with the leaders in new technologies, particularly in data processing and in semiconductors, 
but also in biotechnology and new materials. Their patents concentrate in traditional industries 
and technologies. 
There is, thus, a considerable discrepancy between 
* the growing need for industry in Europe to develop new products and new markets and to 
diversify accordingly, and 
* the reluctance and inability of European industry to invest and innovate outside established 
fields and to develop new products for new markets. 
2  An illustrative case for this situation are developments of new materials, particularly of multi-materials where 
American and Japanese finns act both faster and more_systematic than most of their European competitors. 9 
Fig. 1.4:  Patent shares in major industries 
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Creating new economic opportunities requires a new philosophy of growth: ·got "more of the 
same"  but specific solutions for social  and environmental problems.  An  example for  the 
application of this philosophy is environment 
Environment: A new approach to growth 
As various studies demonstrate, environmental problems and concern are sharply increasing 
in the advanced societies as  well as on a global scale. This requires changes of industrial 
structures and strategies. Strategic atmosphere depletion, greenhouse effect and global spread 
of air pollution remain critical issues. Moreover, there is a massive increase of waste and in 
energy consumption  (cf.  Brown et al.,  1991;  Burrows et al.,  1991;  CEC,  1992a;  OECD, 
1991d; von Weizsacker, 1990). 10 
Fig. 1.5:  Air pollution, waste and energy consumption in OECD countries 
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Though  environment  is  an  extremely  critical  issue  for  industry,  economic  solutions  of 
environmental problems are often missing. Environmental problems are still solved primarily 
by political rather than economic means.  As  a result, frictions and contradictions between 
environment and industrial growth are building up. 11 
Within the population of the member countries of the European Community, there is a high 
concern for environmental problems. This holds not only for the rich but also for the poor 
countries.  In most of the countries a majority of the population also  accepts that environ-
mental protection is a necessary precondition for economic development. 
Fig. 1.6:  Environmental concern in the European Community 
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These  positive  attitudes  towards  environmental  issues  do,  however,  not  result  in  much 
willingness to effectively trade environmental protection against material well-being rather, 
there  are  simultaneously  high  expectations  concerning  material  well-being  as  ·well  as 
concerning environmental quality. 
As a result, a large proportion of the population in Europe assigns high priority both to a high 
material living standard and a high non-material quality of life. 12 
Fig. 1.7:  Attitudes towards environment and the economy in the European Community 
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This results in a contradictory situation. On one side, societal values support strong and even 
increasing pressure for political solutions to environmental problems. They also create strong 
restrictions and problems of acceptance for industry. On the other side, they render it very 
difficult  to  solve  environmental  problems  at  the·  expense  of material  living  conditions. 
Political  solutions  to  environmental  problems  face  severe  restrictions  concerning  their 
effectiveness. 
In order to resolve this multiple dilemma, new economic solutions to environmental problems 
have to be found.  Rather than being a restriction to growth and competitiveness, the. solution 13 
of environmental problems should be used as a motor to open up new economic opportunities 
and to enlarge the scope of market solutions
3
• 
As  a  memorandum  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Community  shows,  economic 
solutions to  environmental problems bear high  growth potentials for many industries. It is, 
therefore, realistic to use  the solution of environmental problems as a means to develop new 
economic opportunities and to  overcome exhaustion (CEC, 1992a). 
Industry in Europe, Germany in particularly, is in a good starting position for environment-
based growth.  It has already significantly invested in relevant R&D and holds a high share 
of international patents. 
Fig. 1.8:  Patents in environmental technology 
Others 
1985-1988 
Western Europe (rest) 
Source:  Ifo, 1990. 
EEC (rest) 
3  There is a broad discussion on economic instruments for environmental policies. This discussion, however, 
is strongly concentrating on issues of regulation and often neglects issues of technology and product deve-
lopment. - Cf. CEC, 1992a, 1992b; OECD,  1989b,  199~e; Scherp, 1992; von Weizsacker, 1990). 14 
Obviously, neither market forces nor governmental regulations are likely to produce sufficient 
incentives for the ecological restructuring of industry. The strategic issue, thus, is that industry 
in Europe may miss  the  chance to  use  the  solution of ecological problems  as  a motor to 
develop new economic opportunities. 
Competitiveness: Is European industry loosing ground? 
Current  debates  on  industry  in  Europe  are  dominated  by  concerns  about  failures  in 
competitiveness. The arguements are often exaggerated. As the World Competitiveness Report 
1992  shows, the overall picture is  not necessarily discouraging, yet there are a number of 
factors which need careful attention. 
Fig. 1.9:  The World Competitiveness Scoreboard/Executive Opinion Scoreboard 
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Ranking 15 
Some of  the European countries, namely Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands 
rank high  on  most factors.  A number  of countries, e.g.  the  United  Kingdom and France, 
perform rather modestly.  Only few  countries, particularly Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece 
seem to have general difficulties with respect to competitiveness. 
It is important to  keep this  broad picture in  mind,  because debates on competitiveness are 
often one-sided and short-sighted. This in turn leads to  strategic choices, which 
* improve  a  particular aspect  of competitiveness,  but create new  or increased problems 
concerning other aspects e.g. by reducing wages and creating a loss of purchasing ·power; 
* solve problems  in  short-term,  but endanger vitality of industry  in the  long run e.g.  by 
protectionist politics; 
* promote  competitiveness  of certain  industries  in  some  parts  of Europe,  but  hinder 
development in other regions e.g.  fostering care technologies which are dependent on a 
highly sophisticated infrastructure. 
Many countries of the European Communities show  unfavourable terms of trade. Between 
1980 and 1990, only in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands terms of trade have developed 
positively. Belgium, Portugal, France and Italy have improved their position, but values have 
remained negative. The other countries of the European Community have declined. 
This  picture reflects  well-known  conditions  of the  European economies  but there  is  also 
reason for new concern: 
1  the  sign~ficance of labour costs as a factor of competitiveness is changing, 
2  "soft factors" of competitiveness are gaining importance; and 
3  technological competence is  becoming an even more critical issue. 16 
Fig. 1.10:  Terms of trade of OECD countries 
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Both Japan and North America are,  as  is  Western Europe,  surrounded by countries with 
much lower labour costs. However, as labour costs in Asian and, in Latin American countries 
are rising faster than those in Central and Eastern Europe, Western, Europe is facing stronger 
competition from its "cheap labour neighbours"
4
• 
If we analyze labour cost problems carefully, we often fmd that the real issue is productivity 
originating from wrong or delayed adjustment to structural change. The European economies 
on the average show comparatively high labour productivity. Yet this is  mostly due to  the 
performance of the  service sector. In  manfacturing Europe scores low (Lehner et al.,  1993; 
OECD,  1991a, 1991b). 
4  Saying this, we do not wish to support calls for protectionism towards Eastern Europe. Rather, we want to 
point at the need to support institutional change and rapid development in Eastern Europe. (See Jochimsen, 
1991).  . 17 
Fig. 1.11:  Labour productivity in the whole economy and in manufacturing 
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Data from the Japanese productivity centre measuring productivity in purchasing parity power 
point at a rather negative position for Europe. It demonstrates that in the 1970's and 1980's, 
productivity in total manufacturing, including core industries, has declined in Germany in. 
relation to the United States. Japanese industry generally reaches better results. Interestingly 18 
enough, this holds particularly for chemical and steel industries where Germany is considered 
to have a strong position. 
This illustrates that industry in Europe has a productivity problem rather than a labour cost 
problem. This is the result of faults  and delays "@  n  the development of organization of 
industrial production. The relevant issue,  thus,  is modernization of production rather than 
reduction of labour costs. 
Factors like management abilities, workers' skills and enterprise culture as well as networking 
of firms, public private partnership or social organization of technology have turned out to 
be  the critical issues to  improve productivity  (cf.  Clark &  Fujimoto,  1991;  Reich,  1991; 
Thurow, 1992; Warner, Wobbe &  Bradner, 1990; World Competitiveness Report, 1992). 
The superior position of Japanese industry in global competition is based 
* not only on lower labour costs, but on better organization of production, 
* not only on shotter lead time, but on a better innovation regime, 
* not only on more high technology, but on better social organization of technology. 
Critical issues are to be found both on the "hard" and the " softer" side of competitiveness. 
Europe does not keep pace in major technological developments and has difficulties to build 
up  an adequate social organization of technological development and innovation (Cf. Lehner 
et al.,1993; Roussel et al.,  1991; van Tulder &  Junne, 1988; de Woot, 1990). 
Empirical  evidence  shows  quite  well  that  the  position  of  European  industry  in  the 
development of new technology is not particularly strong. Data on patent flows in the Triade 
between.1981 and 1988 point at a dominance of the United States and Japan. 19 
Fig. 1.12:  Development of labour productivity in Germany, the United States and Japan 
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Box 1.2:  Challenges of technological competence 
There are at least three problems that may lead to a significant decline of technological competence 
in European industry, namely 
*  the weak position concerning key-technologies, 
*  deficits in systematically building up technological linkages, and 
*  a technological "fundamentalism" instead of a market oriented management of innovation. 20 
Fig. 1.13:  Patent flows in the Triade 
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In particular Europe has a weak position in information and communication technologies. The 
development situation is somewhat better for software where the United States dominate, but 
Europe has secured a rather good position (BMFf, 1993; OECD, 1992; van-Tulder & Junne, 
1988; de Woot, 1990). 
A similar situation can be. observed for biotechnology. Patent activities are again dominated 
by the United States and Japan, whereas in Europe only Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom participate in the game. 21 
Fig. 1.14:  Shares of Europe,  the  United  States and  Japan  in  IC  and  global software 
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Fig. 1.15:  Patent activities in biotechnology 
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These deficits  in  key-technologies  should  not  be  underestimated,  since they  have  severe 
consequences for industries in which these technologies are applied. Based on technological 
interdependencies~ a technological "food-chain" (see fig.  1.30 below) links the development 
of different  industries  to  these  key-technologies  (  cf.  Carlsson,  1989;  Fransman,  1990; 
Kodama, 1991; OECD, 1992; United Nations, 1990). 
An important element of long-term competitiveness of industry in Europe is its ability to 
manage  the  shift to  quality  production.  In  the  context of global  change,  industry  in the 
advanced economies has to turn to  technologically sophisticated, high value-added produstion 
(Lehner,  1992; Ozawa, 1988; Peters & Waterman, .1982; Reich,  19.91; Thurow, 1992)./ Box 1.3:  Quality production 
Modem quality production is characterized by the following elements: 
*  a high quality of goods, 
*  a low degree of standardization and high degree of customization of products, 
*  a fast adjustment of products to diversified and changing demand, 
*  a fast adjustment of products to  the highest state of science and technology, and 
*  a strong service component. 
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Modern quality production constitutes a severe challenge to industrial performance. It requires 
a synthesis of traditional concepts of quality production and of mass production. This results 
in  a  new  and  complex  production  system  which  implies  far  reaching  changes  in  the 
organization of enterprises (cf.  Beer et al.,  1990;  Kanter,  1989;  OECD,  1991a;  Shetty & 
Buehler, 1987; Warner, Wobbe & Bradner, 1990). 
Again results of the World Competitiveness Report 1992 indicate that industry in a number 
of member countries of the  European Communities have considerable difficulties to  meet 
these requirements: 
* In quite a number of countries, price/quality-ratio of domestic products is on the average 
inferior to foreign competitors, 
* quite often customer-orientation is rather weak, and 
* in  some  countries,  production  technologies  are  outdated  in  comparison  to  foreign 
competitors. 
These difficulties illustrate only part of the problem of quality production. What is even more 
alarming is the insufficient organization and integration of technology, human resources and 
management 24 
Tab. 1.1:  Industry in transition 
Yesterday  Tomorrow  Aims/ potential results 
Product strategy: 
Long series, undifferentiated products  Short series, specific products  Personalised products 
Product, price  Solutions, services  Price premium for qualitiy, 
reliability  ,performance 
· Quality control  Perfonnance audits  ·  Equal priority given to design, 
production, delivery 
Manufacturing strategy: 
Volume, scale  Speed, response time  Rapid new product introduction 
Throughput  Flexibility  Multi-use equipment 
CIM, robotics  Logistics, flow dynamics,  design  Design to reduce handling, move-
ment, transport 
Organisational strategy: 
Complexity  Organisation  A  void diturbance, disfunction, 
breakdowns 
Hierarchy  Autonomy, responsability  Better solution because close to 
problems 
Market entry and direct 
investment strategy: 
Local, national markets  World markets  Target and differentiate 
products, services, markets 
Sub-contracting  Partnership  Spread risks, share gains 
Low labour-cost suppliers  Direct investments in key markets  Directly enter new markets 
Source:  OECD, Industrial Policy in OECD Countries, 1991 
Small and medium enterprises: A case for concern 
A considerable part of the  European  economies is  made up  by  small  and medium  sized 
enterprises  (SME).  Speaking  in  sheer  numbers,  more  than  90%  of all  enterprises  in  the 
European Communities have less than 10 employees while only slightly more than 1% of the 
fmns has more than 100 employees. These shares vary considerably between the member sta-
tes of the community and within different industries. Firms with less than 500 employees hold 
a share of 70% of total employment and approximately the same share of total turnover. Fig. 1.16:  Distribution of enterprises in the European Community 
aa.. 0-9 
Ctemical Ind. 
Mechanical eng. 
Electrical eng. 
Molor V  ehic:les 
ConslrUCtion 
Services 
TOTAL 
0  20 
By employment size class 
By secto.-s 
40 
D  Olo9 
•  10!019 
•  20!099 
[ill] 100to199 
ill'])  200 to 499 
1!1111  SOO+ 
Source:  Eurostat 1992; own calculations. 
ao.. 10-99 
au.. 100+ 
60 
•
-:£-imk£f1111:}~: 
1~  •==~~:: 
80  100 
25 
Many small and medium sized enterprises face an uncomfortable future.  In particular, they 
are confronted with: 
* increasing  competition  tn  their  traditional  market  niches  by  large  enterprises  with 
decentralized and flexible organization; 26 
* increasing financial and organizational burden in keeping pace with rapid innovation and 
structural change; 
* increasing problems and costs of marketing, sales and services in volatile and globalizing 
markets. 
Abb. 1.17:  Turnover per employee by firm size in selected sectors 
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In areas  where international markets develop  and where they  loose their traditional  niche 
markets, small and medium enterprises may  have severe problems to  stay in  business. To 
enhance their profit situation, large firms are forced to also serve smaller markets. Moreover, 
modem production technologies provide the necessary flexibility to serve niche markets. Thus 
competition is intensified in markets, which formerly have been the domain of only a small 
number of SMEs. Box 1.4:  Types of small and medium enterprises 
Types of Small and Medium Enterprises: 
1.  Market localists 
micro-sized finns, acting in a local or regional context 
orientation towards local consumer tastes and demands 
no subcontracting, no mergers and acquisitions 
poor access to finance capital and consu"ttancies 
high rate of fluctuation, low entry and exit barriers 
often familiy based, low wages 
v<?latile  individually, but stable altogether 
2.  The Craft Based SMEs 
specialized in diversified and customized products of high quality 
high skilled workers, flat hierarchies, low division of labour 
lacking of close networks of cooperation 
limited access to  finance capital, R&D, and distribution channels 
problems with increasing speed of innovation 
threatened by takeovers of big-sized finns 
3.  SMEs within Regional Networks (Industrial Districts) 
craft based SMEs within networks of suppliers, customers and competitiors 
regionally embedded in support infrastructure 
export orientation 
high degree of product innovation 
lack of marketing and research facilities 
undercapitalized 
their niche markets are threatened by larger competitors 
4.  High-Tech SMEs (Technological Districts) 
often small fim1s  with technolocically advanced products for special 
purposes 
highly skilled workforce (often with university degree) 
often spin-offs from larger firms, universities or public research institutions 
high dependence on large organization 
5.  SMEs in the New Division of Labour 
subcontractors or suppliers of large assembly finns 
first group: system suppliers with cooperative ties 
second group: producing standardized products and used as buffers for 
costs and risks 
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Small and medium enterprises are not a uniform class. Rather, there are different types of 
frrms  with  different types  of problems.  Many  SMEs  operate  in  narrow  local  or regional 28 
markets in which they are well integrated. They can quickly adapt to changes of demand and 
are not much affected by structural change and maintain a rather secure position. 
Against  tha~ many craft-based SMEs,  specialize in highly customized products with  high 
quality and technological sophistication and  high export rates  face more and more direct 
competition by large enterprises. Their position is often at risk. 
Different types of SMEs share one problem. They have poor access to capital markets, R&D 
institutions, consultancy and distribution channels. As a result, they often have difficulties to 
keep pace with innovation and to cope with the internationalization and globalization of their 
markets. 
Experience of SMEs operating in industrial districts underline that these problems can to be 
solved by intetfirm collaboration. Regional networks allow for flexible specialization of the 
individ~al firm, while network as a whole reaches a high degree of diversification. 
A considerable part of the  SME economy is closely linked to  large firms as. part of their 
supply structures.  These structures are currently changing quite dramatically.  Large firms 
integrate and simplify their supply systems and impose rising demands concerning research 
and technical development activities on their suppliers which are hard to fulfill. 
It is common knowledge that small and medium firms are economically successful because 
they  do  things  that large firms  are  not able to  do  or cannot do  efficiently:  Serving local 
markets and market niches, producing highly specialized goods and exploiting marginal labour 
forces.  While this has been true in the past, it is  hardly a promising strategy for the future. 
The advice must be different. Large enterprises decentralize and develop towards a system 
of firm-in- the-firm with similar flexibility and capabilities as SMEs. SMEs, on their part, will 
have to develop those properties which make up for the strength of large enterprises. These 
are capabilities to  accumulate and concentrate large resources, to exploit synergies and to 
coordinate a variety of different developments. This can be done by means of collaboration 
and networking. Possible strategies for collaboration are: 29 
1  to find a shelter in large groups and to renunciate of autonomy in order to gain access to 
the properties and resources of a large enterprise, 
2  to  collaborate in  a  "kingdom",  that is  to  work closely  with  a  big-sized firm  providing 
market access and strategic orientation, or 
3  to  cooperate in  a "republic" where several firms collaborate on equal terms and bring in 
their particular strengths in products, production processes and markets  (  cf.  Sengenber-
ger/Loveman/Piore, 1990). 
The need to collaborate is cutting across long-standing traditions of the SME economy. Due 
to these traditions,  SMEs are usually quite hard to convince to collaborate with competitors. 
Collaboration, and networking thus,  will not emerge on its own.  Processing approaches to 
initiate networks between SMEs have been undertaken in Denmark as  well as by a number 
of  EC-programs.  The  success  of  these  programs  justifies  further  public  and  private 
endeavours. 
Employment, work and welfare: The great challenge 
Work  and employment are  the  most serious  future  challenges  to  industry  and society in 
Europe. It seems as if we were approaching the end of an epoque, in which wealth was drawn 
from human  work.  Payed labour is becoming a scarce good rather than a basic factor of 
production.  A relatively  small but highly skilled and motivated workforce produces rising 
wealth. Those less skilled and less performing disappear in unemployment statistics, informal 
work, odd jobs or join the clientele of welfare offices. 
Industry in  Europe is  under high  pressure  to  strongly increase its productivity in  order to 
secure its competitveness. European societies however, may pay a high price for successfull 
improvement of productivity: structural unemployment. 
Generally  speaking,  structural  unemployment  is  caused  by  a  mismatch  of quantities  and 
qualities of labour supplied and labour demanded. E.g. the introduction of new manufacturing 
processes combined with the spreading of new materials will affect employment as well as 30 
the  relevance of skills  particularly those  traditionally  associated  with  metal  bending and 
shaping (Hayward 1992). These processes are mainly due to a time lag between actual change 
and adjustment. 
In  the  seventies  Europe  had  experienced  growth  in  output  going  along  with  growth  in 
employment. In  the late eighties and nineties,  it has  seen growth produced by automation 
going along with high unemployment rates, high demand for skilled labour, regional isles of 
growth  and a  periphery loosing industrial  and  human  substance (Hayward  1992;  OECD, 
1992). 
Structural unemployment is not only a danger to industry. Similar developments are to  be 
expected in the services as well where e.g. modem communication technology and flexible 
organization are likely to create a strong increase of productivity. 
Box 1.5:  Productivity Competitiveness and employment: The critical issue 
The industrialized societies in Europe are9  in a condition where significant productivity increases · 
are necessary to stabilize competitiveness. But competitiveness alone can not be translated into 
gains in employn1ent This is why new products and new markets are necessary. 
Necessary  strategies  to  increase  productivity  reduce  employment  otherwise,  if no  new 
economic opportunities are opened up  in the long run productivity-induced unemployment 
will endanger the economic and social conditions which are vital to industry in Europe. 
There are  two  basic  strategies  for  firms  to  enhnace productivity and competitiveness:  by 
automation  and  by  intelligent  production  systems  intergration  technology  and  human 
resources. Although the latter shows a number of advantages concerning flexibility inovation, 
these systems, too, are out for reducing input to get the same output Under ceteris· paribus 
conditions thus, intelligent production systems will also add to structural unemployment. 31 
Tab. 1.2:  Umemployment rates and vacanies in France and Germany 
Germany  retail  industrial  unemploy- vacancy rate  composite 
sales  production  ment rate  indicator  leading indi-
volume  cator 
1985  100  100  7,1  100  104,3 
1986  103,3  102,2  6,4  136,4  103,1 
1987  107,4  102.5  6,2  149,4  105,3 
1988  110,6  106,2  6,2  164,7  111,4 
1989  114,2  111,4  5,6  218,9  114,3 
1990  123,5  117,2  4,9  261,5  115 
1991  131  120,8  4,3  270,9  112,1 
France  retail  industrial  unemploy- vacancy rate  composite 
sales  production  ment rate  indicator  leading indi-
volume  cator 
1985  100  100  10,2  100  101,8 
1986  102,4  101,1  10,4  107,2  108,8 
1987  104,5  103,1  10,5  117,3  108,2 
1988  107,9  107,3  10  134,9  113,1 
1989  109,6  111,3  9,4  161,1  112,8 
1990  110,1  112,7  8,9  166  107,1 
1991  109,7  113,3  9,4  130  107,9 
Ironically enough, structural unemployment is often exacerbated by welfare systems. Wetfare 
arrangements in  most of Europe support flexible  adjustment of the  work force  to  change 
limiting individual negative social and economic consequences. This mechanism provides 32 
significant incentives to solve economic problems at the expense of employment rather than 
encouraging alternative economic solutions. 
While European social security systems are based on the externalisation of adjustment pro-
blems at the expense of welfare budgets, the Japanese system of life-time intemalises em-
ployment problems resulting from structural change. Large Japanese firms can not simply re-
duce  th~ir workforce to adjust to declining business.  Rath~r, they are forced into processes 
of diversification thus creating new jobs for their workforce.  Besides this is certainly one 
arguement to explain high capabilities to develop new business in Japanese industry. 
Given this situation, current welfare arrangements have to be reexamined with respect to their 
short  and long  term  impacts  on  work  and employment  More specifically,  the  strategic 
problem is to develop alternative designs for the transition from work to welfare, and  to 
develop the European welfare regime towards a stronger support for employment, flexibility 
and productivity while maintaining a high level of social security. 
Important challenges to industry and industrial policy also result from the aging of the labour 
force. The expectation of experts is that after the year 2000 there will be more older than 
younger workers. 
For firms  these demographic  trends  have important consequences for pay structures, skill 
levels, recruitment policies, innovation and organisational structures: 
* Pay structures and social benefits in  most countries follow some kind of seniority rules, 
raising the cost for "old" labour, 
* skill levels and a propensity for innovation is dependent on continuous training which older 
workers rather tend to look upon as a challenge to  their competence, 
* higher average age of workforce is associated with higher sickness rates. 
On the other hand,  the experience of older workers gain in importance as rapid innovation re-
quires experimental application and continuous improvement of new technologies. This may 33 
partly compensate for  negative  impacts  of an  aging labour force.  This requires  adequate 
training and further education programs, suitable working conditions and also design. 
Box 1.6:  A strategic problem: Work and welfare 
Welfare systems strongly influence the  way in which firms  respond to decline. Social security 
systems  in  Europe  often  support  the  reduction  of the  workforce  as  a means  of adjustment. 
Against that, the Japanese system of life-long employment forces fim1s to respond to decline by 
means of diversification and development of new business. 
Another  alternative  to  cope  with  demographic  problems  is  regulated  and  selective 
immigration.  Scena~os covering the years up  to 2010 have shown for West-Germany that, 
though in the short run immigration would lead to higher unemployment, in the long run it 
would lead up to higher growth providing even for the employment of immigrants. 
The  structure  of  the  European  workforce  .  also  changes  with  respect  to  educational 
qualification. 
Again, water must be poured into the wine: an enhancement of general qualification will work 
out structurally only,  if new  production  systems  are  installed requiring higher degrees of 
qualification, and if new products and new markets are developed absorbing the increased 
productive potential. Otherwise qualification strategies, the more effecient they are, would 
augment rationalization effects. 
Increasing qualification level of the  European workforce may enhance competitiveness of 
industry, but is at the same time associated with a whole range of problems, such as 
* higher labour costs, 
* declining availability of skilled blue-collar work, 
* lower job chances of the less qualified, 
* higher claims to the quality of work places, and 
* decreasing social cohesion on the shop floor. 34 
At  the  same  time,  industry  is  increasingly  forced  to  continuous  efforts  in  training  and 
modernization  of  work  to  maintain  and  stabilize  global  competitiveness.  Yet  the  in-
stitutionaland organizational framework for  continous training is much less developed than 
for general and vocational education. 
Science and technology·:  A new innovation regime 
Viability of industry and development of a sustainable industrial society in Europe is closely 
associated with a shift towards technology-intensive and knowledge-based production. This 
does not simply mean high-technology. Rather, it means a broad trend towards a more in-
tensive application of knowledge and technology both in products and processes. (cf. Kodama, 
1991;  OECD,  1991b, 1992; Tidd, 1991). This calls for not only partial improvments, but a 
striagent organization of innovation processes. What is needed , is a new innovation regime. 
The  shift  towards  technology-intensive  and  knowledge-based  production  leads  to  a  new 
pattern of innovation. This pattern combines technological break-through in basic research,· 
technology ·fusion  to  create  new  products  and  continuous  improvement  of products  and 
processes (Lehner et al., 1993i. 
Innovation processes dominated by an orientation at technological breakthrough are ratther . 
inefficient,as they do  not lead up  to  a continuous development of products~ processes and 
markets. Against that a more market oriented .... of innovation involves a shift from a science 
based to a learning based mode of innovation. 
Europe has considerable capabilities and potentials for a technology-intensive and knowledge 
based production, and its technological competence is still high.  Industry in Europe still is 
first in the world in technology-exports, but growth-rates on the market for R&D-intensive 
s  Technology fusion  is  development of new  products based on an integration of different technologies. Il-
lustrative examples of technology  fusion  are integration of mechanics or optics with  electronics in me-
chatronics and optoelectronics (Kodama.  1991). 35 
products are slowing down(BMFf, 1993). Moreover, industry in Europe has not been capable 
of developing comparative advantages in technology-intensive industries. 
Fig. 1.18:  World Trade Share of R&D-intensive Products 
EC 
Others 
Japan 
Source:  NIW,  1993. 
USA 
European competence in basic research is high. Most European countries put more emphasis 
on basic research than Japan or even the United States. However, there is a widening gap 
between basic research and its application and conversion into new products an.d production 
strategies. Moreover, the position of European industry in global innovation is often endan-
gered by long innovation times and high innovation costs. (Albach, 1990). 
It is well known that Europe has a rather weak position in some key techologies. This is 
strateggically critical, as "technological interdependencies, a technological food-chain'\ link 
the  development of different  industries  to  certain  key-technologies.  (cf.  Carlsson,  1989; 
Fransman, 1990; Kodama, 1991; OECD, 1992; United Nations, 1990). 36 
Tab. 1.3  Innovation Times and Innovation Costs 
Innovation times  Innovation costs 
(Japan serves as an index = 1  00) 
Branch  D  USA 
Automobiles  112  111 
Office  94  92 
machinery 
Chemicals  126  119 
Electronics  121  107 
Machinery  113  124 
Metal-working  113  120 
Other  100  96 
All firms  114  113 
D=Germany, USA=Umted States of Amenca. All figures are average values. 
Source:  Albach et al.,  1990. 
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The technological food-chain is the simple result of the fact, that development and application 
of modem technology requires close collaboration between producers and users. 
Uneven distribution of wealth in  the European Communities has its consequences not only 
for  the  infrastructure  in  science  and  technology  but  also  for  the  innovative  potential  of 
enterprises. In the South of Europe firms partly are struggling to catch up with a minimum 
of technological knowledge while the North can afford to head for scientific and technological 
excellence. Interactive links from North to South still are very poorly developed. 
Yet scientific excellence is only one side to the coin; the other side is made up by the social 
organization of the innovation process (Lehner et al.  1993). Fig. 1.19:  The technological food  chain for information technology 
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Japanese success in the innovation race is  the product ·of a different innovation regime. Ja-
panese innovation processes are very closely related to the market and its main thrust are new 
products and new markets. 38 
For these purposes, research and technological development in Japan is organized in collective 
projects and networks including a variety of different producers and users of new technology. 
This opens up  not only synergies in  technology development but also facilitates facilitates 
development of new applications of technology and diversification of traditional industries 
into new fields (Kodama, 1991). 
Fig. 1.20:  Technological development network for new ceramics 
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The difference between Japan and Europe is well illustrated by the case of key-technologies. 
European  programmes  on  key  technologies  strongly  rely  on  subsidies  for  research  and 
application. This strategy, however, fails to produce strong market ties of the newly developed 
technologies. 39 
More promising strategies should aim at a more favourable environment for development and 
application of key-technologies. Important elements of such strategies are: 
* promotion  of strategic  alliances,  joint ventures  and research  collaboration  to  improve 
international technology transfer and to enhance an open international technology system, 
* stimulation  of  cooperative  networks  of  producers  and  appliers  to  facilitate  risk-
management, to  exploit synergies and to  establish strong markets ties  of technological 
development, 
* development and implementation of a broad socio-technological approach to create markets 
for new technologies, 
* installation of an efficient regulatory regime to promote technological solutions to societal 
problems,  and last not least 
*  political and technological activities to increase social acceptance of new technology. 
Box 1. 7:  Strategic problems of science and technology in Europe 
Development  of a  powerful  innovation  regime  in  Europe  is  facing  a  number  of strategic 
problems resulting from change in sci~nce. and technology: 
*  The role  of university and  other public  research and  its  relation to  industrial research and 
development should be reexamined as the traditional division of labour between universities 
and other public and private research becomes absolete; 
*  as industrial research is moving more towards basic research, there is the danger that scientific 
knowledge is privatized and the public stock of knowledge is declining; 
*  public financing of industrial research can no longer be defined in tenns of competitive and 
precompetitve research, but has to be redefined in tenns of strategic research, that is of rese-
arch exceeding the time horizon of industry; 
*  traditional sectoral boundaries of research and technical development as well as established 
patterns of specialization  in  industry  are  becoming  obsolete  and  have  to  be replaced  by 
collaborative networks encompassing different industries and academic disciplines. 
Unlike Japan or the United States the European Corrimunity has no common tradition of 
innovation,  but rather a  variety of different policies and regulatory regimes.  Science and 
technology policies in European Countries are domin.ated by a· concern to optimize national 
innovation processes in order to keep national economies on a high level. 40 
The development of a powerful innovation regime requires, therefore, the development of an 
adequate research infrastructure in the less developed regions of European Communities and 
also  the  development of European  science and  technology  institutions,  such  as  European 
centers of excellence or a "European Commission on Productivity". 
This should not result in a centralization of science and technology structures and policies. 
Rather,. the idea is to  establish a European innovation system with Eu.ropean,  national and 
regional pillars. 
New production systems: Changing from within 
Discussion about lean production, makes evident that most of the defiencies of performance 
in European  industry are strongly related to organization of production factors.  More and 
more firms in Europe attempt to introduce the major principles of Japanese lean production. 
Lean  production  is  well  suited  to  solve  a  certain  range  of  problems  of  advanced 
manufacturing, but neglects others. The strength of lean production is strong simplification 
and decentralization of production. This includes strict segmentation of production in units 
with high autonomy and a minimization of interfaces between different organizational units 
within and outside the frrm (cf. Brodner, 1990; FAST, 1984; Lehner, 1992; ·Warner, Wobbe 
&  Brodner, 1990; Wildemann,  1988). 
Yet, segmentation only works if markets are well demarcated and production processes are 
well  defined.  If this  is  not  given,  and  activities  within  and  across  frrms  are  interlocked, 
segmentation creates inefficiencies. 
Advanced  manufacturing,  that  is  high  value-added  and  technologically  sophisticated 
production, is associated with situations where activities in and across frrms are interlocked. 
Lean production, therefore, has to be complemented the establishment of interfaces betweeen 
organizational segments and by a flexible management of these interfaces. 41 
Box 1.8:  Anthropocentric Production Systems: An A  venue for European Industry 
The concept of anthropocentric production system 
*  is based on advanced scientific knowledge on organization~ management and technology in industrial 
production, 
*  is grounded on important European experience, tradition and conditions~ and 
*  adapts interesting principles and ideas of advanced manufacturing in Japan. 
It aims at a highly  flexible~ innovative and efficient organization of work and of the broader process of 
industrial production in a bro-ader sense including R&D, marketing and seiVices. 
The concept 
Anthropocentric production systems are computer-aided production systems which are strongly based on 
skilled work and human decision-making. 
1  flexible automation supporting human work and decision-making; 
2  a decentralized organization of work with flat hierachies and a far reaching delegation of power and 
reponsibilities~ especially to the shop-floor level;  _ 
3  a minimized division of labour based on some form of integrated work system design; 
4  a continuous, product-oriented upskilling of workers at work; 
5  a  product-oriented  integration  of the  whole  production  process  including  R&D~ manufacturing, 
marketing and servicing. 
Flexible automation 
Quite frequently, human-centred approaches to manufacturing and production are regarded, by advocates 
as well as by opponents, as being opposed to the use of advanced manufacturing and data processing 
technology.  Against  that,  it should  be stressed that anthropocentric  production  systems  support  the 
application of leading-edge technology in both products and processes. By this, they also make efficient 
use of human skills in manufacturing. 
Anthropocentric  production  systems,  however,  deviate  from  other  concepts  of computer-integrated 
manufacturing with respect to type of technology and the design of computer-aided production systems.· 
For many years, the development and application of computer-aided production technology aimed at full 
automation. Full automation means a centralised, integrated and complete planning, programming and 
control of the production process by automated devices. The underlying vision was that of an unmanned 
factory which was to secure a high precision and efficiency of production as well as low costs. Although 
this aim has rarely been reached, it played an important role both in reaseach and business strategies. 
Meanwhile, it is increasingly recognized that full automation not only involves high costs, but often is the 
wrong way to a competitive industrial production. Major problems are: 
1  Full automation can only be implemented at the expense of flexibility; 
2  full automation hinders rather than advances the application of leading edge technology; and 
3  full automation may result in  high productivity and quality only in certain cases but often restricts 
productivity and quality. 
1  if it works  at all,  mere  imitation  of Japanese lean  production  will  not make  European 
industry a front runner. 42 
Really  advanced  manufacturing  and  modern  quality  production  require  beyond.  lean 
production. 
The task consequently is to develop an organization for fast learning, "intelligent", production 
systems. Production systems are "intelligent" if 
* they make full use of skills, experience and 
* knowledge of well trained and motivated personnel on all levels of the organization, and 
* combines this with the socio.technological integration of advanced technology. 
Fig. 1.21:  Anthropocentric production systems in Europe 
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Most of European industry .is still oriented at technocentric concepts of computer integrated 
manufacturing and quite far away fro·m  anthropocentric production systems. In the member 
states  of  the  European  Communities  a  small  number  of  enterprises  has  introduced • 
43 
anthropocentric production systems. In most of the countries, however,_ experiments are made 
with anthropocentric production systems. (Lehner, 1992). 
This situation points at one of the most critical issues for the future of industry in Europe  . 
Although it is widely acknowledged that competitiveness of industry  strongly depends on 
high performance on the process side, most of industry in Europe still sticks to its traditional 
orgqnizational structures concerning the allocation of factors  (~eer  et al., 1990; Lehner, 1992; 
Tidd, 1991; Warner, Wobbe &  Bradner, 1990; World Competitiveness Report, 1992). 
Fig. 1.22:  Interfaces and flexibility in organizations 
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Application of the principle of advanced manufacturers are often approached by "fmns-in-a-
firm" concepts. Organizational units or production segments are treated as a mini-firm which 
has  powers  and  resources  of its  own.  Relations  between  different. mini-frrms  are  either 44 
governed by internal markets or by the same forms of collaboration as are used in networking· 
between fmns
6
• 
Networking between fmns facilitates coordination between fmns it helps to exploit potentials, 
mobilize  synergies  and  to  establish  collaboration  along  technological  food-chains  as  an 
everyday managerial r 
routine. 
The main problem of networking is not the formal setting of collaboration although this often 
involves difficult legal and organizational problems. The main problem is to match different 
structures, cultures and styles and to create an efficient and constructive working milieu for 
the joint project. 
Organising successfull collaboration is anthropocentric management at its best. The "art of 
managment" is 
* to bring the right people together and train them adequately, 
* to free them as much as possible form the constraints of hierarchy and formal organization, 
*·  to set up effective incentives for collaboration, and 
* to organise intensive exchange of ideas and knowledge between the joint project and the 
involved fmns. 
As  empirical  findings  reveal,  the  development  of successfull  collaboration  is  obviously 
difficult for many firms.  Yet where it seems to work is in the so-called "high-tech" industries 
(biotechnology, new materials, information technology), where cooperation  is much more 
frequent than in mature industries like automotive, aerospace, chemicals, and food processing. 
6  An instructive example of a "finns-in-a-finn" concept is the plant of Bosch at Cardiff, W~es. Units 
in charge for the different components of the product are established  as  mini-firms  with strong 
delegation  of powers  and  responsabilites.  Relations .between  the  mini-fiiTils  are  designed  as  . 
producer-client relations. 
• Box 1.9:  The virtual corporation 
The Virtual Corporation -The Company of the Future will be the Ultimate in  Adaptibility 
Characteristics of a new corporate model 
Today's joint ventures and strategic alliances may be an early glimpse of the business organization 
of the future: The Virtual Corporation. It's a temporary network of companies that come together 
quickly to exploit fast-changing opportunities. In a Virtual Corporation, companies can share cost, 
skills, and access to global markets, with each partner contributing what it's best at.  Here are the 
key attributes of such an organization: 
Technology 
Informational networks will help far-flung companies and entrepreneurs link up and work together 
from start to finish. The partnerships will be based on electronic contracts to keep the lawyers away 
and speed the linkups 
Excellence 
Because each partner brings its "core competence" to the effort, it may be possible to create a "best-
of everything" organization. Every function and process could be world-class-something that no 
single company could achieve 
Opportunism 
Partnerships will be less permanent, less formal, and more opportunistic. Companies will band 
together to  meet a specific market opportunity and, more often than not, fall apart once the need 
evaporates 
Trust 
These relationships make companies far more reliant on each other and require far more trust than 
ever before. They'll share a sense of "co-destiny", meaning that the fate of each partner is 
dependent on the other 
No  Borders 
This new corporate model redefines the traditional boundaries of the company. more cooperation 
among competitors, suppliers, and customers makes it harder to determine where one company ends 
and another begins. 
45 
In Japan, industrial strategies· and industrial policy are systematically exploit collaboration as 
a means to advance competitiveness and performance of fmns and whole industries. Against 
that, in Europe both industry and industrial policy are still reluctant to systematically promote 
collaboration. Intensive collaboration in strategic fields hardly fits traditional European con-
cepts of competition and enterprise culture. 46 
Fig. 1.23:  Virtual corporations in a collaborative economy 
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Source:  Belzer/Hilbert  ..  1993. 
Necessary restructuring of  production systems, whether for the sake of  enhancing performance 
or  environmental  sustainability  has  to  cross  traditional  boundaries  of enterprises  and 
industries.  The  formal  side  of organization  looses  relevance  and  the .  informal  side  of 
organization gains in importance. The picture of a .. virtual factory  .. replacing traditional fmns 
and their interactions is emerging. 47 
The virtual factory reduces permanent and formalized organizational structures and replaces 
them by a variety of project-based collaborative links and interdependencies between different 
organizational units of different firms.  Coordination and collaboration is primarily arranged 
by  temporarily assigned and task-miented teams.  Such teams may, for example, consist of 
people from marketing, R&D, manufacturing and services of different finns and may handle 
a certain portofolio of orders or tasks. 
Strategies and policies for a  vital industry 
The conditions and perspectives of industry and the industrial society in Europe, which we 
have discussed here, leave industry and industrial policy with three main tasks: 
1  to reorganize production systems to  regain competitiveness; 
2  to  develop new markets to  overc01ne unemployment; 
3  to find economic solutions to  social and ecological problems. 
The two  main tasks do  not go  alone,  but are associated with a number of other important 
tasks concetning innovation, competitiveness and adaptability and welfare. 
These tasks have to be aproached simultaneously in order not to solve one problem at the ex-
pense of an  other - and none is really solved at all. 
Moreover, there are synergies to be mobilized. Environmental sustainability may be a motor 
for the development of new  technologies, new products, new markets and new production 
systems. 
All this can not be accomplished along the traditional ways and means of public policy. In 
particular,  it can not be  accomplished with  isolated activities  and  programmes  which  are 
strongly influenced by particular interests managed by highly segmented bureaucracies. 48 
Under conditions of rapid  and multifarious -change,  and high uncertainty, public policy is 
seriously mislead if it attempts to prescribe specific solutions to isolated problems. It is also 
mislead, if it confines itself to the creation of a favourable environment leaving the rest to the 
market. 
The political task is to formulate goals, to seek broad consensus and to  establish open and 
flexible networks to advance the necessary processes. 
Policy recommendation 
Reorganizing the Communities RTD policy 
Community  programmes  for  research  and  technical  developn1ent  should  be  shifted  from 
programmes that are orientated at clearly defined solutions and narrowly defined activities to the 
establishment of networks for problem oreintated and broad application of new technologies. 
European programmes for research and technical development should, for example, not aim 
at developing a certain chip, but rather establish a network of R&D institutions, producers and 
(potential) users from different sectors to develop and apply new technologies. 
Policy recommendation 
Networks for socio-tecluwlogical de versification 
In order to  develop  new  markets  and  new  economic  opportunities,  the  Commission of the 
European Communities should establish networks for socio-technological diversification. 
One  type  of network  should  be orientated  at the  development and  wide  application of key 
technologies and should be organized along technological chains and potentials for technology 
fusion.  Particularly  important  technologies  are  bio-technology,  new  n1aterials,  microstructure 
technology and communication technology. 
Another type of network should focus  on economic solutions of environmental problems such 
as material flows,  recycling, emmissions and  waste. 49 
The  important difference  is,  that  the  first  form  of policy  leads  at best  to  a  solution of 
yesterday's problems.  Against that the second form may reveal a  variety of solutions and 
applications which can give raise to  new products and markets (Kodama, 1991). 
Environmental regulation, to give another example,  should not translate current technological 
standards  into  a  rule  but  rather  define  dynamic  standards  on  the  basis  of technology 
projections. 
Broad mobilization of knowledge, experience and support by means of process-orientated 
networks  is  particularly  important  when  it comes  to  development  and  reorganization  of 
production systems. This involves strong effotts to integrate basic research and applied R&D 
across different fields, ranging from technology to  management and cultural sciences. 
Policy recommendation 
An initiative for new production systems 
Commission of the  European  Communities  should  establish  a programm  for  comprehensive 
development  of new  production  systems  which  combine  high  productivity,  precision  and 
innovation with high environmental quality. 
The programm should be jointly designed and managed by employers, unions, public actors and 
r&D-institutions, and each single project should also inClude the same range of participation. 
The  programm  should  advance  projects  which  integrate  scientific  research  and  practical 
application. 
One possibility to promote advanced fonns of production and management is to observe and 
spread  examples  of  best  practice.  Another  strategy  is  the  establishment  of centers  of 
excellence. 
A  promising example  may  be  the development of the  virtual  factory.  Early activities  to 
analyze, design and experimentally apply possible structures for a virtual factory may provide 
Europe with a comparative advantage which carries far into the next century. 50 
Policy recommendation 
Centers of  excellence 
The  Commission  of the  European  Communities  should  establish  centers  of excellence  for 
research  which  necessitates  broad  interdisciplinary  approaches  and  integration  of scientific 
knowledge and practical experience. 
Centers of excellence should  be established  for  a limited  period (probably  10 years)  and  be 
organized as joint ventures of public research institutions and private fim1s. Private fim1s should 
be involved by- delegating staff and by actively participating in pilot projects. 
In order to enhance exploitation of synergy and broad diffusion of  results~ centers of excellence 
should  develop  strong  ties  and  exchange  with  relevant  reseach  institutions  and  encourage 
mobility of researchers between the centers, fim1s  and research institutions. 
Collaborative strategies are patticularly impottant for the viability of the small and medium 
sized enterprises.  SMEs should be further stimulated to  form production networks among 
themselves and with large enterprises to  increase their capabilities and capacities in R&D, 
marketing, sales and services and to  cope with the challenges of globalization.  Interesting 
examples  for  such  strategies  are  the  Danish  networking  programme  and  the  French 
programme for collaboration of small and large enterprises. 
Policy recommendation 
Initiating collaborative efforts 
The Commission of the European Communities should increase its support of collaboration of 
SMEs and of SMEs with large enterprises. For that purpose~ RTD programmes as well as other 
progran1mes  offering  financial  assistance  to  finns  should  contain  regulations  requiring  the 
collaboration of SMEs. 
What once had been devised to bring about an industrialized society now turns out to hamper 
necessary modernization processes. 
Welfare systems in Europe are in a considerable disarray. They often impose unnecessary 
costs on firms and labour and enhance structural adjustment at the expense of labour. At the 51 
same time, they motivate and enable strategies of social dumping. A European social charta 
is  necessary in order to  avoid both overloading of labour and social dumping.  Moreover, 
financing of welfare systems must be changed. 
Policy recommendation 
Reshaping the welfare state 
The European social charta has to be decided very urgently in order to secure an adequate social 
framework  for  industrial  development.  Working  conditions  should  not  be  applicable  as  a 
competitive argument. Part 2: 
Markets and Technology: 
An Active Approach to Economic Opportunities 54 
The key to the future of industry and the whole economy in Europe is technology-intensive 
and knowledge-based production. It is the key to competitiveness of industry. It is the key to 
the  solution  of environmental problems.  And above all,  it is  the key  to  employment and 
wealth. 
In  the  industrialized  countries~  competition  1s  increasingly  dominated  by  a  pervasive 
orientation at high quality. This is associated with conditions concerning competitiveness that 
can only be met by technology-intensive and knowledge-based production. 
Severe and often increasing environmental problems work in the same direction. Given value 
systems of the advanced societies, effective improvement of environmental conditions needs 
development  of  economic  solutions  to  environmental  problems.  New  technology  and 
improved know-how have to be developed for this purpose. 
Beyond this,  the  advanced  industrial  societies  are increasingly  facing  a  situtation  where 
employment,  profitability  and  wealth  can  no  longer  be  secured  in  traditional  markets. 
Development of markets in new directions and creation of new markets are the main chal-
lenge  to  industry  in  the  advanced  industrial  socities.  A  fast  process  of technology-led 
diversification oti.entated at economic solutions to social and environmental problems has to 
be initiated. 
Background: The quality economy 
In the industrialized countti.es, the shift towards technology-intensive and knowledge-based 
production is  becoming a dominant feature  of industrial change and structural adjustment. 
With some lag~ newly industti.alizing countries, particularly in Asia, are following up in this 
development and build up technologically sophisticated industry. (Lehner et al., 1993). 
The shift towards technology-intensive and knowledge-based production is expressed in a 
high  and further  increasing  technological  content of many  products  or in  an  increasing 
technological sophistication of the production process. In many industries, high technology 55 
and  knowledge  content  of production  develops  simoultaneously  on  the  product  and  the 
process side.  (Kash, 1989; OECD, 1992; de Woot, 1990). 
Tab. 2.1:  Industry in transition 
Yesterday 
Product strategy: 
Long series, undifferentiated pro-
ducts 
Product, price 
Quality control 
Manufacturing strategy: 
Volume, scale 
Throughput 
CIM, robotics 
Organisational strategy: 
Complexity 
Hierarchy 
Market entry and direct 
investment strategy: 
Local, national markets 
Sub-contracting 
Low labour-cost suppliers 
Tomorrow 
Short series, specific products 
Solutions, services 
Performance audits 
Speed, response time 
Flexibility 
Logistics, flow dynamics,  de-
sign 
Organisation 
Autonomy, responsability 
World markets 
Partnership 
Direct investments in key mar-
kcts 
Source: OECD, Industrial Policy in OECD Countries,Paris, 1991 
Aims/ potential results 
Personalised products 
Price premium for qualitiy, 
reliability  ,performance 
Equal priority given to de-
sign,  production, delivery 
Rapid new product introduc-
tion 
Multi-use equipment 
Design to reduce handling, 
movement, transport 
Avoid diturbance, dis-
function,  breakdowns 
Better solution because close 
to  problems 
Target and differentiate 
products, services, markets 
Spread risks, share gains 
Directly enter new markets 
This development is often explained in terms of a changing international division of labour. 
More precisely, it is assumed that industry in the highly industrialized countries is declining 56 
and  confined to  technology-intensive  and knowledge-based production.  This argument is, 
however, severely misleading. 
The  motive  force  behind  the  shift  towards  technology-intensive  and  knowledge-based 
production is a pervasive orientation of industry at high quality. This orientation is embracing 
industrial production more  and  more.  (Lehner,  1992;  Ozawa,  1988;  Peters  &  Waterman, 
1982; Reich, 1991; Thurow, 1992). 
Only  a few  years ago,  a high quality of goods  was a particular market approach offering 
many enterprises a good stand in competition against large mass producers. In some markets, 
such as  mechanical engineering, European companies in particular have often applied this 
strategy  successfully  against  the  powerful  American  mass  production.  Meanwhile,  high 
product quality is ceasing to be a special strategy of competition and is becoming simply a 
precondition. of competitiveness in many markets
1
• 
Quality production is no longer· an alternative to mass production, but rather an encompassing 
feature  of most  of industrial  production.  It synthesizes  in  a  variety  of different pattern 
features of both traditional mass production and customized small-batch production. Quality 
production may operate in different forms ranging from an extremely customized small-batch 
production to a flexible, diversified mass production
2
• 
Quality production in  the  industrialized countries is rooted in the social base of the indu-
strialized countries, pru.ticularly in Western Europe. In many of the industrialized societies, 
particularly in Europe, a long period of relatively high prosperity and other conditions have 
created  differentiated  value  structures.  This  has  translated  into  diversified  demand,  high 
consumption patterns and capaciuos markets for a wide variety of goods of high quality. As 
this  development  continues  and  includes  more  and  more  countries,  social  and  cultural 
1  We are indebted to Peter Wickens, Director for Personel and Information, Nissan UK, who explained to 
us the changing role of quality. 
2  This argument rejects a widely shared assumption that mass production is replaced by quality production 
and flexible specialization as it is forwarded in the well-~own book of Piore & Sabel (1984). 57 
diversity  may  provide  new  impulses  for  growth  1n  the  global  economy  (Kotkin,  1993; 
Featherstone, 1991; Szallies &  Wiswede, 1991). 
Box 2.1:  Quality production 
Modem quality production is characterized by the following elements: 
*  a high quality of goods in response to customers' demand, 
*  a low degree of standardization and high degree of customization of products, 
*  a fast adjustment of products to diversified and changing demand, 
·*  a fast adjustment of products to the highest state of science and technology that is 
economically available at any given time, and 
*  a strong services component 
In this context we should be aware that the economic impact of cultural and social diversity 
depends strongly on income and wealth in society. Cultural and social diversity translate the 
more into diversified demand the higher mass income and purchasing power rise. This points 
at a strategic problem which we have to keep in mind when we discuss labour-related issues 
of competitiveness. The problem is that we have little leeway to  solve problems of high 
labour costs  by reducing  wages  or social  standards  because  this  could endanger further 
development of a capacious quality economy. 
Box 2.2:  A strategic problem: Wages, welfare and markets 
In some of the member countries of the European Commission, particularly in Germany, 
wages constitute currently one of the most seriuos problems of competitiveness of industry. 
Discussing this problem, we"should, however, be aware that high wages are also the source 
of a high purchasing power and of capacious markets in Europe. 
This is particularly important with respect to  an issue which is vital for the future of industry 
in Europe. The issue is development of diversiefied, but capacious marktes. Such markets can 
only develop in a condition of relatively high mass welfare. 58 
A challenge to industrial performance 
Modem quality production constitutes a severe challenge to industrial performance. It is not 
only  representing  a  wider  application  of traditional  concepts  of quality  production.  Far 
beyond that, it is  strongly developing towards a synthesis of traditional concepts of quality 
production  and  of mass  production.  This  results  in  a  complex  production  pattern  which 
requires far reaching changes in industry. (cf. Beer et ~1.,-1990; Kanter, 1989; OECD, 1991a; 
Shetty & Buehler, 1987; Warner, Wobbe & Brodner, 1990). 
Fig. 2.1:  Changes in final domestic demand in OECD 
Source: 
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The pattern combines characteristic features of traditional quality production,  in  particular 
strong  customization,  high  product  quality  and  economies  of scope,  with  characteristic 
features  of mass production,  in  particular strong price competition,  high  productivity and 
economies of scale.  Moreover, as  it is  knowledge-based and technology-intensive, modern 59 
quality production is usually associated with fast innovation. Finally, it also includes a strong 
services component. (Lehner et al.,  1993). 
This condition production contains considerable inconsistencies and trade-offs. The different 
features of modem quality production do not fit well together. It is, for example, difficult to 
assure high quality if innovation is fast, or to reach high productivity in a highly customized 
production. Competition is shaped by ambiguity. Strategic choices are often complicated. Ma-
nagement has  to  cope with  high  uncertainty  and ambiguity.  (cf.  Carlsson,  1989;. OECD, 
1991c; Pondy, Boland &  Thomas, 1988). 
Fig. 2.2:  Price/Quality-ratio 
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An  important  aspect  of uncertainty  and  ambuigity  are  market  developments.  The·  social 
conditions of the advanced societies provide on one side favourable conditions for a quality 60 
economy. At the same time, they produce volatile markets structures with often fast changing 
demand and strong imbalances between different national or sectoral economies. 
Fig. 2.3:  Customer orientation 
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The complex pattern of modem quality production confronts frrms and whole industries with 
difficult  requirements.  Industry  in  a  number  of the  member  countries  of the  European 
Communities  has  considerable  difficulties  to  meet  these  requirements.  According  to  the 
World Competitiveness Report, in quite a number of countries and industries: 
*  price/quality-ratio of domestic products is on the average inferiour to foreign· competitors, 
* customer orientation is rather weak. And in some countries, 
* production technologies are outdated in comparison to foreign competitors. Fig. 2.4:  Production technologies 
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These findings indicate that industry in Europe often has considerable difficulties to  adjust 
to the new conditions of competition in the developed quality economies. Industry in Europe 
is  shifting its  strongholds to  quality production,  but it is  still in search of that excellence 
which is needed to secure ·competitiveness in modern quality production. 
Competitiveness: What are the issues? 
Industry in  Europe is currently facing severe problems concerning its competitiveness. This 
is  feeding  hot debates on  c01npetitiveness.  however, these debates are often one-sided and 
short-sighted. This is likely to  enhance strategic choices which 62 
* improve a  pruticular aspect of competitiveness,  but create new  or increased problems 
concerning other aspects 
* solve problems in shott-tenn, but endanger vitality and viability of industry in the long 
term, and 
* enhance competitiveness of industry in some parts of Europe, but hinder development in 
other. 
Box 2.2:  Competitiveness 
Competitiveness refers to  the pem1anent capabilities of firms and enterprises to stand 
competition. Accordingly, problems of competitiveness exist if firms and whole industries are 
systematically less capable of standing global competition than their competitors· are. 
Competitiveness  is  an  extremely  difficult  problem.  It  depends  on  a  variety of different 
factors.  These factors are linked together in a  complex pattern.  Relations among different 
factors  often  contain  interdependencies  and  inconsistencies.  Moreover,  there  are  great· 
variations across the European Communities in patterns of competitiveness
3
• 
If we look at relative comparative advantage as a main indicator of competitiveness, we find 
.that only few countries have secured comparative advantages throughout the 1980's. Some 
countries have improved their position but still score negatively. A considerable number of 
countries  in  the  European  Communities  has  further  declined.  There  are,  however, 
considerable differences across industries. 
On the other hand, we should note that enterprises in Europe have developed quite well in 
terms of profitability. Operational profits in European business are on the average slightly 
higher than in the United States and Japan. 
3  The lay amount of large literature on competitiveness points at a variety of different key problems 
including particularly issues of technology, industrial organization, management capabilities and labour. -
Cf. Badarocco, 1991; Kash,  1989; OECD,  199la. Peters & Waterman. 1982; Tidd, 1991; de Woot, 1990; 
World Competitiveness Report. 1992.  · 63 
Tab. 2.2: Revealed comparative Advantage (RCA) in manufacturing exports
4 
High tech.  Medium tech.  Low tech. 
Belgium/Lux.  1980  49  102  123 
1990  40  116  124 
Denmark  1980  77  58  161 
1990  78  59  171 
France  1980  84  99  109 
1990  90  98  112 
Germany  1980  95  117  80 
1990  83  121  83 
Greece  1980  18  39  210 
1990  18  33  252 
Ireland  1980  117  58  143 
1990  181  54- 107 
Italy  1980  66  91  128 
1990  63  90  140 
Netherlands  1980  80  73  143 
1990  80  79  142 
Portugal  1980  58  37  194 
1990  47  42  220 
Spain  1980  47  86  142 
1990  53  102  132 
United Kingdom  1980  127  109  80 
1990  123  97  91 
USA  1980  160  106  70 
1990  161  89  74 
Japan  1980  130  106  75 
1990  149  113  44 
Source: OECD, 1992, Industrial Policy in OECD Countries, Paris 
4  RCA for a particular industry is defined in  this case as "the ratio of the share of the country's  exports in 
that industry in its total manufacturing exports to the share of total exports by that industry in OECD 
manufacturing exports. With exports denoted by X, for a country k, the RCA of an industry i is given by" 
(OECD 1992:159):  RC~·100•([XJ(E,X'd[f..XJ[...XJ) 64 
Fig. 2.5:  Operational profits in Europe, the United States and Japan 
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This does not convey any new message, but reflects a condition which prevails in Europe 
since  many  years.  Much  of industry  in  Europe  has  considerable  problems  concerning 
competitiveness;  yet it still  performs  quite  well.  Thus,  there seems to  be  little reason for 
growing concern on competitiveness of industry in Europe. 
However, there are developments which give raise to new concern: 
1  the significance of labour costs as a factor of competitiveness is changing, 
2  productivity  of much  industry  in  Europe  is  declining  in  comparison  to  Japan -and  the 
United States, 
3  competi.tiveness is shifting to the soft side, and 
4  technological competence is becoming a hot issue. 65 
Labour costs and productivity 
In  the developed European economies, labour costs are a long-standing and widely shared 
concern. However, the ground for debate is shiftini. 
In the past, discussion on labour costs has been closely related to industrialization in hitherto 
little  or not industrializeci  countries.  The assumption  was  that  due  t<;>  high  labour costs, 
industry in the highly industrialized societies is loosing its competitiveness. against industry 
in newly industrializing countries. This argument, however,  has  not proofed to be true.  In 
spite of fast industrialization on a global scope, the developed market economies still have 
and are likely to secure an overwhelming share of value-added of manufacturing. 
Fig. 2.6:  Shares of major country groups in value-added of manufacturing 
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s  For a broad empirical analysis of development of labopr ca"sts, see CEC,  1989 .. 66 
Industry in the industlialized countries has lost some ground in labour-intensive productions, 
but has developed new strongholds in technology-intensive and knowledge-based production. 
This  has  secured  vitality  of industry  in  the  advanced  countries  (for  a  more  detailled 
discussion,  see  Lehner  et al.,  1993.  - See  also  OECD,  1988a,  1989a,  1991a;  Shetty  & 
Buehler, 1987; de Woot,  1991)
6
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· · In this context, we should note that  techn~logical content of exports of newly industrializing 
countries to  the  industrialized countries lias  been  growing  since the  1970.'s.  This has not 
increased the significance of labour costs as a factor of competitiveness for the industrialized 
countries.  Rather,  the  more advanced NIC's have to cope with increasing competition on 
labour-intensive productions from less advanced countries while their labour costs as well as 
other costs catch-up to  those of the industrialized countries (cf. OECD, 1988b). 
Fig. 2.7:  Changing composition of NIC's manufacturing exports to OECD 
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Source:  United Nations,  1990. 
6  In  this context, we should note that hopes for a service economy with high employment capacities are li-
kely to be in  vain. The services are facing strong rationalization as it~  hitherto~ has been only the case in 
manufacturing (See OECD,  l99lb).  · 67 
For industry in Western Europe, labour costs may become a much more significant issue in 
the near future. Low labour costs in Eastern Europe create particular difficulties for Western 
Europe since at the same time, economic prospects for Eastern Europe are rather gloomy. 
Both Japan and Notth  America are,  as  is  Western Europe,  surrounded by  countries with 
much lower labour costs. However, economic prospects for Asian and, to a lesser degree, for 
Latin American countries are much better than those for Eastern Europe.  In comparison to 
Japan and the United States Western, Europe is, hence,  facing stronger competition from its 
cheap labour neighbours and has less prospects of profiting from their developmene. 
In  current debates,  labour costs are  increasingly discussed as  a factor  of competitiveness 
among  the  industrialized  countries.  It  is  argued  that  even  in  technology-intensive  and 
knowledge-based production differences of labour costs are becoming an important and often 
decisive factor of competition. 
No  doubt, there is much truth in this argument.  Experience of many firms  and industries 
demonstrate this every day.  Yet, the case needs to  be carefully assessed: 
* to some extend, differences in labour costs simply reflect different economic strength and 
standard of living in industrialized countries; 
* in  countries  with  high  labour  costs,  the  problem  is  often  erronously  conceived  as  a 
problem of wages while the real problem is indirect labour costs; and 
* most important, the real issue is often not labour costs, but comparatively low productivity 
and wrong or delayed adjustment. 
To the extend to  which  dif~erences in labour costs reflect different economic strength and 
standard  of living  in  the  concerned  countries,  they  are  a  necessary  factor  of economic · 
development. In the less wealthy countries, they enhance rapid catch-up and in  the wealthy 
7  Saying this, we do not wish to support calls for protectionism towards Eastern Europe. Rather, we want 
to point at the need to support institutional change and rapid development in Eastern Europe (See 
Jochimscn, 1991). 68  68 
countries they advance innovation. This may be a locational problem for firms, but should 
not be a case for political intervention
8
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Fig. 2.8:  Labour productivity in the whole economy and in manufacturing 
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8  This argument does not justify disparities in social security and social standards which reflect political 
decisions rather than economic conditions. Rather, such disparities are a concern for public policy because 
they create distributive conflict, endanger social cohesion -and hinder effective market operation. 69 
In countries with  high labour costs, cuts  in  wages do not solve the problem,  but weaken 
domestic market strength. An adequat solution must concern with financing of social security 
systems. We will discuss this in  more details in part 4 of this report. 
If  we  analyze  labour  costs  problems  carefully,  we  often  find  that  the  real  issue  is 
comparatively low productivity and wrong or delayed adjustment to structural change. The 
European economies reach, for the most part, a comparatively high labour productivity. This 
is, however, mostly due to  the· services whereas in manufacturing the European position is 
often comparatively low. (Lehner et al., 1993; OECD, ·1991a, 1991b) 
Fig. 2.9:  Development of labour productivity in Germany, the United States and 
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Data from the Japanese productivity center measuring pro~uctivity in purchasing parity power 
point at a rather negative case for  Europe.  It demonstrates that in  the  1970's and  1980's, 
productivity in total manufaturing and in core industries has declined in Germany in relation 70 
to the United States. Japanese industry reaches generally better results. Interestingly enough, 
this aplies particularly to chemical and steel industries where Germany is considered to have 
a strong position. 
Although some of the member states of the European Communities perform in productivity 
somewhat better than Germany, this case demonstrates that much of industry in Europe has 
a  ~trong productivity problem rather than a  r~al labour cost problem  .. 
Much of the productivity problem is the result of faults and delays concerning development 
of· organization  of  industril  production.  The  relevant  issue, . thus,  is  modernization  of 
production rather than labour costs. 
In European industry, there is a growing debate on "lean production", but in most of industry 
in Europe restructuring is still proceeding slowly. Many enterprises try to imitate Japanese 
models. Yet, only few enterprises seem to be sucessful in adapting these models to European 
conditions and to reaching desired results concerning productivity. 
Enterprises have even less been capable of developing a genuine European response to the 
challenge of Japanese lean production. Development of human-centered or anthropocentric 
production systems illustrate this case. Although it is increasingly acknowledged that these 
systems  mark  a  promising  response  not  only  to  Japanese  lean  production,  but  to  the 
challenges of advanced manufacturing, real progress is not overwhelming. (Lehner, 1992). 
This  situation  points  again  at the  difficulties  of European  industry to  adjust  to  the  new 
conditions of competition in the developed quality economies. Particularly, it has difficulties 
to adjust to the fact that in  th~ modern quality economy competitiveness is shifting to the soft 
side. 
9  A sucessful example is Nissan UK. The success of Nissan UK, however, is based on the fact that the 
company did not merely imitate Japanese models, but developed a synthesis of Japanese and European 
approaches to work organization. -We are indebted to Peter Wickens, personel director of Nissan UK 
who has provided us  with many insights in the "art" of adapting Japanese models to Europe. Fig. 2.10:  Development of anthropocentric production systems in European 
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The soft side of competitiveness 
71 
The soft side of competitiveness refers to  factors like management abilities,  worker~ skills 
and enterprise culture as well as  networking of firms,  public-private partnership or social 
organization of technology development. These factors are becoming increasingly important 
in advanced manufacturing and reflect the shift of industry towards technology-intensive and 
knowledge-based  production.  In  the  course  of  this  shift,  "the  human  dimension  of 
competitiveness  has  become  a  key  success  factor  1n  a  modern  economy"  (World 
Competitiveness Report, 1992: 5. - See also Clark &  Fujimoto, 1991; Reich, 1991; Thurow, 
1992; Warner, Wobbe &  Brodner, 1990; World Competitiveness Report,  1992). 72 
A  move  towards  the  softer  side  adds  a  strong  political  element  to  competitiveness. 
Competitiveness becomes more dependent on the quality of interactions of politics, business 
and interest organizations. Setting favourable trends and reversing unfavourable trends often 
needs  strong cooperation of political  and economic actors  in  a long-term orientation  and 
restriction of special interest politics. (Carlsson, 1989; Fransman, 1990; Lehner et al., 1993; 
Wolff, 1986) 
The shift towards the softer side is often neglected in  current debates on competitiveness 
which still focuse on isolated conditions. This is particularly true with respect to discussions 
in Europe and North America concerning Japan. The superior position of Japanese industry 
in global competition is based 
* not only on lower labour costs, but on better organization of production, 
* not only on shorter lead time, but on a better innovation regime, 
* not only on more high technology, but on better social organization of technology. 
In European industry, shift towards the softer side of competitiveness does, for the most part, 
not create vital problems. In many areas, industry in Europe has considerable strength on the 
softer  side  of competitiveness.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of problems  which  need 
attention. (Lehner et aL,  1993; Thurow, 1992). 
In a number of European countries deficits in management capabilities exist. Enterprises are 
often not managed in an innovative, profitable and responsible manner. This is particularly 
the case in France, Norway, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece and Portugal whereas Ger-
many, Switzerland, Denmark Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands rank comparatively high
10
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As  turbulences increase and change becomes faster and far-reaching, this may increasingly 
apply  to  countries  which  still rank comparatively high  on  these matters.  In  Germany, for 
example, it is  increasingly acknowledged that cun-ent economic difficulties are not only a 
10  We are refering here to data from  the World Competitiveness Report which are based on a management 
survey and certainly can only provide a rather crude picture of the situation. Nevertheless, they illustrate 
that there is some reason for concern. 73 
sign of a recession. Rather, a considerable part of industry has failed to develop new products 
and markets and to  implement new production systems. 
Fig. 2.11:  Management 
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In much of Europe, industry profits from the existence of skilled labour force. However, in 
a  number of countries,  severe  problems exist in  this  respect.  Spain,  Portugal,  the  United 
Kingdom, Greece and Italy suffer most from these problems. Even in countries which have 
a  well  developed  vocational  and  professional  training  and  education  system,  such  as 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany, it is often hard to get skilled workers. 
In this context, we should note that disputes on labour costs and related activities as well as 
massive  lay-offs  of workers  may  result  in  an  increasing  deficit of skilled  workers.  In  a 
number of European countries,  more and more young people choose jobs and careers outside 
of manufactuling which are considered to  be more secure and more comfortable. 74 
Fig. 2.12:  Entrepreneurship and innovation 
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Fig. 2.13:  Availability of skilled labour 
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In  order to  secure  availability  and  motivation  of skilled  labour in  the  long  run,  current 
redundancy  practices  should  be renunciated  and  adjustment of work to  structural change 
should primarily operate by retraining. This is,  as Bosch (1992) an  important strategic task 
for both industry and industrial policy in Europe. As we will further discuss in the fourth part 
of this report, this does not only imply deviation from long-standing strategies of structural 
adjustment, but also a fundamental rethinking of the relationsship of work and welfare. 
Alltogether,  there  are  considerable  weaknesses  on  the  softer  side  of competitiveness  of 
industry  in  Europe.  These  weaknesses  together  with  deficits  on  the  harder  side  of 
competitiveness are particularly relevant with respect to a traditional competitive strength of 
industry in Europe, namely technological competence. 
Technological competence: A hot issue 
Technological competence is a traditional strength of much of European industry. There are, 
however, strong warning signs indicating that technological competence of industry in Europe · 
may decline
11
• 
In an overall measure as it is applied in The world Competitiveness Report, some European 
countries, particularly Germany  and  Switzerland,  still maintain  top  positions  significantly 
outmatched only by Japan. Most of the European market economies, including Sweden, the 
Netherlands France, the United Kingdom and Ireland are performing somewhat more modest. 
Only few  countries, notably Greece and Portugal,  have  a significantly lower performance 
which is often below that of NIC's. 
This overall picture, however, hides some issues which are critical for future developments. 
Critical issues are both on  the hard and the softer side of competitiveness. Europe does not 
keep pace in major technological developments and has difficulties to  build up  an adequat 
11  The importance of technological competence for competitiveness is discussed in many studies. - Cf.Kash, 
1989; OECD. 1991a,  199lb. 1992; Shelly &  Buhler. 1987; de Woot,  1990. 76  76 
social organization of technological development and innovation.  (Cf.  Lehner et al., 1993; 
Roussel et al., 1991; van Tulder &  Junne, 1988; de Woot, 1990). 
Fig. 2.14:  Science and technology 
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High  technological competence of European  industry  means that most firms  are  used to 
appling the best available technology in their products and to quickly adjusting their products 
to  the new and better technological solutions. Based on this, the European Community has 
reached  a  share  of 31%  of the  worlds  trade  on  technology-intensive  goods.  Interestingly 
.. 
enough,  this  figure  is  sligthly  lower  than  the  European  Community's  share  in  trade  of 
manufacturing goods. Fig. 2.15:  Shares of EC in world trade of technology intensive products and total 
manufacturing 
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Fig. 2.16:  Patent flows  in the Triade 
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High technological competence does not necessarily mean that European industry is also lea-
ding in technical developments. Even less, it does not mean that European industry has a lea-
ding position in  the most important technologies, particularly in the so-called core techno-
logies. 
Fig. 2.17:  Technological balance of payment of OECD countries 
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Available empirical evidence shows quite well that the position of European industry in the 
development of new technology is not particularly strong. Data on patent flows in the Triade 
point at a dominance of the United States and Japan in global technological development. For 
Europe,  the  situation  has  declined  considerably  from  1981  to  1988.  Moreover,. data  on 
technological  balance of payment show negative results  for  most of the European market 
economies and Japan whereas the United States have a positiv balance. Finally, an analysis 
of  input-output  relations  in  research  and  development  demonstrates  that  some  of  the 
European countries, particularly Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy, have a low R&D-79 
input  and  negative  technological  balance  of trade.  However~ in  these  countries~  R&D 
expenditures are growing faster than in the strong economies (Archibugi et al., 1992). 
Fig. 2.18:  Input-output relations in R&D of OECD countries 
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These data should not be overestimated and are by no means a clear indication that European 
industry is on the way to  becoming technologically backward. Yet,  there are at least three 
problems that may lead to  a  significant decline of technological competence in European 
industry, namely 
* the weak position of much of industry in Europe concerning core-technologies, 
* deficits in  systematically building  ~p on technological linkages, and 
* a technological "fundamentalism" associated with commercialization problems, long lead-
times and an inefficient innovation management. 80 
Fig. 2.19:  Shares of Europe, the United States and Japan in IC trade and global 
software markets 
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It is well known that Europe has a rather weak position in  some core-techologies. This is 
paricularl  y true for  information and communication technologies  which  are dominated by 
Japan and the United States. Both in basic and applied technologies, Europe has little say in 
information and communication. A somewhat better situation exists for software where the 81 
United States dominate~ but where Europe could secure a rather good position.  (BMFf~ 1993; 
OECD~ 1992; van Tulder &  Junne, 1988; de Woot,  1990). 
Fig. 2.20:  Patent activities and scientific publications in biotechnology 
Source:  Ifo,  1990. 
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A similar situation can be observed in  biotechnology. Patent activities are again dominated 
by  the  United  States and  Japan  whereas  in  Europe ·only Germany,  France and the  United 82 
Kingdom are still significant players. The situation is not better when consider publications 
as  an indicator for research activities
12
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Fig. 2.21:  The technological food  chain for information technology 
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Deficits  in  core-technologies  may  hinder  development  in  industries  in  which  these 
technologies are  applied.  Based on  technological interdependencies,  a technological food-
chain  links development  of different  industries  to  core-technologies.  (cf.  Carlsson,  1989; 
Fransman,  1990; Kodama,  1991; OECD,  1992;  United Nations, 1990). 
Technological food-chain is not the result of conspiracy or collusion of the kind that Japanese 
producers  of information  technology  discriminate  against  foreign  users.  Rather,  it is  ~e 
simple result of the fact  that development and  application of modem technology requires 
close collaboration between producers and users. This is easier and more intensive on short 
rather than on long distancies and on face-to-face contacts rather than on telecommunication. 
Given this case, we should expect that deficits in core-technologies are also likely to result 
in  comparative  disadvantages  of European  locations.  They  hinder  the  replacement  ~of 
traditional industry networks oriented at maturing markets by new networks in innovative and 
growing markets. They also reduce the capability of industry in Europe to rapidly adjust to 
changing markets by developing not only new products for established markets but also by 
developing new markets. 
This  situation  reflects  the  high  importance  of the  social  organization  of technological 
development. Development and application of technologies, core-technologies in particular, 
is not primarily a scientific and technological problem, but rather an organizational one. It 
requires a high degree of collaboration and networking among different producers and users. 
(Badarocco, 1991; Kodama,  1991; Lehner, et al., 1993). 
In  Japan,  collaboration  and  networking  is  well  established  in  technologgy  development. 
Development of new cerami<:s, for example, involves a large number of firms from different 
industries. The strength of the Japanese innovation regime is that it organizes such networks 
in collective research. This also facilitates development of new applications of technology 
and diversification of traditional industries into new fields.  (Kodama, 1991). 84 
Fig. 2.22:  Technological development network for new ceramics 
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In  Europe,  networking  and  collaborative  research  is  much  less  developed.  European 
innovation regimes are often technology-centered and neglect economic and social dimensi-
ons of innovation. 
A new pattern of innovation 
The shift towards technology-intensive and knowledge-based production, which goes along 
with development of a quality economy, does not simply mean high-technology.  ~ather, it 
means a broad trend towards a more intensive application of knowledge and technology both 
in  products and processes. (cf.  Kodama,  1991;  Lehner et ai.,  1993;  OECD,  1991b,  1992; 
Tidd, 1991). 85 
High technological sophistication on the product and the process side is likely to induce rapid 
innovation and a changing pattern of innovation. This is particularly the case in a condition 
of diversified and volatile markets.  More and more,  new knowledge and technology is not 
developed  to  maturity,  but  experimentally  applied  already  in  a  relatively  early  stage  of 
developmene
3
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In  the  view  of Fumio  Kodama,  industrial  innovation  at  least  in  Japan  is  undergoing  a 
paradigm change from breakthrough to technology fusion. Technology fusion is development 
of new products based on an integration of different technologies.  Illustrative examples. of 
technology fusion are integration of mechanics or optics with electronics in mechatronics and 
optoelectronics (Kodama, 1991 ). 
Kodamas assumption of a paradigm shift is to simplicistic. Breakthrough and fusion are not 
mutually  exclusive  modes  of innovation.  Economic  incentives,  thus,  SQpport  in'lovation 
patterns combining technology fusion and breakthrough. While technology 'fusion becomes 
· a crucial feature  of innovation,  scientific  innovation  and  technological  breakthrough  still 
remain important. (cf. Lehner et al.,  1993; see also Roussel et al.,1991). 
Moreover, fast innovation and short innovation cycles enhance premature and experimental 
application of technology in new products and processes. Continuous improvement of techno-
logy, products and processes, therefore, play an  increasing role. 
Emerging of a pattern of innovation which combines breakthrough, technology fusion  and 
continuous improvement, changes innovation significantly. Innovation processes dominated 
by  an  orientation  at breaktrough  are  disruptive,  but rather slow  and calculable.  Processes 
combining  breaktrough,  tecQ.nology  fusion  and  continuous  improvement  are  much  more 
gradual and continuous, but more rapid and less calculable. 
The new pattern of innovation involves a shift from a science based to a learning based mode 
of innovation. 
13  This pattern of innovation is well explained in  Nelson  ~  Winter,  1982. 86 
In  a  science  based  innovation  mode,  scientific  inventions  have  been  the  maJor  step. 
Innovation is primarily aiming at technological breakthrough. 
In a learning based mode, innovation is a complex task of whole enterprises and production 
networks. Technological cooperation across production chains or technological linkages is of 
crucial importance. Innovation is aiming at new or improved products in short intervalls. 
Empirical evidence from the executive survey by The World Conzpetitiveness Report (1992) 
indicate that pruts of industry in  Europe have cosiderable difficulties concerning adaptation 
to the new role and pattern of innovation: 
* R&D in key industries is behind foreign competitors, 
* core-technologies, such as information technology, are not exploited strategically, 
* total quality control as a tool for continuous improvement is neglected, and 
* technological cooperation between companies is lacking. 
This  situation  may  carry  strong  negative  effects  when  it comes  to  the  solution  of  a 
fundamental problem of the  advanced industrialized societies, namely the development of 
economic opportunities. 
The threat of exhaustion 
The advanced industrialized societies are experiencing developments which could easily lead 
to exhaustion of economic opportunities, that is of capabilities to secure returns, employment 
and growth in  industry and services. 
In the past, exhaustion of economic opportunities primarily has been associated with mature 
markets, that is markets with stagnating demand and low technological innovation. Now, the 
case is more difficult. 87 
While problems of maturity and low innovation still are important in some areas, exhaustion 
is increasingly arising as a consequence of industrialization in newly industrializing countries 
and rationalization of industry  and services  in  the  industrialized and newly industrializing 
countries. Strong tendencies of exhaustion are also associated with fast innovation and high 
design content of products. 
Currently,  production capacities in  industry  and services  are  rapidly  growing on  a global 
scale. In newly industrializing countries, new and growing business in industry and services 
is  established  at  often  fast  pace.  This  includes  Eastern  Europe  and  the  hitherto  less 
industrialized countries  in  the  European  Communities.  In  the  industrialized countries  and 
newly  industrializing  countries  massive  rationalization  also  creates  growing  production 
capacities in industry and services. (OECD,  1988b, 1991a; United Nations, 1990). · 
Fig. 2.23:  Real growth of industrial production in industrialized and newly 
industrialized countries 
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Growth  of  production  capacities  in  industry  and  services  is  often  not  matched  by 
corresponding  growth  of absorbing  capacities  of markets.  The danger,  thus,  is  that on  a 
global  scope  production  capacities  are  developed  which  exceed  absorbtion  capacities  of 
markets by a wide margin. 
This is particularly the case in newly industrializing countries where low wages are a major 
aspect of competitivness and locational advantage. Accordingly, mass income and domestic 
markets  capacities  grow  much  slower than  production capaicities.  In  Japan,  strategies  to 
distribute  national  wealth  in  favour  of capital  formation  and  at the expense of consumer 
income have the same effect (OECD, 1988b). 
For the European Community, this creates a difficult situation. Its capacious markets are an 
important target for imports from newly industrializing countries and Eastern Europe which 
lack capacious  markets.  However,  in  the  European  Community  too,  demand is  growing 
slower while production capacities are likely to  increase. 
In Europe as well as on a global scope, excessive production capacities in relation to absorb-
tion capacities of markets are like!  y to lead to more severe competition and a related decline 
of prices. Economic opportunities will decrease in value accordingly. 
Exhaustion is by no means a new phenomenon. Capitalist development is always associated 
with  destruction  of  economic  opportunities.  Progress  in  capitalist  economies  is,  as 
Schumpeter pointed out many years ago, a process of constructive destruction. As a result of 
innovation and change, old economic opportunities exhaust and new economic opportunities 
are created. (Schumpeter,  1942). 
Idealistically, the process of constructive destruction creates new economic opportl:lnities as 
it destroys old ones. This ideal is, however, increasingly beyond reach. 
In the last chapter, we have demonstrated that as  the strongholds of industry in Europe, the 
United States, Japan and other countries are shifting to technologically sophisticated quality 
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production, technology is becoming a crucial factor of competition and competitiveness. The 
result is fast innovation and high costs for research and technical development. 
Fast innovation often channels detnand into new markets and results in decline of established 
markets.  An  illustrative  example  is  the  computer  industry  where  fast  improvement  of 
workstations has created squeezing of demand for main frames. This would still fit the model 
of constructive destruction. 
The case, however, is more difficult. In a condition of fast innovation new products are often 
brought to  markets before existing ones have reached profitability. As a result, returns and 
profitability  are  declining.  Microelectronics  and  personal  computers  offer  illustrative 
examples for this situation too.  (cf. Kash, 1989). 
The point,  thus,  is  that  with  increasing  speed of innovation,  the process  of constructive 
destruction is likely to become more destructive and less constructive. Rapid innovation,  th~n, 
is likely to decrease economic opportunities. 
Similar effects are also created by an increasing importance of aesthetical or fashion aspects 
for  product  quality.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in  a  condition  of  increasing  social 
differentiation where taste and aesthetic principles are becoming more fluid  . 
.  ' 
Exhaustion is already more than a realistic threat in a number of industries. In plastics, steel 
and  air  transportation,  for  example,  global  production  capacities  already  exceed  global 
demand. Computers are another prominent example which also demonstrates that exhaustion 
is  not confined  to  traditional  industries  or  to  low-tech  industries,  but  hits  modem  high-
technology industries as well. 
The fear  is  that more  and  more  indusuies are  facing  similar developments.  Accordingly, 
losses  of economic  opportunities  in  some  industries  are  unlikely  to  be  compensated  by 
corresponding gains in other industries. 90 
Fig. 2.24:  Growth of GDP, capital investments and employment in industrialized 
countries 
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In  a  worst  case  scenario~ we  have  to  assume  that  this  condition  will  lead  in  Europe  to 
massive  unemployment.  Competitiveness  and  profitability  of an  increasing  number  of 
companies is  likely to  decline as  prices decline.  In  order to  regain profitability and to  ad-91 
vance competitiveness, many companies have to increase productivity, adjust capacities and 
significantly reduce their workforce. 
Since  many  years  already,  employment  in  the  industrialized  countries  is  growing  much 
slower than GOP and capital investments. There are considerable variations across countries, 
but the general trend is that employment tends to decline even when GOP is growing. Exces-
sive capacities and exhaustion of economic opportunities may drammatically speed up decline 
of employment. 
If decline of employment continues, we should expect that in the longer run, competitiveness 
and profitability of industry and services will decline as well. Long termed unemployment of 
considerable volume will impose increasing social costs on the economy and result in decli-
ning demand. Accordingly, costs of production increase while turnover and returns are likely 
to decline. Then, exhaustion of economic opportunities in terms of sales value and turnover 
as  well as in terms of employment is becoming a realistic threat 
This scenario is not inevitable, but simply underlines the importance of the proble·m. Industry 
in Europe and other industrialized areas is facing a severe threat <?f exhaustion of economic 
opportunities. 
An active approach to economic opportunities 
In view of a severe threat of exhaustion, an  active approach to  economic opportunities is 
necessary. A set of strategies ranging from product innovations or changes in design which 
significantly improve the ful}ctional,  social or aesthetical value of products to development 
of new  products and  new  markets have to  be implemented.  Diversification of industry in 
Europe in  new  businesses and markets must be ·the key  issue on the agenda of industrial 
strategies and industrial policy. 
In  Europe  and  the  United  States,  enterprises  usually  diversify  in  a  particular way.  They 
aquire  other  frrms  and  use  these  aquisitions  to  d~velop business  activities  in  promising 92 
markets.  In  some  cases,  this  strategy  may  create  new  economic  opportunities.  Usually, 
however, it is simply a reshuffling of existing economic opportunities from.one enterprise to 
another and  a change in the protofolio of enterprises. 
In order to create new economic opportunities, a different type of diversification is needed. 
Enterprises  have  to  use  their  potentials,  particularly  their  know-how  and  technological 
competence and the  skills  of their workfo.rce,  to  develop  new  products for  new  markets. 
Along with this, workforce has to be transferred from declining to new business. 
Interesting cases of such  a diversification strategy are provided by  a number of Japanese 
firms,  for example companies in steel and in chemical industries.  Firms like Nippon Steel 
and Kobe Steel have managed to reduce their traditional business considerably and to secure 
employment and returns by developing new business. 
On  the  first  glance,  diversification  strategies  of Japanese  steel  companies  do  not  differ 
significantly  from  that  of European  steel  companies.  New  business  structures  are  quite 
similar. The important point, however, is that the Japanese companies have managed adju-
stment with their existing workforce and out of their existing potentials whereas European 
companies  have  layed  off  much  .of  their  workforce  from  steel  business  and  managed 
adjustment primarily by means of mergers and aquisitions. 
Japanese companies have developed a type of diversification which is technology-led. It at-
tempts to develop new products on the basis of the technological knowledge and competence 
of a firm and its personel. This may be confined to new applications of existing technology, 
but usually includes broadening and development of the technological base. An illustrative. 
example for this case is dev~lopment of R&D in Japanese textile industry. (Kodama, 1991). 
Success of technology-led diversification strongly depends on companies' ability to capitalize 
on  problems,  needs  and demand which  so  far  has  not been  satisfied economically  or for 
which better economic solutions may be developed. This may be called the socio-technology 
apporach to diversification. Fig. 2.25:  R&D profile of diversification in Japanese textile industries 
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Box 2.4:  Socio-technology approach to diversification 
Socio-technology approach to diversification combines two strategies: 
..  .  ..  :  ......  .  ..  . 
-~ 
!I 
i 
0 
b 
~ 
c::o. 
8.  crd  tO  c  c::o. 
.2  crd  .. 
;f 
0  .9 
~ 
8 
*  A systematic exploitation and development of companies' technological base and 
know-how, and 
* a systematic orientation social needs and societal problems which are hitherto not 
satisfied by economic measures. 
The aim is to develop a technological solution for such needs and problems which 
may be translated into a marketable product. 
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A socio-technology approach  to  diversification  technology-led diversification is a strategy 
which suits the profound logic of capitalism. The vitality of capitalist economies relies, quite 
obviously,  on  their  capabilities  to  translate  societal  needs  and  problems  into  economic 
demand and to  secure capacious markets for the rel<?vant products. 94 
However, it is a difficult, costly and risky type of diversification. Major problems are: 
*  It  requires  a  combination  of a  creative  marketing  with  a  long-termed R&D  which  is 
difficult to organize; 
* it  faces  organizational  impedi1nents,  such  as  segmented  structures  or  a  lack  of 
collaboration across firms;  ~~ 
* it involves high uncertainty concerning the application <?f  ~ec);lnology and the  tr~~lation 
of needs into demand; 
* it involves high costs for both marketing and R&D; 
* it  is  time-consuming  and  often  expands  far  beyond  the  usual  time  horizon  of fmns' 
activities; and last not least 
* it does not fit well  into European and American enterprise culture and a related narrow 
definition of enterprises. 
Given these problems, support by public policy may be important 
However, public policy in Europe has a strong tendency to react on the decline of politically 
relevant firms and industries in terms of protectionism. The concerned fmns and industries 
are kept in business by subsidies or regulated to reduce capacities and to avoid exhaustion. 
Little or no attempt is made to support utilization of their potentials for development of new 
products and markets. On the contrary, protectionist policies motivate fmns to dismiss with 
active approaches to economic opportunities. Policiesconceming coal mining, steel or ship-
building throughout Europe provide numerous examples for this case. 
Successful  development  of new  economic resources  to  fight  the  threat of exhaustion  in 
Europe, thus, requires not only a strategic change in industry, but also far-reaching changes 
in industrial policy orientations. 95 
An environmental motor to markets 
An interesting case for a socio-technological approach to diversification and development of 
new economic opportunities is environment. As various studies demonstrate~ environmental 
problems and concern are sharply increasing in the advanced societies as well as on a global 
scope which requires  fast changes of industrial structures and strategies (cf.  Brown et al., 
1991; Burrows et al.~ 1991; CEC,  1992a; OECD, 1991d; von Weizsacker, 1990). 
Although emmission of gases has been significantly reduced in the industrialized countries, 
strategic atmosphere depletion, greenhouse effect and global spread of air pollution remain 
critical issues. 
Fig. 2.26:  Development of emmissions of air pollutants 
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Fig. 2.27:  Man-made emmissions of air pollutants per unit of GDP 
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While emmissions are decreasing in most of the industrialized countries, there is a massive 
increase of municipal  and industrial  waste.  Similarly, energy consumption has increased 
significantly. 
It is not necessary to discuss these problems in more details here. Suffice it to conclude that 
environment still is an extremely critical issue for industry. 
Against that, economic solutions of environmental problems are often missing. Environmental 
problems  still  are solved primarily  by  political rather than economic  means.  As  a result, 
increasing frictions and contradictions between environmental concern and competitiveness 
and growth in  industry are building up. Fig. 2.28:  Development of waste in industrialized countries 
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Fig. 2.29:  Energy consumption in industrialized countries 
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Fig. 2.30:  Environmental concern in the European Community 
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Fig. 2.31:  Attitudes towards environment and the economy in the European 
Community 
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Within the population of the member countries of the European Community, there is a high 
concern on environmental problems. This holds not only for the rich, but also for the poor 
countries. In  most of the countries a majority of the population also  accepts that environ-
mental protection is a necessary precondition for economic development. 
These positive attitudes towards environmental issues are, however, not influencing behaviour 
strongly. Willingness to  involve in concrete activities to  protect environment is fairly low. 
The result is a contradictory situation. 
Fig. 2.32:  Environmental involvement in the European Community 
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On  one  side,  they  support  strong  and  even  increasing  pressure  for  political  solutions  to 
environmental problems. They also create strong restrictions and problems of acceptance for 
industry. On the other side, they find it very difficult to solve environmental problems at the 100 
expense of material living conditions. Political solutions to environmental problems face se-
vere restrictions and their effectiveness is unlikely to be of high. 
Fig. 2.33:  Growth potentials of economic solution of environmental problems 
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In order to  resolve this  multiple dilemma, economic solutions  to  environmental problems 
have to be rapidly developed. Rather than beeing a restriction to growth and competitiveness, 
solution of environmental problems is used as motor to increase economic opportunities and . 
to enlarge the scope of market solutions to a wider range of societal problems
14
• 
As  a  memorandum  of the  Commission  of the  European  Community  shows,  economic 
solutions to  environmental problems bear high  growth potentials for many industries. It is, 
14  There is a broad discussion on economic instruments for environmental policies. This discussio~ 
however, is strongly concentrating on issues of regulation and often neglects issues of technology and 
product development. - Cf. CEC, 1992a, 1992b; OECD, 1989b, 199le; Scherp, 1992; von Weizsacker, 
1990). 101 
therefore, realistically to use solution ef environmental problems as a means to develop new 
economic opportunities and to  avoid exhaustion. (CEC, 1992a). 
Fig. 2.34:  Patents in environmental technology 
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Industry in Europe, Germany in particularly, is in a good stai:ting position for environment-
based growth.  It has  already heavily invested in  relevant R%D  and holds  a high share of 
international patents. 
A new philosophy of growth 
Development  of market  solutions  to  environmental  problems  as  a  means  to  create  new 
economic opportunities means a new philosophy of growth is needed. The philosophy is not 
limited to growth, but rather problem-solving growth. 102 
The philosophy does not only apply to environmental problems, but to social problems as 
well.  Economic  solutions  to  social  problems,  such as care for  the elderly7  may enhance 
economic opportunities and reduce the load on the public welfare system. This is particularly 
relevant with respect to employment. 
The threat of massive unemployment often motivates public policy to think in terms of a so-
called second labo.ur  mar~et, that  is  publically  finan~ed jobs and  training  activities·~  The 
problem with  such  strategies  is  that  that they. increase  welfare  spending  and  directly  or 
indirectly impose higher costs on  business and labour. The possible result may well be  a 
vicious cycle where public financed employment destroys jobs in business and increases need 
for public financed employment. 
An alternative to  such strategies is  public activity which creates larger amounts of jobs in 
the  private  sector  and  stimulates  the  frrst  labour  market.  Regulation  that  puts  high 
environmental standards on public buildings, for example, create strong demand for envi-
ronmental construction technology and, by this, create new jobs in environmental technology 
industry. 
Strategies of problem-solving growth have to be linked to the global perspective. Currently, 
a  considerable  part  of  the  European  population  and  much  of the  world's  population, 
particularly in the third world, are little or not participating in markets. In terms of popula-
tion,  the scope of markets in  the global  system is  still rather limited.  For the most part, 
global  markets  are  confined  to  the  advanced  countries  and  a  small  social ·class  in  the 
developing countries. 
As  is well-known, the economic wealth and the technological knowledge of the world are 
already heavily concentrated in the "triade", that is in Western Europe, the United States and 
Japan. These countries also offer comparatively well living conditions. And they exploit most 
of the worlds resources. 103 
The current concentration of wealth and knowledge, and  the high living conditions in the 
triade can be praised as a great economic  success.  However,  in  a longer perspective, this 
success bears the danger of failure. 
High  and  even  increasing  disparities  in  the  worlds  economic,  social  and  environmental 
conditions are already resulting in  serious problems of migration, criminality, social unrest 
and  environmental  destruction.  As  disparities  continue  to  exist  and  even  increase,  these 
problems will intensify and impose increasing costs on the countries in the triade. 
In view of the dangers and risks of such a development, the strategic goal of industrial policy 
and  of industrial  activity  in  the  advanced  countries  must  be to  enhance a type  of global 
production  which  guides  investments  and  technological  knowledge  to  the  developing 
countries.  Pru.ticularly,  the  aim  must  be  to  build  up  industry  which  is  internationally 
competitive not only by means of cheap labour, but also in terms of quality and technological 
. 
performance. This supports development of mass  welfare. in  the  developing countries  and 
creates at the same time increasingly capacious markets for the global economy. That is glo-
balization at its best. Part 3: 
Industries and Enterprises: 
A Re-examination of Structures and Strategies 106 
The performance of European industry is at stake. European indu~try  certainly has its strength, 
· but also its weaknesses which are truely alarming.  Major weaknesses are productivity and 
development of new products and markets.  Its strength is in technological competence and 
skilled labour. However, both technological competence and skilled labour can not be taken 
for granted. 
This  is  a ·general  picture  which  needs  q uali.fication.  In.dustry  in  Eu.r;ope  is  by  n9 means 
homogeneous.  Some  industries  have  secured  comparatively  high  performance  while 
performance of others is weak or in danger of decline. The crux of the matter, however, is 
that  we  can  not  simply  add  up  strong  and  weak  industries  because  there  are  strong 
interdependences between industries. As a result, weaknesses in some industries may endanger 
in the long run performance of industries which currently are still rather strong. 
Problems and perspectives of performance often differ considerably between small and large 
enterprises. Advantages for large enterprises or often disadvantages for small and. medium 
firms. In many cases, large enterprises secure performance in the short run at the expense of 
small and medium supplier firms. The danger is that small and medium enterprises become 
the victims of industrial modernization. 
In  order to  attain and secure high performance, smaller and larger enterprises  and whole 
industries have to  change structures and strategies.  Enterprises have to  develop intelligent 
production  systems  and  to  shift  from  activity-oriented  to  process-oriented  management 
strategies. Beyond that, collaborative networks of enterprises and whole industries have to be 
developed  in  order  to  account  for  increasing  interdependencies  of firms'  and  industries' 
performance. A new industrial suucture has to  be pushed forward. 
Performance of European industries: Critical issues 
Recent  studies  on  comparative  performance  of European  industries  are  drawing  a  rather 
alarming  picture.  Decline  of  technological  competence,  decreasing  productivity,  low 
capabilities in  product innovations and loss of mar~et shares seem to  be the  most serious 107 
challenges and dangers for  European industry (cf.  Lehner et al.,  1993;  MIT,  1990, OECD 
1991 b,  1992;  van  Tulder &  J  unne,  1988; de Woot,  1990;  World Competitiveness Report, 
1992)
1
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European industry often has  put too  much  emphasis on  traditional businesses and failed to 
invest  timely  in  new  businesses  and  new  technologies.  As  a  prominent expert,  Herbert 
Henzler, chairman of McKinsey Germany, puts the case, it is not the social burden that has 
infected Europe's economic health, but the missing ability to shift timely to new value-added 
business (Henzler,  1992). 
Performance of industry in  Europe is,  certainly,  a case for concern.  However, in spite of 
serious problems, the future position of European industry in a global economy is still open. 
European industries have not only their weaknesses,  but their strengths as well. The most 
important  weaknesses  are  productivity,  product  innovation  and  market  development 
Traditional  strengths  are  technological  competence  and  skilled  labour.  Technological 
competence is, however, at risk. 
Box 3.1:  Key issues of industrial renewal in Europe 
* ability to develop new products and new markets, 
* ability to secure and enhance productivity, 
* ability to fasten time-to-market, 
* technological competence and 
* abilty to implement adequat organization. 
Much of the future of industry in Europe hinges on the capabilities of major industries to shift 
from traditional structures and established products to modem organization and new products 
and new markets. 
1  General problems of performance of industry in Europe are discussed in the FINE-Synthesis Paper No 2. In 
this paper, we discuss problems more specifically in relation 10 particular industries in order to identify major 
weaknesses. 108 
While many of Europe's industries are successfull in their established, tractional markets, few 
have impressive abilities to develop new products and markets. European firms are often more 
reluctant to respond to new market opportunities and rather slow in switching their activities 
to  new value-added  business.  An  illustrative case is  development of new  materials,  par-
ticularly of multi-materials  where American and Japanese films  act both faster and more 
systematic  than most of their European competitors. 
In European industry, product innovation often is strongly oriented at established markets. 
Firms  often  act  in  isolation  and  efforts  in  product innovation  are  limited sector specific 
resources, activities and developments. 
Yet, this focus on firm and sector specific resources is challenged by three developments: 
1  innovation  of  technologically  sophisticated  products  is  increasingly  dependent  on 
technological advances in supplying industries, 
2  fusion  of different  technologies  is  an  increasingly  important  momentum  of product 
innovation, and 
3  development of new markets requires rapid application and diffusion of new technologies 
over a variety of sectors. 
Capabilities of frrms and industries to develop new products, hence, depend increasingly on 
cross-fertilization,  collaboration  and  synergies  across  traditional  sectoral  boundaries.  (cf  .. 
Kodama, 1991; see also Clark &  Fujimoto, 1991; Fransman,  1991; Lehner et al.,  1991). 
In recent times European industries have become more and more aware of the relevance to 
systematically develope cross-fertilization strategies in  innovation  management.  However, 
cross-sectoral cooperation activity is still in its infancy. Against that, in Japan cross-sectoral 
cooperation is not only enhanced by traditional group structures (keiretsu), but is also syste-
matically organized in terms of collective research projects. Fig. 3.1.  Strategic alliances for R&D in Europe, the United States and Japan 
1980~1984- 1985-1989 
D  Others 
l§i Japan 
Source:  Freeman/Hagedorn 1993. 
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Problems  of industry  in  Europe  to  develop  new  products  do  not  only  relate  to  high 
technology. There are also considerable difficu_lties  to  satisfy less sophisticated demand by 
downsizing high-tech products to standardized products covering a wide area of application. 
As is well known and often discussed, one of the major comparative disadvantages of industry 
in Europe is productivity. Both in the United States and Japan, value added per manufacturing 
worker is considerably higher than in Europe. Indeed, differences are often quite spectacular 
even if we acknowledge longer working times in Japanese manufacturing workers and un-
favourable exchange rates
2
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2  As we have demonstrated in part 2, there are in the European Communities big differences concerning pro-
ductivity. The average for  whole of Europe is  influenced by low productivity in countries like Greece or 
Ireland. Yet, even Germany and other more advanced countries are hardly capable of keeping pace with Ja-
panese developments.  -110 
In most industries, product life cycles tend to become shorter and competitiveness increasingly. 
depends on firms' capabilities to launch new products earlier than competitors. There seems 
to be a new rule that firms which are first-to-market will gain the biggest market share and 
consequently the highest profits while those  with  significant delays in  product innovation 
often twill hardly have any considerable returns on their investment 
In  electronics~ for example, delayed launching of a newproduct  .. may lead to a  loss of nearly 
half of the total market volume.  And  variations of development times have much  greater 
impacts on profits than variations of development costs causes. (Sommerlatte 1990). 
European firms are often rather slow when it comes to development of new products. They 
have difficulties to keep pace with declining product life cycles and to play .their part in the 
innovation race. As a result, they loose market shares and profit. European industry, thus, is 
often uncapable of translating high technological competence in market success because new 
products are launched too late. 
A  traditional  strength  of most  European  industries  is  technological  competence.  Indeed, 
European industry is technologically often at the leading edge.  There are,  however, early 
warnings that technological competence of many industries in Europe is in danger to decline. 
As  patent data show, European industry has problems to  catch up  with the leaders in two 
technological areas, which are widely accepted as future technologies: data processing and in 
semiconductors. Moreover, there are problems in biotechnology and new materials. This data 
also reveal that the European industry has its peculiar strengths mainly in traditional industries 
and technologies. 
In a future oriented perspective, technological competence, thus, is a key issue of industrial 
performance in Europe although it is currently not really a case for concern. Fig. 3.2:  Patent shares in major industries 
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Many industries in Europe are standing at the watershed today. Until the end of the century 
the  switches  are  worked for  staying at the competitive edge of the respective industry or 
missing connection with  the world leaders. Concerned industries have promising potentials 
to master structural change and new challenges, but non-European competitors face good pro-
spects to  pace their European counterparts out.  Examples for this situation are mechanical 
engineering, automotive industry, telecommunications and aerospace industry. 
Mechanical engineering is indeed an illustrative example for a position on the watershed. In 
the last decade, American mechanical engineering has lost ground on the world markets and 
Japanese  mechanical  engineering  industry  has  gained  heavily.  European  mechanical 112 
engineering industry remained stable in this period and still profits from its technological 
potentials and competences. It is still on the leading edge in almost all market segments, but 
this may change soon
3
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Future competitiveness of mechanical  engineering  in  Europe  is  seriously  endangered  by 
problems of  productivity and production strategy. Compared to Japan, mechanical engineering 
in  Europe is  in a  serious  "productivity crisis":  Japanese films  are twice or even more as 
productive as the average European firm.  Moreover, Japanese firms usually have more fle-
xible production strategies and cover both markets for special and for standard machines with · 
technologically sophisticated products. They have developed an organization of production 
which secures high productivity, quality and flexibility. 
European mechanical engineering is producing highly sophisticated and innovative products, 
but time-to-market is too slow to realize full profits. Best practice examples show, that the 
time for design can be reduced by 30% to 50%. 
A major problem is product development. Most of the products of European manufacturers 
in  mechanical engineering are primarily  oriented at the demand for  highly  sophisticated 
technological solutions of big enterprises. These products are usually too advanced for the 
needs of small and medium enterprises. As a consequence, European mechanical engineering 
manufacturers renunciate of a market which is estimated at about 8000 machines in Gen:nany. 
In the whole European Communities and in Easte111  Europe there is certainly a much higher 
demand for this low-cost and easy-to-use machines. 
3  The following  analysis  is  based on a study on  mechanical engeneering within the FINE-project by  Peter 
Brooner (1993). We also have greatly profited from an interesting study for the Commission of the European 
Communities on European  machine tools  industry by  WS  Atkins (1990) and from  a study by  Brooncr & 
Schultetus (1992) on machine tools in Japan and Germany._ 113 
Tab. 3.1  Productivity in mechanical engineering 
Japan  Average in German  Germany 
Mechanical Engineering in 
1989 
JA 1  JA 2  JA 3  G 1  G2  G3  G4 
Production value/employee  650  795  725  179  239  283  311  199 
Value added/employee  336  517  249  95  119  132  149  113 
Profit/production value  14%  6%  8%  1,3%  -2%  2%  5%  2% 
Productivity performance indicators of Japanese and German machine tool manufacturers (1990. numbers are thousands Deutsch Mark) 
Source:  Bradner, 1993. 
. 
In a longer perspective, there is another crucial problem. In comparison to Japanese ·producers, 
profit rate of European fmns is rather low. Obviously, low profits are likely to lead to lower 
investments in R&D, machinery and related equipment, and marketing and advertising. In the 
end this impedes innovativen and causes a severe loss of competitiveness and market shares. 
A comparison of mechanical engineering in Europe and Japan points at a. clear message. 
European mechanical engineering has to rapidly reorganize in order to attain high productivity 
and flexibility. And it has to develop market strategies which enhance more flexible response 
on  diversified  demand.  Otherwise,  it  will  loose  ground  in  competitiveness  and  enter  a 
downward spiral of longterm decline. 
In automotive industry the situation seems to be even more dramatic. European automotive 
industry is persistently loosing ground against Japanese automotive industry. 
European automotive industry has a high technological performance and still secures a leading 
position.  Many  new  devices like  ABS,  ASR and turbo  charging  have  been developed in 
Europe and first  attempts  to  make  wider use of vehicle electronics,  to  implement traffic 
guidance systems and to transfer ecological requirements to vehicle design have started in Eu-114 
rope.  Technologically~ European  automotive  industry  may  still  be  well  prepared for  the 
future
4
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However~ it has become extremely weak with respect to  productivity and consequentially is 
often not competitive in terms of price-quality-ratios. Moreover~ it has a bad performance with 
respect to development lead-time (time span between starting of development of a new model 
and market  introdtic~ion). 
Fig. 3.3:  Productivity in automotive industry 
80.---------------------------------------~ 
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~  Weighted Average 
Source:  Womack/Jones/Roos, 1990. 
In Japanese automotive companies the time needed for the development of a new car is 46,2 
months~ while it is  58~6 months in European companies. Even more striking is the difference 
between Japanese and European manufactureres regarding the time spent between new model 
4  For a more detailled discussion of these problems, see the· special study on automotive industry within the 
FINE-project by Belzeli?Dankbaar (1993).- Particular problems of  competitiveness exist for automotive com-
ponent industry which 1re do not discuss here. They are well analyzed in study by Boston Consulting (1991). 115 
launch and return to normal quality: As it is 1,4 months in Japanese companies, the European 
ones need 12 months- this is over ten months more. Even American manufacturers perform 
slightly better (MIT, 1990; Womack et al., 1991)
5
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Box 3.2:  A Synthesis of European and Japanese production concepts 
at Nissan UK 
The production concept of Nissan UK combines the following features: 
People 
*  We will develop and expand the contributions of all staff by strongly emphasising training 
and by the expansion of everyone's capabilities. 
*  We seek to delegate and involve staff in discussion and decision making particularly in those 
areas in which each of us can effectively contribute so that all may participate in the efficient 
running of NMUK. 
*  We finnly believe in common terms and conditions of employment. 
Teamworking 
*  We recognise that all staff have a valued contribution to make as individuals but in addition 
believe that this contribution can be most effective within a teamworking environment. 
*  Our aim is to build a Company with which people can identify and to which we all feel com-
mitment. 
Communication 
* Within the bounds of commercial confidentiality we will encourage open channels of com-
munication. We would like everyone to know what is happening in our Company, how we 
are performing and what we plan. 
*  We want information and views to flow freely upward, downward and across our Company. 
Objectives 
*  We will agree clear and achievable objectives and provide meaningful feedback on perfonnan-
ce. 
Flexibility 
*  We will not be restricted by the existing way of doing things.  We will continuously seek 
improvements in all our actions 
European automotive industry faces one big imtnediate challenge, namely to rapidly .increase 
productivity by applying modem concepts of industrial organization and by reorganization of . 
the production chain. The challenge is not simply to copy Japanese lean production. Rather, 
5  Although the empirical evidence reported here is already some years old, ongowing research of the Institute 
of Work and Technology indicates that the general picture is still valid. 116 
lessons from Japanese lean production have to  be combined with European approaches and 
experiences to develop organizational forms which support European strentgth in technology, 
design  and  environmental  concern  while  eliminating  weaknesses  in productivity.  This  is 
particularly important because in  a longer perspective, environmental concerns constitute a 
much more severe challenge to  automotive industry in Europe than productivity now
6
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A  quite  different  situation  exists  in  telecommunication  industries.  The  problem  is  not 
productivity, but standardization and investments. Telecommunication and related equipment 
are one of the most promising markets of the future with a sustainable growth potential. In 
contrast to  other market segments of electronics, European firms  have a good competitive 
position  in  telecommunication:  Alcatel,  Siemens  and  Ericsson  are ranking  in  the  top  ten 
worldwide, inspite of strong competitors in the United States and in Japan
7
• 
The future  success of telecommunication industry hinges considerably on how far  market 
unification is paralleled by an EC-wide standardization of norms and interfaces. This will lead 
to  better economies of scale and subsequently enhance competitiveness. The prospects for 
small and medium enterprises in this sector are dismal: Because of the huge investments ne-
cessary they can only survive im market niches left by the big firms. 
Again  a  different situation  exists  in  aerospace  industry  which  is  one of the  outstanding 
success stories in European industrial development in the second half of this century. Through 
close  interfirm  cooperation  and  with  considerable  government  aid,  European  aerospace 
industry has today nearly closed the gap to  the world-champion United States. With respect 
to· technological competetence, particularly in relation to civilian aircrafts, Europe has caught 
up  on  the  United  States  and  is  well  ahead  of Japan.  However,  United  States  firms  in 
aerospace  industry  have  an  advantage  in  time-to-market  compared  to  their  European 
counterparts. 
6  In  several discussions with  some of the authors, Peter Wickens, director for  personal and information of 
Nissan UK has pointed at the importance of a synthesis of Japanese and European approaches as a major 
cause of the success of his company. 
7  Again,  we  refer  to  a  special  study  within  the  FINE-project The study on telecommunications has  been 
performed by Didier Pouillot - Interesting perspectives are also shown in  a study of the Commission of the 
European Communities on advanced communication (CEC, 1992c). 117 
After the end of the cold war and the ensuring reduction in defense expenditures, aerospace 
industry faces a severe decline in orders for military aircrafts. The importance of the military 
sector for this industry elucidates the fact that 60% of the industries turnover in 1990 resulted 
from military equipment. The market for civil aircrafts is expected to  grow rather steadily 
until the end of the century. But the growth in civil aerospace is regarded to be unsufficient 
to  compensate the shortfall in  the defense market.  Satellites may provide another field of 
.growth,  but market volume is too  small to  balance the decline in demand for military air-
crafts8. 
Fig. 3.4:  Military and civilian markets in aerospace 
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Source:  Hayward, 1992. 
In a much more difficult situation is electronic industry. Today this industry is standing at the 
edge of a yawning abyss. Immediate strategic action is necessary to revitalize at least partly 
8  For a more detailled analysis of aerospace industries, see the special study within the FINE-project by Keith 
Hayward (1993). 118 
its competitive position. Looking at the world market shares, European electronics industry 
seems to be better off than often predicted. It still provides a quarter of the world market Eu-
ropean  electronics  industry  has  in  certain  market segments  a favourable  position,  e.g.  in 
vehicle electronics. 
Fig. 3.5:  Shares of European, American and Asian  producers in world markets for 
microelectronics 
.EC 
lfiUSA 
D  Japan 
USA 
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Source:  Panorama der EG-Industrie. 1991-1992 
In most markets, however, it is lagging behind and has virtually been decoupled from market 
development.  Products and innovation cycles are determined by  Japanese firms,  European 
firms are more and more loosing first-mover advantages. This holds true for consu~er elec-
tronics as well as for computers and ICs. 
Particularly bitter is  the backlog in  the future industries, e.g. computers and microchips. In 
the computer market United States and Japanese firms are dominating, DEC has taken over 
Kienzle  and  Phillips,  Fujitsu  did  the  same  with  ICL  and  Nokia.  It is  expected,  that the 119 
Japanese  will  do  the  same  with  their  other  European  GEM-Partners  (Bull,  Comparex, 
Olivetti). Though having lost market shares to  South-East Asian firms,  Japanese producers 
of microchips  still  have  an  outstanding  market  share  while  European  firms  are  only  of 
marginal relevance in most segments
9
• 
The industries discussed so far,  are typical for a large part of European industries. They are 
still in a rather good shape, but there are developments in process which may lead in rather 
short time to deterioration of competitiveness. 
Strong industries: Pillars for the Future? 
There  are  a  number  of industries  which  have  maintained  a  good  competitive  position. 
Examples are agribusiness, construction, chemical and pharmaceutical industry, and fmancial 
services. 
Agribusiness (especially food processing) has a good competitive position. Facing the single 
market, some fmns have extended their activities to other EC-countries through acquisitions 
and interfirm cooperation. A handful of fmns are operating on global scale, particulalrly with 
business in North America. Besides a few European or global players, a huge number of small 
and  medium  enterprises  are  existing  - mainly  a  consequence  of  different  tastes  and 
preferences in the single European regions. European agribusiness is  moving to  the use of 
advanced technologies,  in  particular biotechnology, to  improve products and productivity. 
Distress causes only the starting point of the food chain, agriculture, which contains a huge 
number of small and inefficient producers
10
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Construction industry is  to  a large extent protected from  international competition, mainly 
through  national  or even  regional  regulations  (quality  standards,  materials  used)  or non-
9  With respect to consumer electronics, see BIS Mackintosh, 1990. 
10  Within the FINE-Project, Professor Wyn Grant of the Univ~rsity of Warwick has written specific study on 
agribusiness which contains a more detailled analysis (Grant. 1993). 120 
regulative  barriers  (taste,  tradition).  Furthermore,  the  product  itself prohibits  large  scale 
international competition: it is more immobile and more regional bound than other products. 
Besides  that,  European  construction  industry  still  profits  from  it  variety  of skills  and 
competences and is making first steps to respond to growing ecological needs. Only few fmns 
are engaged in  international activities, mainly in countries where know-how about building 
construction and underground engineering is missing. But this relates primarily to contruction 
and control task.s,  not to  the deployment of workers.  Here new competitiors are asceQding, 
mainly from Japan or South-Coreau. 
Fig. 3.6:  World market shares in chemical industry 
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Source:  Howells/Wood 1991.  ~ 
Chemical and pharmaceutical industries have a long tradition in Europe and are still the most 
dynamical industry in the EC. European firms have very early internationalized and maintain 
11  For a more detailled analysis, see the special study on construction industry within the FINE-project written 
by Brigitte Unger/Frans van Waarden. 121 
a salient position in international competition. This is expressed in considerable market shares 
in the United States and in Japan. While European frrms are loosing ground in traditional bulk 
chemicals contesting with third-world or Eastern Europe frrms, they have strengthened their 
position in materials, which require high R&D-activities and which fit to customer needs. 
With respect to R&D, European chemical industry is roughly on the same level as the United 
States and Japan. However, the American and Japanese firms _often have some comparative 
advantages in applied research. This is, for example the case, in growth sectors like new en-
gineering polymers or ultra pure ceramics. European pharmaceutical firms  have sometimes 
problems to keep pace with American firms,  but are able to respond quickly and efficiently 
to  specific market demands.  Problems may  arise,  if European firms  do not· enhance their 
R&D-activities and investments in gene- and biotechnology
12
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Financial  services  are  a  business  where  hardly  any  conclusive  statements  concerning 
international competitiveness can be  made.  Modem information technology made its con- . 
tribution to the internationalization of this business. Banking around the world has become 
reality. The same holds true for insurance. As a result, many non-EC frrms came to Europe. 
But this does not imply that European financial services lost competitiveness. European firms 
have spread their activities worldwide too. There is little indication that financial services in 
Europe have overall outstanding strength or weaknesses compared with their foreign com-
petitors, but there are considerable differences between companies and countries 
13
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Considering the situation of different industries, one might be tempted to conclude that ali-in-
all prospects for a competitive industry in Europe are not all that bad as  is often assumed. 
However,  this  conclusion  would  be  erreneous.  It neglects  one  decisive  fact:  With  the 
12  See ·on  this the more detained study for  the FINE-projects by BETA (1992). 
13  A  more detailled analysis of financial  services  has  been  ~ade within  the  FINE-project by  William  D. 
Coleman (1993). 122 
exception ·of chemical industry, European industry has its strength in businesses were world 
markets are not existant or where global competition is limited and rather weak
14
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In  these industries  productivity growth  as  well  as  development of new products is  slow. 
Agribusiness and construction are good examples. They are, for the most part, characterized 
by craft production with low productivity. Moreover, while changing life styles and ecological 
requirements lead to  a demand for  higQ~value, healthy and nonpolluting :products,' fums in 
these industries are very reluctant to satisfy this emerging demand. These industries are, hence 
not necessarily strong pillars for the future
15
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The problem is  even worse because industries are  often closely linked to  eachother with 
respect to their performance. Low productivity and innovation in one industry will have more 
or less severe impacts on other industries. The weaknesses of most of the strong pillars, thus, 
adds  additional  risk  to  those  industries  which  are  already  in  some  danger  to  loose 
competitiveness. 
Small and Medium Enterprises: Victims of Modernization? 
Small and medium enterprises are extremely important for the European economies. Speaking 
in sheer numbers, more than 90% of all enterprises in the European Communities have less 
than  10 employees while only 0,1  percent of the European firms  have more than 500 em-
14  Product idiosyncrasies in the construction industry, in agribusiness and in financial services make their con-
tribution to the fact, that markets haven t developed on international or worldwide scale. E.g., houses or other 
buildings cannot be moved from one place to another, food and beverages cannot be transported ·over long 
distances without the danger to be spoilt. Additionally, consumer tastes and preferences vary from region to 
region, from  country to country, a  unique product would not fit to varying consumers demands. Even in 
financial services, though operating on global scale, many services have to be done on the spot. . 
15  To a similar result comes the Japan Productivity Center (1992) in its "International Comparison of Labour 
Productivity": Comparing productivity in manufacturing in Japan and Gennany, one of the major outcomes 
was that Germany has productivity advantages in traditional industries, while Japan is at the fore in high 
technology industries. 123 
ployees. The bulk of enterprises have a size below 100 employees and only slightly more than 
1% of the fmns have more than  100 employees
16
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Fig. 3.7:  Size of enterprises in the European Communities by member states 
Micro-enterprises by country (Nace 1 to 9, 1988) 
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Source:  Enterprise Policy/Eurostat 1992; own calculations. 
16  Our discussion of the specific developments and problems of small and medium enterprises is based on a 
special report for the FINE-project (Hilbert, Kleinschmidt, Rainnie & Sperling, 1993). In a global perspective, 
problems of small and medium enterprises are discussed in Lehner et al.,  1993. 124 
These shares are varying considerably in  the member states of the community: While the 
share of firms  with less than  10 employees is more than 90 % in Portugal, Belgium  and 
Spain, it is around 80% in Denmark and the Netherlands. They are also varying  significantly 
between different industries:  In  the construction industry  small firms  are dominating with 
more than the half of the  total  workforce. On the other hand, the portion of these firms is 
rather small in the automotive industry and chemical industry. 
Fig. 3.8:  Size of enterprises in different industries in Europe 
Chemical Ind. 
Office machinery 
Mechanical eng. 
Electrical eng. 
Motor Vehicles 
Construction 
Services 
TOTAL 
0  20  40  60  80  100 
Ooto9  Em  100 lo 199 
• 
tOto 19  mill  200 lo 499 
61 20to99  •  500+ 
Source:  Enterprise Policy/Eurostat 1992; own calculations. 
As  is  well known,  weight of the  small and medium economy is  bigger in  terms of sheer 
numbers than in terms of employment and turnover. Firms with less than 10 employees make 
for  only  29%  of employment  and  22%  of total  turnover.  Still~ firms  with  less  than  500 
employees hold a share of 70%  of total employment and the same share of total turnover 
whereas firms with more than 500 etnployees account for aboout 30% of total employment 
and total turnover. 125 
Fig. 3.9:  Employment by firm size 
Distnbution of employment by employment size class  Distribution of turnover by employment size class 
Source:  Enterprise Policy/Eurostat 1992; own calculations. 
Small and medium enterprises, thus,  are of great importance for  the European economies. 
They are much more than a marginal economical force. 
Many small and medium enterprises face an uncomfortable future.  In Particular, they face 
* increasing  competition  1n  their  traditional  market · niches  by  large  enterprises  with 
.. 
decentralized and flexible organizational structures; 
* increasing financial and organizational burden in  keeping pace with rapid innovation and 
structural change; 
* increasing problems and costs of marketing, sales and services in volatile and globalizing 
markets. 126 
Small and medium enterprises have their specific capabilities and strengths because of their 
higher flexibility, stronger customer orientation, and informal and non-hierarchical working 
conditions. But where international markets develop, small and medium enterprises may have 
severe problems to stay in  business. Big firms often have better capabilities in research and 
developement, in production, and in marketing to cope with the requirements of globalization 
and structural change. 
Many small and medium enterprises have considerable disadvantages in a. condition where 
they loose their traditional niche markets and have to compete with large enterprises, or in 
a condition where they have to  meet high productivity requirements which large enterprises 
impose on their suppliers. Theses advantages are highlighted by data on tunrover per em-
ployee and which show that turnover generally is increasing with fmn size. 
Fig. 3.10:  Turnover per employee by firm size in selected sectors 
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Source:  Enterprise Policy/Eurostat, 1992; own calculations. 127 
This points at a serious danger for many small and medium enterprises: Their productivity 
seems to  be  too  low to  master the challenges of the ongoing structural change. While the 
quality of their products may remain high, their low productivity will probably cause a severe 
loss of market shares. Furthermore, low productivity may lead to a decline of profit rates and 
endanger future investment in  new technologies in the long run. 
Although  such  a  scenario  is  quite  realistic for quite a number of enterprises,  it does  not 
describe a general trend. Even less it describes an inevitable situation. 
SMEs: The strong and the weaks 
Small and medium enterprises are not a homogenous class, but rather differ strongly in size, 
technological competence, capabilities, production structures, organization and market activi-
ties. 
For our purposes, small and medium enterprises may be divided into five categories. Although 
the categories are partly overlapping, each represents a genuine path of development and a 
particular configuration of problems. The categories are: 
1  the market localists: the bulwark of SMEs, 
2  the craft based SMEs: the niche and flexible specialization options, 
3  SMEs within regional networks: industrial districts, 
4  the high-tech option for SMEs: technological districts, and 
5  SMEs in the new division of labour. 
Market localists represent the overwhelming majority of SMEs. They are operating on a local 
and regional context and are strongly integrated in this context Family ties, neighbourhhood 
and friendship  play an  important role in  their economic and social behaviour.  Orientation 
towards international developments and globalization is low.  Market localists serve markets 
which  are geographically narrowly defined.  They are  strongly represented in construction, 
food processing, clothing, furniture, printing, mechanical engineering and in the services. 128 
In this class of SMEs, rate of fluctuation is high because entry barriers as well as exit barriers 
are low. Individually, the firms are often rather volatile and vulnerable. They have poor access 
to capital markets, R&D institutions and consultancy. However, as a class of enterprises they 
are rather stable because they  serve narrow markets in  which they  are well integrated and 
were they can quickly adapt to  changes of demand.  Moreover, their markets are, as a rule, 
of little interest for large enterprises. 
Craft-based SMEs also have their origins in local or regional contexts and are often serving 
these markets. But many of the frrms escaped the traditional borders of their regional markets 
and are strongly involved in  export. They have specialized in highly  custo~zed products 
which have high quality standards and require skilled work. Traditional businesses of this type 
of SME are primarily printing, mechanical and electrical engineering, and consumer goods 
like furniture. 
Organization of production in these firms can be traced back to  artisan production and has 
been adjusted meanwhile to changing requirements concerning technology, organisation, skills 
and production. The entrepreneurs are standing in the centre of these firms  and are often 
running  the  fmns  alone.  Organization  is  usually  characterized  by  flat  hierarchies,  easy 
communication, low division of labour and high flexibility of work rules. Product innovation 
is closely related to customer demands and accomplished in cooperation with them. 
In the past,  these flrms  have been successful in  gaining a strong market position.  For the 
future, this position is often at risk. Relevant enterprises increasingly face direct competition 
by large enterprises. They are often lacking access to capital, R&D and distribution channels. 
They are used to operate alone and are not well suited for a condition in which collaboration 
is becoming increasingly important. And they are threatened by acquisition strategies of large 
firms. 
The firms  operating in  industrial districts are also craft based,  but differ in one important 
respect from the usual craft-based SME: They have been successful in avoiding isolation and 
have  early  developed  a  network  of close  interfirm  cooperation  within  certain  regions, 
particularly  in  Northern  Italy,  Juteland,  Baden-Wtirttemberg  and  Cataluna.  They  are 129 
predominatly working in traditional and labour-intensive industries producing consumer goods 
like footwear, textile, clothing, ceramics, and furniture, but also in mechanical engineering, 
particularly in  machine tools, packaging machines and electronic musical instruments. 
Based on mutual trust embedded in close social interaction, relevant firms have established 
cooperative networks with multifarious links between suppliers and producers, and between 
manufacturing and related services. The networks combine specialization and flexibility and, 
by  this, enhance flexible adjustment to  changing demand.  Moreover, individual fmns may 
specialize on narrow market segments and operate in small market niches, but whole network 
often reaches a high level of diversification. 
As  other craft-based SMEs, these firms  also suffer from problems of access of capital and 
R&D.  Moreover,  they  suffer like other SMEs from problems concerning intergenerational 
transition of ownership. 
Industrial districts have developed in traditional industries. But there is a modern high-tech 
analogue to that, namely technological districts, where SMEs are involved in future industries 
like information technology, software, biotechnology or new materials. Technological districts 
have  developed in regions  with a strong infrastructure for  R&D  and a related innovative 
milieu comprising large innovative firms, research institutions and universities. 
Whereas  networking  in  industrial districts  is  focussed  on material  production,  this  is  not 
essential in technological districts. Rather, networking is focussed on research and technical 
development.  Less by formal collaboration but intensive, informal exchange is dominating 
between  various  research  institutions  and  enterprises.  Indeed,  it  does  not  represent  an 
organizational structure, but .. a milieu
17
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This is a point with  an  extremely important implication:  Technological districts cannot be 
organized  by  business  or  public  policy,  but  they  emerge.  What  can  be  organized  are 
17  We are indebted to Professor Richard Gordon of the University of  California at Santa Cruz who has explained 
as the nature of technology districts at the example of  .Sillicon Valley. 130 
technology parks, but most of this parks never have developed to a technolgical district and 
an innovative milieu. 
In Europe these "milieus" can be found in the Technopole of Grenoble, in Sophia-Antipolis 
close to Nice, in the English M4 corridor west of London, and in  the German "Technology 
Centres". In spite of much effort, other regions with a similar or even better infrastructure for 
rese~ch and techJ;tological development, such as the· Ruhr, have not s~cceeded to develop to 
..  ·.  .·  .  . 
a technological district. Often, the reason is a continuing dominance of traditional industrial 
milieus and their culture. 
A considerable part of the SME economy is closely linked to large firms and are part of their 
supply structure. In conditions of traditional mass production, many SMEs are operating as 
subordinate  suppliers  without  technological  competence  and  are,  thus,  functioning  as 
"extended work benches" of big companies. 
In the industrial societies, this pattern is vanishing as much of industrial production, including 
mass  production,  is  shifting  to  quality  production.  Large  fmns  are  reducing_  vertical 
integration. Accordingly, they increasingly contract tasks in production and services which 
do  not belong to  their core business or core technologies out to  suppliers. By this, a new 
division of labour is established between large firms and their suppliers. 
For many of the concerned small and medium enterprises, particularly for SMEs with rather 
low technological competence producing standardized parts, this process is  associated with 
certain difficulties. They have to cope with requirements which can not easily made consi-
stent. They get under pressure to reduce prices, but at the same time should enhance quality 
standards, adopt new produc!ion technology and deliver just-in-time. They are used by large 
firms as buffers to reduce costs and risks and remain strongly dependent on their large clients. 
A quite different situation may exist for small and mainly medium-sized firms that are able 
to  manufacture specialized and complex components or moduls  with a high technological 
content These firms can more easily  master requirements of large fmns concerning quality 
and productivity, and they have considerable innovation capacities. Although pressure on these 131 
firms is often strong too, they have a chance of gradually altering their relationsship with their 
clients from  .. sub-contracting to co-contracting" (Dubois &  Linhart 1992). 
Box 3.3:  Types of small and medium enterprises 
1. Market localists 
- micro-sized firms, acting in a local or regional context 
- orientation towards local consumer tastes and demands 
- no subcontracting, no mergers and acquisitions 
- poor access to finance capital and consultancies 
- high rate of fluctuation, low entry and exit barriers 
- often familiy based, low wages 
- volatile individually, but stable altogether 
2. The Craft Based SMEs 
- specialized in diversified and customized products of high quality 
- high skilled workers, flat hierarchies, low division of labour· 
- lacking of close networks of cooperation 
- limited access to finance capital, R&D, and distribution channels 
- problems with increasing speed of innovation 
-threatened by takeovers of big-sized firms 
3. SMEs within Regional Networks (Industrial Districts) 
- craft based SMEs within networks of suppliers, custOmers and competitiors 
- regionally embedded in support infrastructure 
- export orientation 
- high degree of product innovation 
- lack of marketing and research facilities 
- undercapitalized 
- their niche markets are threatened by larger competitors 
4. High-Tech SMEs (Technological Districts) 
- often small fmns with technolocically advanced products for special purposes 
- highly skilled workforce (often with university degree) 
- often spin-offs from  larger fmns, universities or public research institutions 
- high dependence on large organization 
5. SMEs in the New Division of Labour 
- subcontractors or suppliers of large assembly firms 
- first group: system suppliers with cooperative ties 
- second group: producing standardized products and used as buffers for costs and risks 
It remains to be seen how many SMEs are capable of acquiring such a position in relation 
to their large clients. Much depends upon strategies of large firms  and the new division of 
labour which they may establish. Current developments in automotive industry indicate that 132 
there will be few  technological sophisticated system suppliers at the top of the supplier py-
ramid while most other suppliers facing  less favourable conditions and even become sub-
suppliers. 
A warning is due here: While it may advance efficiency in the short-term, such hierarchical 
supply systems may prove to become a major impediment to an industrial performance in the 
long run.  Hierarchical structures in enterprises have turned out to  be unfavourable for pro-. 
ductivity,  quality  and  innovation  in  whole  production  chaines  will do  any  better.  Rapid 
innovation and development of new markets, in particular, require collaborative rather than 
hierarchical structures. 
Considering the situation of different types of small and medium enterprises, the conclusion 
is that prospects for this important part of the European economies are quite uncertain. The 
relationsships between small and medium enterprises on one side and large enterprises on the 
other are changing significantly.  Large firms  are decentralizing and the newly established 
small, powerful, flexible and partly autonomous units often become competitors for SMEs. 
Moreover, large fums often integrate  small and medium suppliers integrated in a hierarchical 
organization of the production chain. 
Strategies and policies for a vital SME economy 
Traditional wisdom is that small and medium firms are economically successful because they 
do things that large firms  are not able to do or cannot do efficiently: Serving local markets 
and market niches, producing highly specialized goods and exploiting marginal labour forces. 
This is hardly a strategy for tl}e future because this would leave small and medium enterprises 
with a decreasing share as increasingly flexible large enterprises enter the traditional domain 
of the SMEs. 
The advice must be different. As large enterprises decentralize and develop towards a system 
of frrms-in the  .. finn with similar flexibility and capabilities as SMEs, the latter have to acquire 
on  their part those capabilities which  make up  for the strength of large enterprises. Major 133 
strengths of the large enterprises are their capabilities to accumulate and con<;;entrate large res-
sources, to exploit synergies and to coordinate a variety of different developments. 
These capabilities  can  be  acquired  by  SMEs  by  means  of collaboration and networking. 
Examples of industrial or technical districts demonstrate that this is a promising approach. 
More specifically, SMEs may choose one of the following  strategies for collaboration: 
1  The first strategy is to find a shelter in large groups. In this case, they renunciate wholly 
or partly from autonomy in order to gain access to the capabilities and resources of a large 
enterprise. 
2  The second strategy is to collaborate in a "kingdom". This means that small and medium 
firms work closely together closely with one big-sized firm which provides market access 
and determines strategic issues. 
3  The third strategy is to cooperate in a "republic". In this case, fmns collaborate on equal 
foot and bring in  their particular strengths  in products  and the production process.  (  cf. 
Sengenberger/Loveman/Piore, 1990). 
The need to collaborate is cutting across long-standing traditions and cultures in. much of the 
SME economy.  Due to  these traditions  and  cultures,  SME  are  usually quite unwilling to 
collaborate. Support by industrial policy is, therefore, often necessary or useful to initiate new 
organizational structures. 
There are two particularly interesting examples of such policies. One is the Danish networking 
programme and  the  other is  a  French  programme  to  enhance collaboration  of small and 
medium enterprises with large enterprises. We will discuss these programmes later in some 
more detail. 
Development of collaborative structures implies that SMEs have to  give up  their traditional 
definion  of  autonomy  which  is  anyway  becoming  obsolete  in  the  world  of advanced 
manufacturing.  In  this  world  organizational  boundaries  loose,  as  we  will  further  discuss 
below, much of their relevance and become fluid. SMEs have to acknowledge this case and 134 
cease to  operate in isolation.  But this  is,  as  we  will  further discuss below,  true for large 
enterprises as well. 
Box 3.4:  Two policies for collaboration 
The Danish Networking Programme 
Features: 
networking of SMEs; joint solutions  to  common problems, mutual complementarity, improvement of 
subcontracting links; public policy scheme for 480 mill. DK for  1990-92; network brokers, subsidies on 
transaction costs; encourage firms to engage in new business opportunities, new markets and strengthening 
of firms' competitive performance. 
Developments: 
250 fmns with about 2000 firms involved; majority of firms aim at an increase of turnover by joint efforts 
in marketing and distribution of new and old products; 19% of them with substantial cost reduction, 42% 
with  substantial  increase  in  turnover,  75%  agreement  on  improvement  of competitive  position  by 
networking; 650 full time employees as direct result 
Prospects: 
Joint efforts of SMEs has qualified them  to compete on international scale. However, this happens in 
rather specialized fields. SMEs could not qualify as system suppliers to 1NEs with global perspectives. 
Restructuring Big Firms in France 
Features: 
Networks of 1NEs and SMEs; national or even international orientation; cooperation in productive and 
non productive functions; endogenous (role of big firms)  and exogenous development (Public sunsidies 
for conversion). 
Developments: 
"Societes de Conversion"  (subsidies for employment and spin-offs by big  firms;  in- 1988 32.000 firm 
founders had subsidies from their former flfffi; consultancy for SMEs by big fmns, exc~ange  programmes 
between ftrms); from subcontracting to partnership networks, cooperative programmes in order to improve 
value chain in  terms of design, organization, production and transport; sharing skills and reducing risks. 
Prospects: 
Risk of dependence of SMEs; need for longtern agreements, need of diversification od system suppliers 
vs.  strong ties to big ftrms, networking between SMEs has to be improved. 
A learning firm: Anthropocentric production systems 
After a long discussion on lean production, it has become clear that most of the deficencies 
in performance of European industry are strongly related to organization. For many years, a 135 
large part of European industry has been concerned with a "microlectronic ·revolution" and 
its potentials for automation, and has missed that the real revolution under way was and is 
an  organizational revolution (  cf. Miles &  Snow, 1992). 
This is certainly not an argument against automation in general. But it is an argument against 
exaggerated expectations concerning the impact of automation. And it is an argument against 
automation  strategies  that  merely  consider  technology  and  neglect  the  complicated 
relationsship between technology and organization. 
The well-known study of the Massachussetts Institute of Technology on automotive industry 
has  well demonstrated that correspondence between automation and productivity is rather 
weak.  The  world's  most  automated  automobil  plant  (a  German  plant)  ranks  low  in 
. productivity, whereas the world's most productive automobile plant (a Japanese plant) ranks 
low in automation (cf. Womack, Jones & Roos,  1990). 
Fig. 3.11:  Automation and productivity in automotive industry 
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Meanwhile, this is increasingly acknowledged in European industry and there is a growing 
discussion on lean production. More and more firms attempt to introduce in Europe the major 
principles of Japanese lean  production.  Yet,  only a few  firms  in  European  industry  have 
already been successful in this attempt. Most of European industry is still struggling with re-
organization. 
The crux of this situation is  two-fold: 
1  if it works  at all,  mere  imitation of Japanese lean  production  leads at the  atmost to  a. 
second-best position of European industry; and 
2  advanced  manufacturing  and  modem  quality  production  require  an  organization  of 
production which is developed far beyond lean production. 
There is much discussion whether Japanese lean production can be transfered to Europe and. 
the United States. The argument against it is that lean production relies on specifi~ Japanese 
conditions. The argument is not convincing. Empirically, a number of examples demonstrate 
that a  transfer of major principles  is  possible  and  even  produces expected results.  More 
systematically, Japanese lean production is nothing completely new, but combines principles 
which are established since long time in European and American industry (Womack, Jones 
&  Roos,  1990Y
8
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The point is not whether it  is possible, but whether it is reasonable to simply transfer Japanese 
lean production to European industry. This would be the second best solution. Due to one of 
its  basic  principles,  namely  continuous  improvement,  lean  production  is  in  permanent 
development and danger is that European industry implements versions that are not at the top 
18  As  Peter  Wickens~ certainly one of the  leading European experts on lean  production~ pointed out in  his 
inaugural professorial lecture at the  University of Sunderland in  January  1993~ lean  production amounts 
basically to an enlightened Taylorism which has incorporated a number of ideas from European craft pro-
duction. 137 
of development. Moreover, there is  knowledge, experience and skills in European industry 
which can be used to develop lean production beyond Japanese models
19
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Development of production systems beyond lean production is necessary to cope successfully 
with difficult requirements of advanced manufacturing concerning productivity, quality and 
flexibility. Much more impottant, it is to reach high capabilites to develop new products, new 
markets and sustainable forms of industrial production. 
The task is to develop an organization for fast learning, an  "intelligent" production system. 
A production systems is  "intelligent" and capable of fast learning, if 
* it makes full use on all levels of the organization of skills, experience and knowledge of 
well trained and motivated personel, and 
* combines this with the exploitation of advanced technology. 
"Intelligent"  production  systems  are. anthropocentric  rather than  technocentric  production 
systems
20
• 
Box 3.5:  Anthropocentric production systems 
Anthropocentric production systems are characterized by the following components: 
1  flexible automation supporting human work and decision-making; 
2  a decentralized organization of work with flat hierarchies and a strong delegation of power and 
responsabilities, especially to the shop-floor level; 
3  a minimised division of labour based on some form of integrated work system design; 
4  a continuous, product-oriented upskilling of workers at work; 
5  a product-oriented integration of the broader production process, that is of the chain of research 
and development, work, marketing and  services (Lehner, 1992). 
1
·
9  Indeed, one of the most successful Japanese transplants in Europe, Nissan UK, has reached its performance 
exactly in this way. Nissan UK has, for example, strongly delegated decisions on equipment to team-leaders 
and decentralized budgets accordingly. Moreover, they have introduced continuous education schemes that 
go far beyond Japanese training and represent European concern for training at its best. 
20  In this report, we do discuss anthropocentric production systems and their advantages as  well as problems 
of implementation of these systems only briefly. For a broader discussion, we refer to another FAST-project 
in which some of us have been involved (cf. Lehner, 1992). 138 
Most  of European  industry  is  still  more  oriented  at  technocentric  concepts  of computer 
integrated  manufacturing and quite far away  from anthropocentric production systems. In 
some of the  member states of the European Communities more than a small proportion of 
industry has already introduced anthropocentric production systems. In most of the countries, 
there is, however, some experimentation with anthropocentric production systems. (Lehner, 
1992). 
Fig. 3.12:  Anthropocentric Production systems in Europe 
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This situation points at one .. of the  most critical issues for  the future of industry in Europe. 
Although it is widely acknowledged that competitiveness of industry strongly depends on high 
performance on the process side, most of industry in Europe still remains in their traditional 
organizational structures. There is much discussion on lean production, but rather few firms 
are establishing lean production, not to  speak of more advanced anthropocentric production 
systems.  (Beer et al.,  1990;  Lehner,  1992;  Tidd,  1991;  Warner, Wobbe &  Brodner,  1990; 
World Competitiveness Report,  1992). 139 
Fig. 3.13:  Traditional and lean organization of production 
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Lean  production  is  well  suited  to  solve  a  certain  range  of  problems  of  advanced 
manufacturing, but neglects others. The strength of lean production is strong simplification 
and decentralization of production. This includes strict segmentation of production in units 
with high autonomy and a minimization of interfaces between different organizational units 
within and outside the firm. 
Strong segmentation and decentralization is a key condition for high flexibilty, productivity 
and quality. It also supports continuous improvement of products and processes. (  cf. Brodner, 
1990; FAST, 1984; Lehner, 1992; Warner, Wobbe &  Brodner, 1990; Wildemann, 1988). 
There  are,  however,  important  limitations  to  segmentation.  Segmentation  works  well  if 
markets  are  well  demarcated  and  production  processes  are  well  defined,  that  is  if no 
significant interdependcies and interrelations of market relations, technological developments 
and production processes exist. If  this is not the case, activities within and across firms are 
interlocked and segmentation does not properly work but rather creates inefficiencies. Rather, 
well working interfaces between different organizational units or while firms are becoming 
decisive. 
Collaboration: Networking for high performance 
Advanced  manufacturing,  that  is  high  value-added  and  technologically  sophisticated 
production, is increasingly associated with situations where activities in and across firms are 
interlocked. Important examples are: 
1  As competition is increasing  I  y shaped by rapid innovation and short product cycles, time-
to-market becomes a decisive factor of competitiveness. Amongst other things, short time-
to-market must be reached by designing products to manufacturing. This links research and 
technological development closely to manufacturing. 
2  Advanced manufacturing is, as we have discussed in the second part of this reprot, by a 
changing pattern of innovation which combines technological breakthrough and technology 141 
fusion with continuous improvement. Inevitably, this interlockes activities in research and 
technical development and in manufacturing not only within, but also across fmns. 
3  More and more, viability of enterprises and whole industries depends on development of 
new products and new markets and a broad diversification of production. This requires a 
synergetic use of knowledge, skills and ressources across tradtional boundaries of markets 
and technologies. Cross-fertilization between different organizational units, enterprises and 
whole industries is becoming decisive. 
4  In advanced manufacturing, organizational boundaries are becoming increasingly fluid and 
open.  Production has to  be flexibly organized along the  whole production chain.  Rapid 
development  and  application  of leading-edge  techology  involves  collaboration  along 
technological food-chains. Accordingly, interdependencies of activities within and across 
fmns increase. 
Fig. 3.14:  Interfaces and tlexibilities in organizations 
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In  this  and  similar  cases,  strict  segmentation  would  create  significant  impediments  for 
productivity, quality and innovation. Lean production, therefore, has to be complemented by 
establishment of interfaces between organizational segments and by a flexible management 142 
of these interfaces. This does not mean renunciation of lean production in favour of an in-
crease of formal  coordination.  That would mean a fall  back in  traditional forms  of large, 
complex and inflexible organization. 
Rather, the task is to develop devices of informal and flexibel coordination which fit to  the 
principles of lean production. The solution is networking rather than formal organization. This 
is a principle which applies both to coordination within and between firms. 
For medium and large firms, application of this principle amounts for the implementation of 
some "fmns-in-a-firm" concepts. Organizational units or production segments are treated as 
a mini-fmn which have powers and resources to serve its task. Relations between different 
mini-fmns are not primarily regulated by formal rules and hierarchy. Rather, they are either 
governed by internal markets or by the same forms of collaboration as are used in networking 
between fmns
21
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Networking of different firms should be .established in order to 
* coordinate activites which are interlocked across firms, 
* exploit potentials for synergy and cross-fertilization, and to 
* institutionalize collaboration along technological food-chaines and in technology-fusion. 
Networking, thus, serves as an  instrument to  bundle resources and capabilities of different 
enterprises  in  order  to  increase  perlormance  of  all  participating  frrms.  Weak  and 
noncommitally cooperation does not sufficiently serve this purpose. Rather, networking has 
to  take the shape of a close, purposive and efficient collaboration in one or more clearly 
defined projects. 
Networking in  this intensive form of collaboration is difficult to  arrange because the usual 
means of formal organization are hardly effective. This is well illustrated by failure of many 
21  An instructive example of a "finns-in-a-fum" concept is the plantof Bosch at Cardiff, Wales. Units in charge 
for the different components of the product are established as mini-finns with strong delegation of powers 
and responsabilites. Relations between the mini-fums Eife designed as producer-client relations_. 143 
attempts of firms  to  diversify through acquisition. ·The  hope was  that in bringing together 
different fmns under one roof of an enterprise this would produce considerable synergies and 
new economic opportunities. In  reality,  however, integration of different firms'  strategies, 
organization, culture and social structures often proved to be extremely time-consuming or 
even failed at all, and the expected results often remained out of reach. 
Fig. 3.15:  An instructive example of  networking: The Japanese consortium on automobil 
recycling (structure and task} 
Source:  Japan Research  Institute~ 1992. 144 
Similar problems  occur if independend firms  should collaborate intensively in  some joint 
project.  Again,  the  problem is  not the  formal  setting of collaboration although  this  often 
involves difficult legal problems. The main problem is to bring different structures, cultures 
and styles together and to  create an efficient and constructive working milieu for the joint 
project. 
Fig. 3.16:  Strategic technology al~iances 
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Creating  an  efficient  and  constructive  working  milieu  for  successfull  collaboration  is 
anthropocentric  managemen~  at its best. The "art of managment" is 
* to  bring the right people together and train them adequately, 
* free them as much as possible from the constraints of hierarchy and formal organization, 
*  to set up effective incentives for collaboration, and 
* to  develop intensive exchange of ideas and knowledge between the joint project and the 
involved firms. 145 
This "art of management" can hardly be phrased in rules and tought in textbooks. 
Development of successful collaboration is,  obviously, difficult for many  frrms.  At least, 
available data demonstrate that intensive collaboration among enterprises is still rather rare. 
An illustrative case are strategic alliances  which are widely discussed since some years, but 
still  rarely established.  In recent years,  the  number of strategic  alliances  has  grown con-
siderably, but still is low in absolute terms. 
Interestingly enough, the number of cooperation agreements in so-called "high-tech"industries 
(biotechnology, new materials, information technology) is much higher than in more mature 
· industries  like  automative,  aerospace,  chemicals · and  food.  This  demontrates  that  fmns 
operating  in  new  and  expanding industries  are  more  likely  to  seek  new  organizational 
solutions and new ways of solving technological and financial problems than those operationg 
in established markets which adhere more or less to their traditional relationships. 
Fig. 3.17:  Cooperation and innovation 
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This is rather paradoxical  because collaboration could  help  firms  in  mature industries  to 
develop new markets and economic opportunities. A study on manufacturing industry in the 
German land of Northrhine-Westfalia demonstrates this well. Results of the study which is 
based on a survey, show that only about half of all firms which have not collaborated have 
developed new products in the last years whereas more than 80% of the collaborating firms 
have developed new products (Belzer, 1993). 
The study also reveals another interesting phenomenon, namely that smaller firms involve less 
in  collaboration  than  larger ones.  This is  particularly  true  with  respect to  marketing and 
research and development where many small and medium firms will not be capable of sur-
viving in isolation. In view of the specific problems which small and medium enterprises· face 
in advanced manufacturing, this is certainly a critical issue not to say an alarming problem. 
Fig. 3.18:  Collaboration by field and by size of firms 
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In European industry, collaboration between firms seems to be much less developed than in 
Japan. In Japan, industrial strategies and industrial policy are rather systematically exploiting 
collaboration as  a means to  advance competitiveness and performance of fmns and whole 
industries.  Against that,  in  Europe both  industry and industrial policy are still reluctant to 
systematically enhance collaboration.  Intensive collaboration  in  strategic fields  hardly  fits 
traditional European concepts of competition. 
The analysis and explanations in the chapters above have taught a more or less intriguing 
lesson.  European  industries  need  to  significantly improve  their capabilities  to  respond to 
arising  problems  and  new  market  opportunities  more· quickly,  more  innovatively,  more 
efficiently and close to the demands of environmental protection. However, it became obvious 
that single fmns  or branches  with  their traditional strategies  are  less  and  less capable to 
respond to the increasing demand for adaptabiliby. Probably~ the challenges of the future can 
only  be  met  adequately  by  linking  and  bundling  various  resources  and  potentials  from 
different fmns, sectors and actors - from finances via production equipment and know-how 
to human resources and organisational-knowledge. Or, to put it in other words: The .future of 
industries in Europe is beyond the borderlines of existing enterprises and traditionally defmed 
sectors and branches. 
Within the last couple of months it has become more and more familiar to  lable such new 
production clusters "virtual corporations" (Davidow/Maione 1993; De Meyer 1992; Business 
Week 8/93; Elektronik 9/93). Roughly spoken, this term characterizes a cooperation, a joint-
venture, an alliance or something similar which was founded between two or more fmns to 
solve their specific problem or to respond to a promising market opportunity by bundling a 
part of the resources of the actors involved;  mostly, communication in· these collaborative 
systems  is  supported  by  making  use  ·of  advanced  information  and  communication 
technologies.  These  new  bi- or multilateral  arrangements  do  not  only  aim  at  linking  the 
technological strenghts and skills of different participants. Furthermore, virtual corporations 
to  profit additionally from  the different market accesses held by  the contributing partners. 
Such a virtual corporation is normally characterized by  a very low level of hierarchy and 148 
vertical integration. Instead, all strengths and activities are focussed to realize the vision of 
quickly responding to a new market opportunity or to solve a common problem
22
• 
Tab. 3.2:  The Virtual Corporation 
The Virtual Corporation - The Company of the Future will be the Ultimate in Adaptibility 
Characteristics of a new corporate model 
Today's joint venture$ and strategic alliances may be an early glimpse of the business organization of 
the future: The Virtual Corporation. It's a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to 
exploit fast-changing opportunities. In a Virtual Corporation, companies can share cost, skills, and access 
to global markets, with each partner contributing what it's best at. Here are the key attributes of such an 
organization: 
Technology 
Informational networks will help far-flung companies and entrepreneurs link up and work together from 
start to finish. The partnerships will be based on electronic contracts to keep the lawyers away and speed 
the linkups 
Excellence 
Because each partner brings its "core competence" to the effort, it may be possible to create a "best-of 
everything" organization. Every function and process could be world-class-something that no single 
company could achieve 
Opportunism 
Partnerships will be less permanent, less formal, and more opportunistic. Companies will band together 
to meet a specific market opportunity and, more often than not, fall apart once the need evaporates 
Trust 
These relationships make companies far more reliant on each other and require far more trust than ever 
before. They'll share a sense of "co-destiny", meaning that the fate of each partner is dependent on the 
other 
No  Borders 
This new corporate model redefines the traditional boundaries of the company. more cooperation among 
competitors, suppliers, and customers makes it harder to determine where one company ends and another 
begins.  ~ 
22  Why virtual? The has its origins in the computer industry - but not, as you might think, in the phrase "virtual 
reality". Instead, it derives when the term "virtual memory" described a way of making a computer act as if 
it had more storage capacity than it really possessed. The virtual corporation will seem to be a singly entity 
with vast capabilities but will  really be the result of numerous collaborations assembled only when they're 
need (Business Week 8/1993).  -149 
In telecommunications, the promising growth industry, some alliances and joint ventures are 
illustrating what a virtual corporation is  and how it works  (see Elektronik: 9/93).  See for 
example the enterprises pooling in and around the EO Inc. which was founded not until1991 
and which is located in Mountain View (USA). AT&T, Matsushita, Marubeni and Olivetti are 
contributing to this network aiming at developing a so-called pen software which will be able 
to identity and process hand-written scripts. 
Fig. 3.19:  Virtual corporations in a collaborative economy 
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Source:  Belzer/Hilbert, 1993. 150 
Up to now, both academic debates and those among managers are focussing on the interfaces 
between the organisations involved. However, one should avoid to  underestimate that the 
success of interfirm collaborations strongly depends on intraorganisational features of the 
firms involved. Anthropocentric production systems which are characterized by both a highly 
qualified,  selfconfident  and  motivated  work-force  and  by  an  advanced  intra-firm 
dezentralization (fmn-in-fmn), will be an excellent intra-finn starting point for contributing 
to  interfirm collaborations. 
If virtual corporations are discussed, it is very often implicitly assumed that one talks about 
project-based alliances and cooperations which only exist for a bounded and narrowly defmed 
times  pan.  "  ... ,  this  new evolving corporate model will  be fluid  and flexible - a  group of 
collaborators that quickly unites to exploit a specific opportunity. Once the opportunity is met, 
the venture will, more often than not, disband." (Business Week 8/93:37) However, this does 
not mean that virtual enterprises can be built out of nothing. Different recent studies analysing 
the birth and development of interfirm collaborations result in a clear message: A successfull 
operation of such an arrangement is more probable if organizations and persons involved are 
familiar to each other and if their relationships is characterized by trust Closeness and trust 
of the potential collaborators is not a conditio sine quo· non, but it makes collaboration much 
more promising (Belzer 1993; Hilbert et al. 1991; Sabel1992, Gordon 1992; Grabher 1992). 
Idealtypically, a project based cooperation, i.e. a new virtual enterprise, is. another knot in an 
existing broad network of joint-ventures, formal and informal alliances etc: Such a network 
does not only comprise large, medium and small sized enterprises, but also finns providing 
business services as well universities and other research institutions. By its very nature, the 
borders of such a network are blurred and fuzzy. Summing up and putting it into other words: 
Virtual  corporations  will  be  ..  better of if they  are  based  on  a  collaborative  or a  network 
economy (see fig.  3.19). 
There is some evidence that regions, nations, sectors and branches differ with· respect to their 
collaborative traditions and practices. The japanese economy, for example, with its famous 
"keiretsu"  is  well-known  for  its  ideosyncratic  kind  of collectivistic  spirit.  Collaborative 
traditions  are  not  quite  unknown  in  Europe  as  well.  See  for  example  the  European 151 
construction industry which already profitted from collaborative production clusters for a very 
long period. However, though even Europe has its experiences with interfrrm collaboration, 
European  industries  have  many  difficulties  to  systematically  increase  and  exploit  this 
promising business strategy. Particularly the SME-sector, i.e. those enterprises that are said 
to  profit the  most from an  increase in  intetfirm collaborations,  is very reluctant to  start 
cooperative arrangements (we already discussed this problem in the previous chapters). 
If the thesis proves valid that virtual corporations are a promising business strategy, and if 
the  analysis  holds  true  that  European  frrms  and  industries  are  very  reserved in  starting 
collaborations,  new concepts and means  have  to  be  identified to  initiate  and to  develop 
European virtual corporations (and to motivate European firms to contribute to multi-national, 
multi-regional collaborations). 
Obviously, Europe is missing an adequate strategy to bundle and link existing potentials from 
various firms and sectors. Perhaps, this gap can be partly filled by further establishment and 
broad use of a modem information and communication infrastructure. Another promising path 
could be that business consultants identify the strategic relevance of interfrrm collaboration 
and start to convince their clients to practize this strategy. But precondition to realize this is 
that the consultants will be able to provide adequate tools to match the interests and purposes 
of the different partners. However, though these developments and hopes are promising and 
helpful, European industrial policies as well should not hesitate to develop strategies to better 
motivate  industries  to  increase  their  performance  and  adaptability  by  founding  virtual 
corporations. Part 4: 
Employment, Work and Welfare: 
The Great Challenge 154 
Mismatches 
It seems as if we were approaching the end of an epoque, in which wealth was drawn from 
human  work. Technological progress has  step  by  step  substituted human work.  Economic 
growth does not necessarily also mean growth of the number of work places. A considerable 
portion  of industrial  investments  aim  at  reducing  human  work.  A  reduced  but  highly 
qualified and highly motivated workforce produces rising wealth. Thqse less qualified  an<~: 
less performing disappear in  unemployment statistics, informal work, .odd jobs or join the 
clientele of welfare offices. 
This state of affairs raises a number of questions which European society may try to evade 
but in one way or other will have to answer. Will we approach a kind of society where many 
are doomed to unemployment and few to overproductivity? Will those who actually work be 
ready to  work more and  work more productively to  finance  a  minimum income for all
1? 
What about the social esteem of those out of payed work but may be engaged in non-payed 
work, of which there is so much in our societies? Should we e.g. go on taxing work income 
instead of the consumption of resources? The list could be continued, and admittedly the 
following chapter will not cover all these issues. But what should be kept in mind, is that we 
face a situation in which facts, means and goals are ambiguous and consequently have to be 
continuously reassessed and redefined- which means that we will have to thoroughly analyze 
and to  learn. 
Box 4.1:  Mismatches 
*  economic growth - rising unemployment 
*  unemployment - overproductivity 
* quality and quantity of labour offers - quality and quantity of labour demanded 
*  actual change - industrial
6adjustment 
1  This situation is highlighted by  the Kaldor-criterion, which. is met when the profits of the winners 
outweigh the compensation payments to the loosers, I<aldor (1939: 549-552). 155 
There is much evidence, that work and employment make up  a considerable  part of the 
portfolio of challenges facing European societies (Commission of. the European Communities 
1991a). The dynamics of these challenges are mainly due to a set of mismatches between 
secular trends, institutional structures and economic rationales. 
Throughout Western industrialized countries, shrinking and aging processes of the population 
can be observed, bringing about a new and irreversible demographic and social structure: 
Fig. 4.1: 
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Qualified labour is running short in many industries.  By the year 2000 there will be more 
workers over 50 than under 30 (Naschold 1993). Estimations for Germany point out, that by 
2000 there will be a share of 422 people of over 60 per 1000 of the age co~ort of 20-59  .. A 
peak will  be reached by  2035,  when  there  will  be 747  over 60 per 1000 of 20-59 years . 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1992;  Naschold  1993).  Politicians already announce a postponement 156 
of retirement-policies, completely contrary to the present struggle over shortening working 
time in many countries. Yet at the same time unemployment is marching on. 
Fig. 4.2:  Share of 15-19 year olds in Europe and the United States 
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For fmns these demographic trends are reflected in the age composition of their workforce 
with  co.nsequences  for  pay  structures,  skill  levels,  recruitment  policies,  innovation.  and 
organisational structures: 
* Pay structures and social benefits in most countries follow some kind of seniority rules, 
raising the cost for "old" labour. 
* Skill levels and a propensity for innovation is dependent on lifelong further training, which 
older workers  tend  to  look  upon  as  a  challenge  to  their competence,  while  technical 
innovation threatens both competence and organisational status. 157 
* Shortage of labour and aging end up in organisational sklerosis
2
• 
These demographic trends receive their erosive powers by the characteristic link of European 
welfare systems to industrial work.  It may be looked upon as an irony of history, that it is 
the original European project of the welfare state, which makes for much of the structural 
unemployment problem. Welfare arrangements support the flexible adjustment of labour to 
change, limiting the negative social and economic consequences for the individual. However, 
at the same time these arrangements constitute incentives for enterprises to solve economic 
problems at the expense of unemployment schemes and welfare budgets rather than searching 
for economic alternatives. The result is considerable financial stress on welfare budgets and 
the welfare system as  a whole,  as well as a delay in the necessary structural adjustment of 
firms and in the search for new economic opportunities and new jobs. 
Politically, too, the welfare system provides the instruments to take the strain off politics to 
formulate and implement employment policies instead of administrating unemployment. This 
in mind, Naschold (1993) speaks of a "virtuous" and a "vicious" circle of work and welfare. 
As  has  been  pointed out in  the  previous  chapters  of this  report,  Europe  suffers  from  a 
productivity and general competitivity lag vis a  vis Japan, and in a number of  ·fields vis a  vis 
the US, too. European industries mostly have defmed their backlog in terms of costs, which 
in most European languages  means to  cut the cost of labour.  But even where firms have 
taken  recourse  to  advanced  models  of production,  e.g.  by an  intelligent combination  of 
advanced technology and human skills, the consequent deployment of qualified labour takes 
its toll on less qualified or less efficient labour - at least  as long as there is no growth based 
on new products and new markets. While the integration of markets favours "strong" regions, 
peripheral or less developed regions of Europe tend to loose industrial and human substance, 
thus  endangering  social  cohesion  of  EC-Europe  and  the  project  of  a  political  union 
(Jochimsen 1992). 
2  This is also one of the core  theses of OECD (1992:  1~9 ff.). 158 
Tab. 4.1:  Expenditure for social security 1962-88 (percent of GDP) 
1962  1966  1970  1975  1980  1986  1987  1988 
Belgium  15,5  16,5  18,5  23,0  26,6  29,0  28,7  .. 
Denmark  . .  ..  19,6  25,8  28,6  26,8  27,7  28,5 
Germany  17,5  18,7  21,4  29,8  28,5  27,9  28,2  28,1 
France  16,3  18,2  18,9  22,9  25,9  28,6  28',3  28,3 
Greece  . .  . .  . .  . .  ..  . .  . .  . . 
U.K.  . .  ..  15,9  19,5  21,4  24,6  23,6  . . 
Ireland  . .  ..  13,2  19,4  21,8  24,3  23,6  22,6 
Italy  14,3  18,1  18,8  22,6  22,8  22,5  22,9  22,9 
Luxembourg  15,7  17,6  16,0  21,5  24,8  25,5  26,4  26,6 
Netherlands  13,7  17,2  20,7  28,1  30,4'  30,9  31,3  30,7 
Portugal  . .  . .  . .  ..  . .  16,4  16,7  17,0 
Spain  ..  . .  . .  . .  . .  17,7  17,7  18,1 
Source:  Gabriel, 1992. 
As an alternative to cope with demographic problems, regulated and selective immigration 
might be considered. Scenario studies covering the years up to 2010 for West-Germany have 
shown that though in a short run immigration would lead to  higher unemployment, in the 
long run it would lead up to higher growth covering even the employment of immigrants. For 
West-Germany immigration would increase the GNP by 1% - 1.3%; and employmet:lt would 
rise by 13%- 22%, whereas without immigration it would go down by 6%. Unemployment 
-rates  are· forecasted with quotas of 9% to  10% -quotas, which because of lacking demand 
would have to be expected also without immigration. Real income per head would rise within 
the  period  forecasted  by  about  a  third~  again  with  or  without  immigration;  without 159 
immigration,  contribution  to  social  security  schemes  would  necessarily  go  up 
(KolVOchelNogler-Ludwig 1993). 
Fig. 4.3:  Share of the foreign labour capacity in the total number of employees in 
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As  there  is  obviously  no  invisible  hand  at  work  reconciliating  economic  and  social 
imbalances, external effects and contrasting interests, politics is  called upon  to  shape  the 
design and rules of interaction in a Single Market 
Structural unemployment 
In the course of a relatively long period of growth, employment in most European countries 
has gone up, although accompanied by phases of cyclical unemployment and regional shifts. 
Problems of cyclical unemployment can be tackled by some kind of Keynesian strategies. But 160 
in  the last years each phase of cyclical unemployment has  added to  a growing stock of 
structural unemployment, which can only be handled in combination with other policies. 
Fig. 4.4:  Unemployment rates in Europe 
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Source:  Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir das Ausland, 1992. 
Generally  speaking,  structural  unemployment is  caused by  a  mismatch of quantities  and 
qualities  of  labour  supplied  and  labour  demanded.  E.g.,  the  introduction  of  new 
manufacturing  processes  combined  with  the  spreading  of  new  materials  will  affect 
employment as well as the relevance of skills particularly those traditionally associated with 
metal bending and shaping (Hayward 1992). These processes are mainly due to  a time lag 
between actual change and adjustment. While the seventies had experienced growth in output 
going along  with  growth  in  employment,  the  late eighties and nineties  have  seen growth 
produced by automation going along with high unemployment rates, high demand for skilled 
labour,  regional  isles  of growth  and  a  periphery  loosing  industrial  and human  substance 161 
(OECD 1992: 150). The situation is well illustrated by a comparision of unemployment rates 
and vacancies. 
Tab. 4.2:  Employee  activity  rate  1950-1987  (economically  active  population  to  the 
entire population in percent 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1986  1987 
Belgium  41,6  40,1  39,1  39,0  39,7  40,8  42,2  42,6  42,7  42,9 
Denmark  46,3  46,4  44,0  46,3  48,3  49,1  52,0  55,4  56,2  56,7 
Germany  46,1  48,2  47,3  45,3  44,2  43,5  44,2  45,6  45~  46,1 
France  ..  43,9  41,5  40,6  42,2  42,4  ·43,4  43,4  43,3  43,3 
Greece  . .  . .  ..  39,9  39,0  38,0  37,7  41,1  40,9  40,7 
U.K.  45,2  46,3  45,6  46,1  45,5  46,0  47,6  48,8  48,9  49,0 
Ireland  42,2  41,0  37,2  38,7  37,9  36,4  36,7  36,9  36,9  37,0· 
Italy  ..  40,5  43,6  39,3  38,8  38,3  39,8  41,1  41,7  41,9 
Luxembourg  ..  42,5  41,9  40,2  40,0  41,7  41,8  42,6  42,5  42,9 
Netherlands  37,0  35,8  35,4  35,9  36,8  36,5  38,0  40,1  40,0  40,6 
Portugal  36,6  . .  38,4  . .  ..  45,4  46,2  46,9  46,5  46,9 
Spain  37,7  . .  38,1  ..  38,6  38,7  36  .• 0  36,2  36,6  37,8  . 
Source:  Gabriel, 1992. 
The French economy, for example, grew at an annual rate of about 3%  anually during the 
second half of the  eighties;  yet over the same period employment only grew at a pace of 
0.4%.  Empirical evidence shows,  that enterprises prefer bigger overtime payments· to  their 
skeleton crews instead of hiring new  personnel. 
People outside the employment system still have the chance to  find work, but often only in 
temporary  or part-time  positions  with  less  pay  and  fewer  benefits  (Commission  of the 162 
Etiropean Communities 1991a; Bernstein/Magnusson 1993). Manifest already in the US, these 
tendencies can already also be observed on the European labour market. 
No  doubt, the application of new and modern technologies has contributed to  the massive 
killing of jobs, but, due to the ambiguity of change, they have simultaneously contributed to 
the creation of new jobs (Schettkat/Wagner 1989). By far stronger than by  the introduction 
of  new  technologies  structural  unemployment  is  accounted  for  by  developments  of 
·competitiveness among the triad as well as among the industrialized countries and the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs). So unemployment is rising as new restructurings of markets 
and layoffs come on top  of earlier ones  made in  anticipation of the  Single Market.  E.g. 
automobile manufacturers will have to cut costs - which in European tradition means cuts in 
personnel costs- of by and large 50% to close the gap with the Japanese (Belzer/Dankbaar 
1993).  European  steel makers  have  heavily  invested in modem technology  and are  now 
among the world's most efficient- yet this has cost Europe hundreds of thousands of jobs. 
Unequal  distribution  of  growth  and  decline  among  regions  and  branches,  including 
'promising' branches, puts severe strains on the national economies as well as  on the EC · · 
bugets  (see also  the  paragraph on  'Work and Welfare'  below). The economic and social 
impacts and strategic problems of both structural unemployment and unequal distribution of 
growth can be named: 
* a significant decrease of purchasing power and absorbing capacities of European markets; 
* a  decline  of the  diversified  market  structures  which  have  been  the  stronghold  of the· 
European economies so far; 
* a loss of industrial competence and competence of human resources; 
* a considerable rise of distributive conflict; and 
* a decline of social cohesion, regionally, nationally as well as Europe-wide. 
Structural  unemployment always threatens  to  staJ.t  a  vicious,  self-enforcing  circle of less 
consumption,  decreasing  market volumes  allowing  for  less  output and  use  of production 
capacities, which in turn creates more unemployment and destruction of human resources. 
European markets traditionally operate under the condition of a broad diversity of demand, 163 
which  makes  for  much  of their  world-wide  competitiveness.  A  significant reduction  of 
purchasing powers of large strata of the population would almost certainly devaluate this 
asset  of European  industry.  Beyond  that,  structural  unemployment  will  almost  certainly 
aggravate distributive conflicts and undermine endeavours for social cohesion -preconditions 
for both the prospects of a political union and global economic competitiveness. 
The  problems  sketched  out  above  already  point  to  policy  implications:  phenomena  of 
structural unemployment cannot be tackled directly by means of short-term "labour market 
programmes" of the traditional kind, because the lay-off of labour is only the end of what in 
reality is a complex and ambiguous process. What is required is rather a strategic, long-term 
political concept aiming at institutional rearrangements geared to  the enhancement of the 
competitiveness  of the  labour  force.  Apart  from  the  issues  discussed  below,  stra~gic 
. -employment policies will have to focus on 
the economies of traditional labour market institutions and processes and their integration 
into competition policies
3
; 
- the short- and long-term consequences of different production models for labour market 
strategies; 
- recruitment and personnel strategies of enterprises; 
- the  development  of strategies  to  enhance  the  contribution  of employment policies  to 
regional development and social cohesion within the Community. 
Skills, qualification and training: Bringing about change by learning 
In the debate among the ecopomic sciences education and training has been promoted from 
an exogeneous residual factor to a status of intangible investment
4
• The logic is evident: it is 
not due to lack of capital investment which inhibits poor countries and regions to catch .up 
with  richer  ones,  but  lack  of human  capital  to  realize  the  potential  productivity  of new 
3  Basic philosophies of institutional competition are discussed in Siebcrt/Koop (1993). 
4  For a definition of 'tangible' and 'intangible' investme.nt see OECD (1992:18). 164 
machines and technologies. Comparisions of the competitive strength of Japan and East Asian 
countries to the US and Europe have made clear that the quality of human capital makes for 
much of these countries' success (World Bank 1991; Industrial Research and Development 
Advisory Committee of the Commission of the European Communities - IRDAC - 1990; 
CEC,  1991b). The message of all these studies is clear: cohesion and competitiveness, the 
overriding goals of the community in the years "after Maastricht", are to a significant extent 
dependent on effective education and training policies. The alternative to  further training 
structurally anchored in an individual's working life as well as in a fmn's.-strategy portfolio 
are rigid rationalization strategies, at the end of which there is remaining only a thin stratum 
of expert workers managing the production process. 
To  get  hold  of the  chances  of new  technologies  and  the  Single  Market  a  favorable 
institutional environment is needed, a central part of which is the organization of education, 
qualification and training. Because of demographic developments, EC-countries will have to 
take into account an overaging of the economically active population with the consequence, 
that already in ten years time Europe will lack young, qualified and efficient labour. In so 
far, says Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner, president of the Club of Rome, permanent further training 
and teaching takes a crucial role.  But still fmns do not make sufficient use of the creative 
potential of employees, especially of women, who in his view are the largest unused resource 
of creativity  (Siiddeutsche  Zeitung,  March  4th  1993;  Rees  1992).  For Herbert  Henzler, 
chairman of the German subsidiary of McKinsey's, qualification and appropriate qualification 
policies make up the most important single factor of competitiveness and moreover the most 
important factor within the disposition of national policies (Henzler 1992a). 
Along with  the changes in  the structure of the population and the workforce fundamental 
changes in the structure of e<!ucational qualification can be observed throughout Europe.  As 
more and more youth with higher education enter employment, and further training schemes 
are extended, a turn-around of the traditional qualification pyramid takes place, leaving only . 
marginal chances to a remaining pile of low qualified and uneducated workers (OECD 1992). 
The increasing qualification level of the European workforce makes for much of industries' 
competitiveness,  but at the  same  time  there  are  associated  serious economic and social 165 
problems as e.g. labour costs, the availability of skilled blue-collar work as well as unskilled 
work, job chances of the less qualified, claims to the quality of work places as well as the 
quality of working life in general, and finally social cohesion on the shop floor as well as 
within enterprises as  a whole. 
Fig. 4.5:  Educational attainment of working age population in selected OECD 
countries 
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Tab. 4.3:  Annual percentage changes in educational attainment levels of working age 
population 
Level of education 
A  B  c  D  E 
Australia 1983-88  -2,02  0.54  3,16  1,97  3,32 
Austria 1981-87  -5,73  1,54  7,32  ..  12,30 
Belgium 1970-87  -1,28  5,77  ..  . .  3,07 
Canada 1975-87  -2,50  1,89  ..  0.55  3,97 
Germany 1978-87  -2,16  -3,75  0,90  4,20  2,75 
Italy 1980-87  -1,32  .  -4,91  . .  . .  3,60 
Japan 1974-87  -2,76  1.54  . .  ..  3,55* 
Norway 1972-87  -5,83  6,32  . .  ..  5,80 
Sweden 1971-87  -2,71  1,86  5,31  7,08  .. 
United States ·1972-88  -2,83  0,51  ..  2,23  3,34 
*  Since levels D and E are separated in 1987, but not in 1974, they have been combined under level E for the 
purpose of this analysis. 
Source:  OECD, 1992. 
Education  and  training  programmes  for  sure  are  no  instrument  to  reduce  actual 
unemployment, and hopes for immediate results will be disappointed.  Yet in the long run 
human capital investments will pay off in economic growth, competitiveness, higher wages, 
innovation  and  finally  in  more  jobs.  US  studies  of  the  late  80s  have  confJl1'Ped  the 
conclusion, that company-sponsored training programmes have ·~oosted workers' wages by 
about  4%  to  11%,  but  productivity  gains  outweighed  higher  labour  costs  (Bernstein/ 
Magnusson  1993). There are cases where a  10% increase in spending on training schemes 
produced  3%  in  productivity  over two  years,  which  was  twice  as  large  as  the  pay  rise 
resulting from the upgrading of workers. President Clinton's plans to upgrade US-workers' 167 
skills and training by obligatory training funds are expected to cost enterprises an extra $21 
billion per year, which would almost certainly cause them to restrain wages and hiring in the 
short run.  But it would also generate some $63  billion in new economic activities and 2.5 
million new jobs over the next three  to  five  years  to  come.  These numbers highlight the 
underlying calculus of a positive trade-off between upfront costs and long-term gains. The 
same can be  shown for France,  where ChoffeVCuneo/Kramarz (1988)  have systematically 
analyzed  frrm's  development  during  the  70s  and  80s.  Their  studies  confrrm  that active 
qualification  strategies  have  considerably  enhanced  performance  and  strategic  efficiency. 
Robert Reich at his confirmation hearing in the US-Senate: "The overarching goal is not only 
more jobs for our citizens, but higher-wage jobs." This obviously requires more and better 
training. 
The argument for school and college training runs along the same road. D.W. Jorgenson of 
Harvard University calculated, that an extra year of high school education adds an average 
of $96,000 to  a  male worker's life income and $51,000 to  a female's  (Jorgenson/Bowker 
1989). The lifetime rate of return from an investment in college training averages 10%. 
These arguments represent the broadly shared view, that the upfront pains of human-capital 
investments will bring a healthier economy down the·  road~ The strategic issue headed for is 
not  only  training,  but  the  modernization  of work  to  gain  global  competitiveness.  The 
enhancement of human qualifications brings about change in ·production systems enhancing 
competitiveness;  advanced production systems  put new.  demands  on  human qualifications 
and the development of new skill profiles. "It is not the number of robots and computers, size 
and technical perfection of work centres or the degree of automation which will decide upon 
our future success, but our human resources." says Carl H. Hahn, chairman of the supervisory 
board  of Volkswagen  AG  SStiddeutsche  Zeitung  March  4th  1993).  This  philosophy  is 
nurtured by a recent INSEAD-study based on data from.108 big European companies from 
15  countries  (DeMeyer  1992).  Though  firms  to  a  large extent had  by  now  absorbed the 
principles  of customer-driven  manufacturing,  total-quality  management  and  just-in-time-
practices,  it is  argued,  this  ha~ not  significantly  enhanced  the  competitive  position  of 
European manufacturing. Therefore, investments in robots are found at the absolute bottom 
of a list of important future actions to be taken by  ~anagement. Rather, something extra is 168 
required if a manufacturer is  to  gain competitive advantage - which according to the study 
may be found in-the "unambiguous commitment to the improvements of human resources." 
The unmanned factory  does  not seem to  be  the current goal  of European  manufacturers; 
instead they try to regain competitiveness by upgrading and deploying their workforce. The 
management problem is to keep the balance between technological innovation, organisational 
design and the resulting transformation of skill profiles (Baden-Fuller/Stopford 1992). 
Weak  management  performance  is  a  specific  characteristic  of small  and  medium  sized 
enterprises (SME)
5
• They often find themselves in a kind of "skill-trap", because the demand-
supply-interface  doesn't ·really  work:  hardly  able  to  predict  their  short  term  economic 
development,  they are  unable to  qualify and quantify their specific  skill needs - with the 
consequence,  that  trainers  or  training  institutions  cannot respond  to  their  demands  and 
expectations, which in turn leads to failure and further neglect of training. 
Though the importance of further training is undoubted, this is a field only poorly shaped by 
political measures and initiatives, although in most European countries there is a considerable 
amount of politically fostered and publicly funded measures to train and retrain unemployed  .. 
Against that preventive measures of further training for the employed are mainly left to  ~e 
-'discretion of enterprises. In the consequence most measures are rather enterprise specific and 
selective, and since most acquired certificates are not generally acknowledged, the mobility 
of workers is hindered instead of enhanced. Usually, it is rather the well qualified who enjoys 
the  "privilege"  of further  training  than  the  employed  un- or less  qualified  - a  strategy 
fostering the tendency to build up a highly qualified core workforce and thereby widening the 
qualification gap on the labour market, i.e. fostering structural unemployment. For Germany 
a CEDEFOP-study has estimated that only 3%  of the unqualified enjoy further training, as 
against 40% of technical  pe~sonnel and 65%  of management personnel (Hocker 1992). To 
apply  further  training  as  a  means  of preventive  labour  market  policy  as  well  as  an 
entrepreneurial strategy is advancing only slowly. 
s  For details see Rainnie/Sperling/Hilbert/Kieinschmidt {1993). 169 
The exception is  Denmark,  where already  in  the beginning of the sixties  a partly ·public 
corporative system of further training for the employed has been established, which in terms 
of costs and numbers of participants is rating higher than further training of the unemployed. 
With a share of 0.28%  of the GNP (1989) devoted to  further training Denmark keeps the 
unchallenged leading position of the OECD-countries. The importance ascribed to publicly 
institutionalized further training is  reflected by  the composition of the overall budget: two 
thirds are covered by public funds, one third by private money. This relation, and along with 
that part of the rationale of this strategy, is explained by  the structure of Danish industry, 
which is mainly small and medium sized, with all the adv.antages and disadvantages of this 
type of enterprises. The system is financed by a fund fed by contributions of both enterprises 
and employees, irrespective of the degree of utilization. This way a kind of redistribution of. 
resources takes place between training-intensive and less intensive enterprises and employees. 
Programmes are operated by a corporative executive committee and intensively frequented. 
Stress is  layed  upon  training of less  qualified leading up  to  independent qualifications -
measures that had to be pushed through against the skilled workers' unions, but meanwhile 
are acknowledged in collective bargaining agreements. 
The Danish example demonstrates in line with the FINE-regional studies the importance of 
differentiated regional networks including enterprises, training institutions, federations, unions 
and public authorities  as  well as  schools  and universities,  and fmally  special support for 
SME's to approach facilities offered. Quite a number of supporting EC-programmes such as 
COMETT, FORCE, EUROTECNET all go along this road. Yet the studies also make clear, 
that the social and economic status quo as well as the challenges to  meet require activities 
developed and launched primarily at the regional level. Branch, enterprise and qualification 
structures,  infrastructures  and  educational  traditions  are  too  manifold  to  be covered by  a 
centrally designed approach  ... Instead,  policies should strengthen the regional  institutional 
and  educational  infrastructure,  especially  in  the  poorer and  peripheral  regions.  Here  the . 
provision  of an  efficient education  and  training  infrastructure  may  be  the  kick-off for  a 
sustaining economic development. 
Though  widely  acknowledged  to  be  one  crucial  issues  for  structural  change  and 
competitiveness,  further  training  programmes  are  rather  diffuse  and  only  poorly 170 
operationalized. To a more or less high degree it is  left to  industry itself, so that structural 
effects are rather accidentally than strategically planned. Against that the Danish experience 
demonstrates firstly,  that it is  more promising to  train less qualified workers while they are 
on the job than once they are layed off; secondly, state governed or corporatively organized 
schemes are an efficient cotTective to  take the edge off the  unbalance of market-mediated 
supply, access and use of further training facilities. This way, it would make politically and 
economically sense to  push cooperative models ranging from vocational training centres to 
SME-networks to polytechnics and universities and to provide them with the necessary means 
to  successfully take off (Commission of the European Communities 1991; Kommission der 
Europaischen  Gemeinschaften  1992).  Although  polytechnics  and universities  are in  most 
countries  engaged  in  technology  transfer,  they  have  not  been  very  inventive  to  gain 
substantial  shares  in  the  further  training  m~ket, especially  in  the  field  of management 
training for advanced production systems
6
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There is remaining the question of what to qualify in. This question very often postulates an 
end product. that will last for the rest of an individual's working life. But the goal is life-long 
learning, and each cutriculum or training course can only provide another step for further 
training and education. It has not been the task of the FINE-project to go into any details of 
education and training schemes proper, yet some general trends should be mentioned which 
emerge from the FINE-industry as well as from the regional studies. Global competition and 
volatile demand behaviour require a higher degree of commercial or management thinking on 
all levels of the frrm: employees as well as management have to be aware ot  cost and quality 
throughout the organization. "Higher-order"-technologies ask for distinctive skills to analy~e, 
synthesize, solve problems, develop, shape and apply new technologies or systems. 
The seiViCe industries are in ryeed of customizing their products. Finally, the redesign of work. 
and organisations as a whole require decision-making capacities, responsibility, social skills 
and adaptability to new situations and conditions. Recently, the European Round Table added 
"linguistic  skills"  as  a  prerequisite  for  market  integration  and  the  mobility  of labour 
6  An exclusion to the rule is said to be Warwick University, UK, which has successfully set up a  "Warwick 
Manufacturing Group" conducting joint research with ~ompanies. (The Economist, April  17th,  J993). 171 
(Monod/Gyllenhammar/Dekker 1991). It is especially social skills that were found to  be of 
importance in particular to technically and organisationally advanced fmns
7
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Source:  OECD, 1992. 
Box 4.2:  Skills 
Type of skills and competences 
Product specific 
skills 
............ 
.. ········• 
Mulliskilling  Problem solving and 
entrepreneurial skills 
.. ···" 
............... ···················/· 
.................... 
On all levels of the firm's hierarchy the redisign and reorganisation of work require: 
*  decision-making capacities and responsibility 
*  social skills 
*  adaptability to new situations and improvisation capacities 
*  managerial thinking 
7  A more detailed investigation into skill shortages is given by the Industrial Research and Development 
Advisory Committee of the Commission of the European Communities- IRDAC- (1990), see also 
OECD (1989a+b).  . 172 
Specific stress should be layed upon the advancement of management skills. It is not only 
market orientation and commercial skills, that are lacking. Deficits are even more distinct in 
persuasion  and  communication  skills,  teamwork,  and  orientation  towards  results  and 
performance. Accordingly it is the less qualified executives, who tend to neglect training for 
themselves  as  well  as  for  their employees,  thus  missing  to  establish  a  company training 
culture. 
The pressure to deploy human resources· more efficiently only in part stems from market and 
technological developments; considerable strains are exerted by demographic developments. 
The aging of the workforce  and integration of foreign  labour will also require particular 
training strategies, e.g. with respect to previous schooling and vocational training, attitudes, 
flexibility and experience. Attention will have to be paid to link further training measures to 
specific career situations in order to develop the willingness to accept the necessity for life-
long  learning.  Instead of a  once-and-for-all-passport  to  a  specific  career provided  by a. 
vocational or professional training certificate people must be convinced that what is needed 
is rather a portfolio of competences developed and renewed over time and in line with the 
life cycle of an individual's working life. 
Box 4.3:  The important link: Qualification and production systems 
An enhancement of general qualification will work out structurally only, if new 
production systems are installed requiring higher degrees of qualification, and if new 
products and new markets are developed absorbing the increased productive potential. 
Otherwise qualification strategies, the more efficient they are, would augment 
rationalization effects. 
The problems arising from the changing age structure of the work force and skill shortages 
may  be  encountered  by  increasing  women's  labour  market  participation.  In  almost  all 
European countries, women's qualification is rising and thus  they provide for a major labour 
market reserve. Especially in regions where industrialisation and the corresponding service 
branches are only developing they stand for an important development potential. By the end 
of the  80ies  about  half of the  students  in  higher education  courses  in  central  European 173 
countries  were  women,  yet  up  to  today  they  only  occupy  a  minority  of supervisory  or 
managerial jobs, not to speak of higher executive positions. Open or hidden discrimination 
and biased recruitment practices still keep this enormous potential closed and unused (Rees 
1992). 
Fig. 4.7:  Female employment 
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Source:  Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Ausland 1992. 
In the case of infotmation technology skills Teresa Rees of Cardiff University has shown, 
that  in  many  of the  skills  needed in  modern jobs,  such  as communication,  team  work, 
languages  and  diagnostic  skills  women  excel.  Yet  there  are  only  few  careers  offered 
demanding specific women's skills (Rees 1992). She gives the example of secretaries, whose 
skill potentials are often overlooked as managers' perceptions of the potential of secretaries 
has  not  changed  in  line  with  secretaries  actual  skills  and  training  achievements.  Her 
conclusion is,  that not only school education, vocational and professional training should be 
reorganized to meet the specific learning predispositions of women, but that managers should 174 
be trained to understand the implications of new technologies for job design and recruitment 
policies (Rees 1992: 35 ff.). 
As the relevance of qualification and training is undisputed, the main strategic problems are 
to  be found on the operational side.  Changes in demand for skilled labour are much more 
rapid  than  changes  in  supply.  The diversity  of institutional  arrangements,  infrastructural 
provisions and economic and social structures require 'individual' approaches instead of a 
coherent, encompassing concept. As the Danish example quoted above makes clear, matters 
of qualification and training can be handled successfully on national and even on regional 
levels. The role of politics and political institutions in this field therefore is primarily to give 
impulses and to provide platforms, where necessary to press for activities and to coordinate 
and support advanced and promising model solutions. Why not e.g. offer tax incentives to 
training intensive enterprises and stimulate discussions to make "competitiveness by training" 
an issue for industrial relations and collective bargain~ng agreements. The long-term strategic . 
aim of national and EC-policies should be to convince employees and management alike, that 
there  is  no  chance  to  adjust  to  change,  to  modernize  work  organization,  to  enhance 
competitiveness,  to  open up  new  markets  and to  secure workplaces except by learning -
lifelong. 
Work organization and the management of human resources: Promoting change from 
within 
As we are rapidly moving towards a knowledge-intensive economy, new market structures 
and  organizational  paradigms  are  about  to  change  the  way  economies  work,  or more 
precisely: the way competition is carried· out. There are enormous growth potentials to be 
mobilized - on  the  precondition that politics  and industry succeed to  match  advances in 
knowledge and technology with the necessary innovations in the workplace
8
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8  For an elaborated discussion of this issue see: Dcrtouzos/Lester/Solow (1989) and Eliasson/Ryan (1986). 175 
Successful  production  strategies  have  been  developed  in  the  context of anthropocentric 
production systems (APS), that is of advanced production systems which combine computer-
based  technology  with  intelligent organization  and  skilled  work  (Lehner  1992;  Bradner 
1992;  Monitor-FAST 1992). The visions of the "factory of the future" of the early eighties 
had been dominated by CIM-strategies; now in the early nineties, the discussion has shifted 
to  "lean production", mainly evoked by  the book of Womack/Jones/Roos (1990). This has 
provoked  Bradner  to  ask:  "Should  it  perhaps  have  been  just  another  huge  marketing 
campaign of the big data processing suppliers in alliance with interested research institutes 
and state agencies being horrified by expected losses of competitiveness?" (Bradner 1992). 
At  least  the  style  of discussion  suggests  the  question:  .. And·  what  is  there  beyond  lean 
production?" 
The strategic problem can be highlighted with a view to  mechanical engineering, which as 
the supplier of necessary means of production is central to  most other industries (Bradner 
1992).  European  mechanical engineering shows a marked tendency to  further lose· market 
shares  to  Japan  as  well  as  the  US.  The  products  of this  branch  of industry  are  highly 
sophisticated,  diverse  and  innovative  and  they  serve  a  big  domestic  market.  Though 
enterprises  have  experienced  considerable  growth  rates  and  export  successes,  they  have 
realized only poor profits tightly limiting their financial resources and investment powers. 
Cyclical  fluctuations  and  management  failures  in  the  estimation  of  markets  put  aside 
(Bradner  1992)  the  industry  mainly  suffers  from  a  productivity  crisis:  a  highly  skilled 
workforce  commanding  considerable  experience,  knowledge  and  competence  has  been 
employed to horizontally and vertically segregated work demanding only part of their virtual 
competence,  thus  diminishing the  ability  of companies to  react flexibly  aild creatively to 
market changes and to continuously adjust organizational structures. The gap between leading 
and average companies is widening. 
Anthropocentric production systems take up  the basic rationale and principles of Japanese 
lean  production  systems,  but  "translate"  them  into  European  industrial culture.  European 
management  philosophies  are  implicitly  or  explicitly  still  strongly  influenced  by  the 
tayloristic  paradigm,  i.e.  the  worker is  the cause  of trouble.  Consequently  progn).mmable 
automation has been used to  (re-)gain independence from (tacit) knowledge and experience 
of the workforce. But technology turned out not to be the solution, rather it turned out to be 
part  of the  problem.  In  many  firms  along  with  the  workplaces  human  skills,  ingenuity, 
knowledge and experience got lost, and as capital investments in NC and CNC technologies 
didn't pay off, the decline of firms was programmed_ Only recently the VDMA, the German 176 
metal engineering  association,  acknowledged  this  analysis  as one of the reasons  for  the 
present  situation  of the  machine-tool  industry  (Siiddeutsche  Zeitung  March  18th  1993; 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung March 24th 1993). 
There is yet another argument for a substantial paradigm shift in production models: in the 
short run, rigid automation strategies may be a way out of problems of competitiveness and 
cost structures,  but examples have shown that even in medium-term results may tum out 
disastrous.  Automation technologies require significant capital investments, which in turn 
makes it necessary to achieve high capital productivity. If labour costs cannot be-significantly 
reduced  and market shares  significantly  extended,  this  may lead to  existential  problems 
already in the short run. Against that organizational measures. to enhance the productivity of 
labour is less expensive and less restricted by the uncertainties of markets. 
An argument, that should neither be overestimated nor neglected, says that along with rising 
living standards, rising levels of qualification and changes in the structure and organization 
of industrialized societies, a  general change of values has evolved.  For working life,  this 
results in a call for more demanding jobs offering higher degrees of autonomy, chances to 
take over responsibility and to deploy one's skills. At least to qualified workers, irrespective 
of blue- or white-collar, these issues are gaining in importance (Brodner 1992). These are 
conditions, under which manufacturing has to compete on the labour market for qualified · 
labour.  The conclusion  is,  that manufacturing  industries  will  have  to  make work  more 
-attractive, among others by modernizing the production system. 
In the introduction to this chapter the aging of the work force has been pointed out as one of 
the important change factors to be taken into account. Anthropocentric or other variants of 
advanced production systems explicitly demand for the best possible deployment of skills, 
practical  experience and tacit  knowledge.  This meets  with  the  secular trend of an aging 
population and the resulting shortage of qualified labour.  In order to  productively use  the 
practical experience of older  workers  and experts,  it is  necessary  to  provide appropriate 
working conditions for them p.nd to provide opportunities for handing down their competence 
(Brodner 1992).  Again  the  underlying calculus is to  exploit the dialectics of competence 
supplied and competence demanded: the reduction of competence demanded by substituting 
human  labour  by  technology  results  in  a  downward  spiral  of qualification  supplied  -
qualification badly needed to adjust technology and production to new goals. 
Following these arguments, all signposts point towards production structures designed along 
the criteria of deployment of skilled labour supporte9 by an appropriate level of technology, 177 
provision of holistic working procedures~ object-oriented work structures, team-work and high 
degrees of autonomy and responsibility at the workplace. The steps to be taken along this 
road are 
* to  explicitely define  the process of reshaping the  factory  as  an  intra- as well  as  inter-
organisational process of negotiation rather than a technological necessity; this means that 
all the workforce irrespective of organizational status and the respective bargaining parties 
have to be involved and convinced; 
* to organize a consensus about objectives and procedures and to see to due consideratio·n 
of all interests articulated; a neglect of interests might easily lead to failure; 
* to  make  participation  the  basic  principle  of  decision-making,  not  only  to  maintain 
consensus but to make everybody deploy his competence and experience; 
* to  ultimately  provide  a  framework,  within  which  more  detailed  roles,  functions  and 
substructures can coherently be developed (Brodrier 1992: 40). 
The developments, which have been sketched out for the manufacturing industries can also 
be expected in the· service industries, where modern communication technologies and flexible 
organization are likely to create comparable groWth rates of productivity (Coleman 1992: 25). 
Empirical  evidence  shows,  that  in  general  capital  and  information  technology  intensive · 
service sectors  show  high  productivity,  but only  slow  growth in employment (Kendrick 
1988). Here again the introduction of technology to cut nothing but costs has the well-known 
effects on the labour market. In the US, investment in information technology has surged 
31% over the last two  years~ substituting labour ·by capital. This way, American wholesale 
trade has lost 53000 jobs over the last year (1992), and 33000 have been laid-off in the 
insurance industry. In many European countries, telecommunication has enjoyed the status of 
a public service ranking among the most important employers of the cou.ntries.  Under the 
influence of denationalisation and decentralisation, together with technological progress since 
the  mid-eighties  a  rapid  decline  in  employment is  registered.  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Germany are lucid examples (Pouillot 1992). Similar to manufacturing, service fmns tum to 
keeping a lean core of full-t!me employees and using outside "consultants", many of whom 
had been specialists and were laid off earlier. But down-staffing is neither a survival strategy 
nor a substitute for the creation of new fields of economic activity. 
An example of handling technological change and oppottunities in the services is provided 
by  the German banking business,  which  under the strains of "technological"  lay-offs has 
developed into  a  comprehensive  "finance  business"  including  insurance  services,  private 
pension funds and building societies (Hilbert/Potratz/Widmaier 1992). This has been realized 178 
on the basis  of the deployment of employees'  skills  and experience  and new inter-fl.IlTl 
cooperation arrangements. Yet by this example it can be shown at the same time, that the 
enhancement of the quality of work can also result in an increase of the quantity of work, 
stress and self-exploitation. 
This shows the fly in the ointment which should not be ignored. Just like any other kind of 
process  innovation  or  reaiTangement  of production  facilities,  anthropocentric  and  other 
advanced production systems carry a considerable potential of rationalization - rationalization 
in a double meaning: as they make extensive use of people~s capacities and as hierarchical 
rituals are removed, new production systems render work more efficient and meaningful; to 
the degree additional efficiency is achieved, the economic input-output-calculus come to the 
fore.  This  holds  even  more  as  pioneering  phases  out  and  the  anthropocentric  logic  is 
generalized. Anthropocentric systems, too, are out for reducing input to get the same output, 
only they try to reach this goal in a more intelligent way. Under ceteris paribus conditions, 
i.e. stagnating and exhausted markets, anthropocentric productions systems will certainly add 
to structural unemployment 
Yet again there is another side to the coin. The "rationalization" of organizational structures 
and procedures, the challenge to all levels of the workforce to deploy their own ingenuity 
also carries a  potential for innovation and impetus fqr the development of new economic 
activities. 
This is where economic policy comes in again. Many economic incentives and development 
programs  are  basically  conservative  as  they  foster  the  formation  of capital  and not  the 
development and deployment of work. Innovation policies cover fields which bureaucracies 
tend to look upon as innovative or promising. But even European low~ost  countries are not 
globally competitive compared to Eastern Europe, the Asian NICs or locations somewhere 
else in  the developing countries.  Consequently it is not capital,  that has  to  be  rendered 
competitive, but labour.  A comparision of the volumes of the investment budgets of large 
enterprises and groups  and _Public  budgets should long have destroyed any illusion of a 
political steering of the economy by public money. 
The virtual political task rather is to convince and support industry to take the risks to change 
management philosophies, organizational structures and market strategies. Why not launch a 
"productivity campaign" systematically developing and demonstrating cases of best practice, 
forming  cooperative  networks,  developing  adequate  models  of infrastructure,  setting  up 
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evaluate progress and to  assess chances? Only secondly this would be a matter of funding 
e.g.  of new  R&D-programs,  and  if  so,  they  should  be  consequently  directed  towards 
enhancing the performance of production models and joint industrial innovation projects. 
Though the  4th Framework Program (Commission  of the European  Communities,  1992) 
already points  into  this  direction,  much  more  stress should be layed on establishing and 
demonstrating best practice, i.e.: the program should invest even considerable resources in 
setting up examples of advanced manufacturing in specifically selected branches and regions. 
The underlying  idea is  to  establish  a  pull-mechanism just as  it has  been  established by 
Japanese transplants: firms in the sunoundings of these transplants will have to live up to. the 
standards set if they want to  keep their workforce and a  share in the supply and demand 
potential; local authorities are challenged to  provide appropriate infrastructure, unions and 
associations will be given a real-life chance to scrutinize hallowed. principles and strategies. 
In so far the program might be better off if it took up a more active and offensive role rather 
than to submit subsidiary offers. Money does not replace ideas. 
Work and welfare: The mutation of an historical project 
Whatever  single  strategy  or combination  of strategies  is  chosen  to ·tackle  problems  of 
employment, they all will be affected by the relation of work and employment to the welfare 
system.  Given  this  situation, current welfare provisions will have to  be  reexamined with 
respect to their short and long term impacts on work, employment, technology, flexibility and 
competitiveness. 
The main strategic issues are 
* to develop alternative designs for the transition from work to welfare, and 
* to  develop  the  European  welfare regimes towards  a  stronger. support for employment, 
flexibility and productivit:y while maintaining a high level of of social security. 
In  European  tradition,  the  welfare  state  is  the  price  for  a  functioning  and competitive 
economy. Although social costs. are rather high, they "lay the groundwork for stable, long-
term  alliances  among  econotnic  constituencies  - workers  and  managers,. suppliers  and 
distributors,  private  industry  and· government - as  well  as  a  heightened degree of social 
cohesion." (Henzler 1992b: 61 ).  Most of the various welfare and social security concepts are 
based on the externalisation of adjustment problems at the expense of welfare budgets based 180 
on taxes  and contributions.  This strategy  obviously has come to  an end,  as world  wide 
recession  has  set  clear  limits  to  financial  possibilities.  Governments  seek  remedy  in 
"Solidarpakt"-strategies, i.e. they seek consensus with unions and associations about cuts into 
the social system.  While in  Germany government, unions and associations are still  in an 
infight grimly defending their assets, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Greece, France, 
Denmark and Belgium have  announced  or already pushed through  severe cuts in  social 
security  payments or the  postponement of retirement  Sweden  has  gone  farthest  cutting 
pensions,  postponing  retirement,  reducing  holidays  and  payed  leave,  cutting  child  and 
education  allowances,  introducing  waiting  periods  in  case  of  sickness  and  reducing 
employer's contributions to social insurance schemes (Siiddeutsche Zeitung March 9th 1993; 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung March 15th 1993). 
The opposite to the European state backed security schemes is provided by the Japanese 
system of life-time employment in return for unambiguous commitment to the firm's goals. 
Though this is a model of internalisation of employment problems with the fringe effect of 
enforcing innovation, it has obviously reached limits of economic safe load. Facing a third 
year of declining profits, a new round of restructuring industry is looming behind the horizon 
- including the threat of redundancies in  manufacturing as well as in the services.  White 
collars will be the group hit hardest by the new development, as they are looked upon as the 
country's  most  unproductive.  Estimates  range  between  2%  and  3.3%  of the  workforce 
endangered by lay-offs. So far shrinkage had largely been offset by a growing service sector 
- yet this does -not  happen this time.  The response of organised labour suggests that both 
sides are on a collision course, putting the Japanese system of industrial relations and social 
security at stake (fhe Economist January 16th 1993; Financial Times February 6th 1993). 
In view of the strategic problems formulated above, this discussion in most countries as well 
as about the social dimension of the Single Market has been rather onesided, as it has been 
focussed on the conservation of the internal logic of given systems and mutual accusations 
of social  dumping.  What is  required in  the essence is  what is required of management 
philosophies, too:  to  take  th~ turn from thinking in terms of costs to thinking in terms of 
markets.  The  perspectives  of  the  welfare  state  are  not  cuts  in  social  allowances  but 
restructuring  and  reorganizing  the  system  to  foster  employment,  flexibility  and 
competitiveness.  Enterprises  should  feel  the pressure to  find  economic solutions for their 
employment problems, e.g. developing new fields of activities and systematically developing 
the qualification of their work force,  employees should feel the pressure to care for lifelong 
learning and to adjust to new conditions; and finally politics should not be released from the 
basic  task  to  balance  economic  performance  and  social  inclusiveness.  In  all,  the  basic 181 
philosophy of securing future welfare should be to search for economic incentives to invent 
various competing, customized forms of social security instead of simple transfer solutions. 
Political strategies, therefore, should focus on a change of the externalisation rationale of the 
various welfare systems. The analysis of earlier reforms as well as a thorough look at latest 
developments mentioned above make clear, that there are two minimum requirements to be 
met (Naschold 1993): statutory and intra-plant regulations have to  be systematically linked 
and  integrated;  measures  have  to  be  broad-based on the  widest possible range of actors, 
including the central political level. as well as the plant level. 
Following the philosophy of a work oriented instead of a transfer oriented system, a number 
of strategies  are conceivable:  enterprises  might turn  to  a  preventive stabilisation of their 
workforce's labour capacities by stressing health and safety at work, continuous learning and 
modernisation  of work  organisation;  that  would  in  tum  require  unions  to  agree  to · the 
flexibilisation  of  labour,  working~time :regimes  and  changes  in  working  structures. 
Complementary  state  strategies  would  include  decidedly  active  labour  market  and 
employment policies, long-term support and incentives for fmns' preventive policies, and a 
flexible prolongation of retirement age and pension schemes. "The challenge of designing an 
integrative policy in continental Europe is thus to create an intemalisation regime which, by 
its  orientation  to  the  work principle,  induces sufficient additional productivity  growth  to . 
provide compensatory payments for  the potential  'losers' of the  new  regime."  (Naschold 
1993). 
Industrial relations: New patterns are necessary · 
Industrial relations, unions and the system of collective bargaining are important factors  in 
the context of any  modernisation strategy. German unification problems already present a 
well probable outline of the agenda to  be expected realizing the Single Market: 
* fiercer competition will continue to depress wages even after production picks up·; 
* services are growing at the expense of manufacturing with  the double effect of turning 
manufacturing  into  "lean  production  systems"  managing with  less  but higher qu3lified 
personnel less inclined to join a union; 
* declining industries and regions will tend to negotiate lower wages and working conditions 
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The  tradition  of industry-wide  wage  agreements,  a  German  idiosyncracy  anyway,  looks 
increasingly  unrealistic  given  the  actual  pressures of competition, regional disparities and 
differences in frrms'  structures. Growing service sectors and lean-manufacturing techniques 
change the structure of firms'  workforce.  Between  1960 and 1990 the share of services in 
total  employment  in  Germany  has  gone  up  from  40.2%  to  56.8%,  while  the  degree  of 
unionisation has dropped from 25% in  1960 to  19.6% in  1990 (The Economist January 3rd 
1993).  Along  with  the  merging  of  traditional  blue  and  white  collar  work  and  rising 
qualification levels, a new  breed of employees is more difficult to  organise;  they take their 
grievances to  the planfs Betiiebsrat rather than to  the union. At Siemens AG, the German 
high-tech group, less than one-fifth of the workforce has joined the 'appropriate' IG Metal!. 
OPEL systematically exploits this  situation in the new Eisenach plant in eastern Germany. 
The plant is not a member of the employers' association, which allows for negotiations of 
contracts separate from the rest of the car industry. Aerospace industry is another example 
(Hayward 1992: 94f.);  attributable to  comparatively high qualification, higher rates of pay 
and  generally  good  working  conditions  throughout  the  industry  and satisfying workplace 
experience, there is no strong union tradition, not to speak of union militancy. 
All  this  weakens  union  powers  and  puts  them  under  pressure  to  change  their  internal 
structures as well as their philosophy of collective bargaining. To court the new breed, they 
show  more  flexibility  e.g.  with  respect  to  working  times  of programmers  and  other. 
specialists, take up ecological issues which concern modem white-collar and service workers 
more  than  traditional invocation  of workers'  solidarity.  The employees  of Lufthansa,  the 
German  loss  making  state  air carrier,  have  shocked  the  union  scene when  they  gave  up 
demands  for  pay  lise  and  other concessions.  Again,  Lufthansa  is  not  a  member of any 
employers' association and has its own wage contract instead. As the economy weakens and 
foreign competition intensifies, more firms  will demand the same flexibility and either opt 
out or put on pressure to change unions' and associations' structures and philosphies.  IBM 
Germany has just recently announced a legal restructuring of the corporation in order to leave 
the employers' association as well as the edifice of collective agreements with the IG Metall 
(Stiddeutsche Zeitung  Marcl~ 18th  1993).  So  in  the  end  the decline of union powers goes 
along with the decline of employers associations powers. 
The decline of union powers is even more significant in Great Britain. The latest survey on 
industrial  relations  (European  Industrial  Relations  Review  1993:  229)  reveals  a  marked 
decline in  the extent of trade union representation since the eighties. By  1980 closed shop 
arrangements,  the  symbol  of British  trade  union  power,  had  covered almost five  million 
employees;  by  1990 it was just about half a  millio~. This was due not only to  the political 183 
and legal changes in the course of the conservative government and changes in the structure 
of the  economy;  it was  also  a  result  of markedly  weakening  support  from  employees. 
Management has turned to  use a wider range of channels to communicate with employees 
and has developed strategies to increase employee involvement. The report concludes, "that 
the traditional, distinctive 'system' of British industrial relations no longer characterised the 
economy as a whole." 
The strategic task for both unions and employers will be 
* to find ways to competitive labour costs; 
* to invent bargaining structures to promote greater labour mobility; 
* to develop more flexible employment rules; 
* to anchor  training and retraining to (re-)capture high-skilled, highly paid, high qualitative 
jobs. 
The Swedish LOM-project (management, organisation and participation) (Naschold 1992) is 
an  ambitious experiment to regain international competitiveness on the basis of a. general 
consensus. As against similar programs in other countries it is radically process-oriented and 
egalitarian, i.e.  it aimed at including as many actors  a.S  possible from all levels. It started 
building up basic communicative competence and tried to tie together individual fJ.rms  with 
cross-border networks and national innovation structures. LOM was thought to provide the 
functional  equivalent to  Japanese consensual innovation  structures~ The LOM-vision was 
based  on  three  conceptional  modules:  as  against  the  'direct attack'  -orientation  of most 
enterprise and national change and innovation programs LOM aimed at an alteration of the 
change  process  itself;  a  communicative  infrastructure  including  all  strata  of actors  was 
supposed to  be a necessary precondition. Secondly, LOM proceeded from the concept of a 
tight  inten-elation  of  language  and  operative  action;  consequently  an  extension  of 
communication competence was thought to induce cooperative action and mobilise synergies 
resulting thereof.  Again  the  inclusion of all  those concerned was  seen as  a  precondition. 
Thirdly,  the  idea  was  to  suppot1  these  processes  by  central  funds  and  organisational 
resources.  The  idea  was  to  establish  a  "learning  organisation"  complementary  to  the 
conventional, formal organisation. 
The basic hypothesis of the program is twofold: the traditional innovation model  because of 
its utilitarian and instrumental approach is appropriate for problems of low complexity in a 
stable environment. Yet what is needed and what LOM aimed at is the handling of highly 
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communicative infrastructure  including  all  relevant  actors  is  the  necessary  condition for 
rational action and processes of adjustment and change. 
The concrete  results  of the  program  are  apt to  suggest a  rather sceptical  view.  Yet the 
German evaluation  team,  which  included experts from  industry and unions,  unanimously 
looks upon the concept as a bold and original idea, theoretically well founded, representing 
conceptional progress and a model of a specific European road to post-lean concepts of work 
and industrial organisation. 
A  final  problem  should  at  least  be  mentioned:  The  recent  case  of  Hoover,  the  US 
multinational which has shifted operations from France to Scotland allegedly because of more 
flexible  pay  and  other  conditions  marks  the  necessity  of cross-border  cooperation  of 
employee  representatives  and  the  establishment  of  European-level  information  and 
consultation mechanisms. Corresponding!  y there is strong demand for the development and 
completion of international trade union structures and union - management communication 
and cooperation structures on European level. There is a number of multinational enterprises . 
which already have e~tablished information and consultation arrangements, grown up from 
a variety of sources and with a broad range of different forms. Many of these activities have 
been pushed by the Single Market and the perspectives of economic integration. To remain 
an important player in the game, it sl)ould be unions' interest, too, to push much stronger for 
economic integration by means of powerful European-level representation structures. Though 
the Single European Act assigns a duty to "develop the dialogue between management and 
·labour at European level''  to  the Commission, and though there is a  considerable budget 
allocated, the development of appropriate structures should remain mainly_ with unions and 
employees' representatives themselves. It is· them who will have to suffer the consequences. 
Towards new institutional arrangements 
Factors pressing for political  .. action in the field of employment and welfare mainly stem from 
structural unemployment and demographic developments in  Europe. While the aging of the 
population follows  a  secular trend  which can be  followed  up  since the  beginning of the 
century, structural unemployment has its roots in a changing world economy, technological 
developments  and  competitive  relations  between  the_  industrialized  countries.  Unequal 
distribution of growth and decline between European regions not only produces a  loss of 
economic welfare, but also threatens the political and social cohesion of the community. This 
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Solutions  can  be  found  along  various  routes.  As  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  previous 
sections, production systems can be modernized, education, qualification and training can be 
intensified,  women  can  be  integrated  into  the  labour  market,  the  relation  between 
employment and welfare can be reviewed and finally the industrial relations system adapted 
to the changing social structure of enterprises. 
This bunch of strategies reflects the multifaceted nature of the relationship between work, 
welfare  and  the  general  subject  of  competitiveness.  Each  of  these  strategies  implies 
investments and costs, each gives rise to  externalities restricting the others - but above all 
each requires a rethinking and clitical review of well familiar political rituals. There is no 
way of attacking issues of work and welfare directly. What has to be changed are structures, 
processes  and  understanding of the  virtual  tasks  of industry  and politics.  Too many key 
factors of competitiveness are to  be found on the micro-economic level, in the capacity of 
firms  and regional or local public authorities to organize change, and it is the interactive and 
cumulative feedback relationships, which makes the difference. 
This may suggest a new division of labour, but this is not the point. There will be no way for 
industry to change but to follow the economic rationale of scarcity. As change is rapid, there 
is no time to wait for public initiatives. Their asset at hand and within their resonsibility is 
their endogenous potential of labour, technology and organization. Qualification and work 
organization  are  thus  the  main  strategic  issues  for  individual  enterprises  as  well  as for 
industry as a whole. Each individual enterprise will have to critically review its performance 
and find out its specific way to alter work organization, personnel policies and strategies of 
how to compete in the market. Critical analysis and readiness to learn provide the basis for 
necessary interfirm cooperations and public-private-partnerships, e.g.  in setting up training 
infrastructures od R&D-networks. 
To sum up: industrial relations, social security systems, the transition from education to 
work, work itself and agaih the transition from work into welfare have to be 
reorganized to deploy the potentials of an integrated European market and to meet the 
challenges of a globalized economy. So the virtual political task in the process of change 
is to organize a new mode of interaction adequate to a changed environment - which 
with respect to the issues dicussed above is to organize a learning society. Part 5 
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The significance of science and technology for European industry 
There is no  prophecy needed to  predict that industrial production in the 21st century will 
depend even more on the rapid conversion of research and innvoations into new products and 
production systems. Global competition is bound to increase, not only because in the leading 
industrial nations innovation times become shorter, but also because more and more countries 
gain  competence in  sophisticated  industrial  production  (e.g.  NICs,  China).  The need  for 
European industry to compete in a global environment which is likely to become even more 
complex and risky  within the  next twenty  years calls for  the  optimal use of science and 
technology. 
Fig. 5.1:  World trade ratio of R&D-intensive products 
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Source:  NIW,  1993. 
Since the eighties technology-intensive industries have proved to  be the most expansive in 
growth and also in employment. Industry in  Europe is still  first in the world in technology-189 
exports,  but  growth  rates  in  markets  for  R&D-intensive  products
1  are  slowing  down 
(Bundesministerium fi.ir Forschung und Technologie 1993; cf. Fig. 5.1). This should be reason 
enough to think about ways for industry in Europe to make the whole process of research and 
technological innovation, in particular the process of application of research more efficient 
in order to  secure growth and employment. The judgement of experts is polarized: One side 
sees  Europe  winning  the  "technology  battle"  on  the  world  markets,  others  see  Europe 
becoming a "technological colony" of Japan or the U.S.
2 
Fig. 5.2:  Competitive position of the EC in foreign trade 
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1  R&D~intensive products here are defined: Top Technology= at least 8.5% of the turover spent on R&D; 
Higher  Technology=between  3.5%  and  8.5%  of the  turnover  spent  on  R&D.  (Fraunhofer  lnstitut  fuer 
Systemtechnik und  lnnovationsforschung- lSI - 1993) 
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From  both  points  of view,  dangers  are  seen  in  losses  in  electronics .  and  information 
technology where most of the technologies are dominated by Japan. The argument is that the 
dominance in core-technologies also leads to a dominance in  the related "technological food 
chain". 
Fig. 5.3:  Technological "Food Chain" 
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This argument is quite plausible, if we look at consumer electronics or at U.S.  mechanical 
engineering  where  Japan  has  taken  over  most  of the  market  shares.  One  of the  main . 
arguments, however, is that a top position in electronics enables the respective country to use 
it as a "weapon" to keep other countries away from promising markets. One does not have 
to go that far, but, in other fields as well, it becomes more and more visible that the pace for 
innovation is set from outside Europe. 
Indicative for this development is, among other things, an international comparison of the 
number of patents: It does not only show the advantage,  but also  the rising tendencies for 
Japan. Fig. 5.4 shows the dominance of US and Japan vis a  vis the EC-countries in innovation-
transfer. From the US and Japan  roughly  3.6 respectively  three times as. many patents have 
been registered in the EC than vice versa. 
Fig. 5.4:  Patent flows within the triade 1988 (1981) 
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Source:  OECD, Basic Science and Technology Indicators, 1991; own calculations. 
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In a global context, increasing interdependencies and dependencies of science and technology 
as  well ·as  of production  make  it necessary  to  think  about  future  innovation  strategies. 
European  industry  has  to  adapt  to  rapid  innovation  and  short  product cycles  to  remain 
competitive.  Rising demands  of customers require more product diversification  and more 
complex  products,  combined  with  higher quality.  This  does  not  mean,  that a  European 
innovation regime should exclusively be limited to  the Community. To remain competitive, 
European industry has to  be a powetful partner for powerful innovative industries in other 
parts of the world.  In the first place this requires an efficient organization··process. Planning 
of strategies for the direction of innovative production for the future requires networks where 
industry, research institutions,  national and supra-national institutions work together. The 
Common Market has  to  be  a  starting point for concepts that take account of  the global 
interdependencies and answer the challenge especially in terms of  cooperation, not only within 
Europe, but also between Europe and the globe. 
Fig. 5.5:  Percentages of basic research expenditure/total research expenditures 1987 
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Source:  OECD. Basic Science and Technology Indicators. 1991; own calculations. 193 
Although  European  competence  in  scientific  and  technological  research  is  generally 
unquestioned, there seems to  be a widening gap between basic research and its application 
and rapid conversion into new products and production strategies. Basic research has, in most 
European countries, more emphasis  than in Japan or US. 
However,  this does not mean at the same time  that Europe's competitiveness is higher as 
well. Rather the position of European industry on the global markets seems to be endangered 
by long innovation times and high innovation costs. Albach (1990) shows, that innovation 
times as well as innovation costs in nearly all branches are lower in Japan and USA than e.g. 
in Germany (fab. 5.1). 
Tab. 5.1:  Innovation Times and Innovation Costs 
Innovation times  Innovation costs 
(Japan serves as an_ index= 100) 
Branch  Germany  United States of  Germany  United States of 
America  .  America 
Automobiles  112  111  107  103 
Office machinery  94  92  134  116 
Chemicals  126  119  119  120 
Electronics  121  107  117  111 
Machinery  113  124  108  114 
Metal-working  113  120  99  93 
Other  100  96  111  111 
All firms  114  113  112  Ill 
All figures are average values. 
Source:  Albach et al.,l990. 
These  data  suggest,  that  inspite  of  European  successful  basic  research,  potentials  for 
innovation are weak. This may be interpreted in such a way that  research capacities are not 
exploited  optimally  to  develop  new  products  and production  systems  and  corresponding 
markets. 194 
There is little doubt, that in several fields of manufacturing Europe has lost track in leading 
technologies  and,  Japan,  in  particular,  is  pushing forward  in  branches,  where  there  has 
traditionally  been  a  European  market  leadership  (e.g.  chemical  industry,  mechanical 
engineering). But, while Europe thinks about a faster way to market, there are voices in Japan 
who warn, that too little is done in basic research and that the  strong  orientation towards 
applied research one day  might lead to  serious deficits in the scientific basis.  In terms of 
markets, however,  the Japanese system is more successful. The requirements for the future, 
thus,  as  they  are  fonnulated  by  the  European  Round Table  of Industrialists:  "The  real 
challenge is to move technology out of the laboratory and in the market place as rapidly as 
possible"  (Monod/Gyllenhammar/Dekker 1991:39) this is only one side of the medal.  For 
future competitiveness in Europe it will be important to find a reasonable combination of both 
ways:  Scientific  excellence  is  needed,  but it has  to  be  more  than  a  national  thrive  for 
excellence. The whole process from basic research via the development of new technologies 
to application in products has to be reorganized in a way that societal needs can be quickly. 
transformed into new products and markets. European resources will have to be combined to 
mobilize the synergies emerging from a multitude of research traditions and specializations 
to the end of a new innovation regime. 
Unlike  Japan  or  the  United  States  the  European  Community  has  no  common  national 
charcteristics and very different policies and regulatory conditions (Gillibrand in context of 
the discussion in the Advisory Panel of the Monitor/FAST-Programme). The economic and 
cultural diversity of Europe is, like in many other respects, opportunity and constraint alike. 
Science and technology policies in Europe are naturally dominated by a concern to optimize 
national  innovation  processes  in  order  to  keep  national  economies  on  a  high  level  of 
perfonnance and make the location attractive for foreign investment. Existing disparities and 
institutional parochialism to .some degree reduces capacities and capabilities of a European 
innovation system. It often hinders the exploitation of synergies as well as of economies of 
scale and scope. It is not likely nor desirable for the future that the areas of institutional and 
cultural homogeneity will be broken up. But on the other hand, European diversity could be 
much  more of an  opportunity if in  the future  there  were a common thrust to develop  a 
framework for a European innovation regime. 195 
This raises questions about the organization of innovation in Europe. Innovation systems, as 
we now find them in the triade- US, Japan and Europe-,  have developed under various 
cultural  influences.  Different  political  and  economic  "philosophies"  have  shaped  public 
infrastructure  and  business  climate  for  the  firms.  European  organization  of research  and 
innnovation follows the segmentation of the sciences. The political task here is to  break up 
the barriers between disciplines and institutions. A very general characterization leads to two 
different types of innovation. Usually the Western type of innovation strategy is inspired by 
the search for,  "break through" innovations. This means that new technologies and products 
are only developed, when the life cycle of old products is over..  Research and markets are 
treated as more or less seperated spheres. A "step-by-step" innovative development, typical 
for Japanese firms, means that technologies and products are constantly improved "stepwise" 
in a continuous process so that a new product is already on the market before the old one is 
at the end of its cycle.  In other words: Europeans rather tend to solve a scientific or technical 
problem with  highest competence frrst  and then  start thinking about products, whereas in 
Japan,  the  development  of a  new  technology  goes  along  with  the  development  of new. 
products. Accordingly, industrial policy in Europe so far is still to  a large degree directed 
towards high-technology. 
Technological  excellence and  the  concentration  on  a  few .core  technologies,  which  only 
account for a rather small and  highly competitive sector can not be a value by  itself.  In 
mechanical engineering, e.g., experts  see large gaps in  market needs for  "90%-tech",  i.e. 
everything is focused on  high~tech markets and only little attention is payed to the relatively 
large market potentials for conventional products (Brodner 1992).  Competition among the 
triade countries requires top performance in high technology, but short product cylces and the 
tight competition in these markets diminish the returns. The Japanese model demonstrates that 
continuous, market oriented (re  )search for new products and production processes on all levels 
is a more promising strategy to secure a sufficient return on investment. 
It becomes more and more obvious, that concentration on high technology in Europe does not 
only slow down the emergence of new  markets but also often blurres the view for future 
developments and requirements that reach  beyond economic necessities. The emphasis on 
economic  growth  pushes  technological  feasibility  in  the  foreground.  For  a  sustainable 196 
developmenf,  this also has to be seen in the context of social and ecological concerns. The 
challenge to industry and even more to  public policy in Europe is not so  much to  master a. 
particular technological development,  but rather to  establish a powerful innovation regime 
which, along with improving competitiveness of industry, also contributes to the solution of 
problems which threaten social cohesion and environmental stability in Europe. This requires, 
as  Japanese experience demonstrates:  u  .. the  maintenance, stabilisation and creative further 
development of the complex interaction between microeconomic development processes and 
macropolitical  structures  (Naschold  1993).  This is  what the notion  of a  unew  innovation 
regime"  is  about.  European  industrial  policy,  therefore,  is  challenged  to  provide  an 
infrastructure of institutions which, on national or regional basis, enables the relevant actors 
to bring forth their innovative potential. This is essentially a process of  reorganizing the game. 
At  the  same  time,  enterprises  are  challenged  to  be  open  for  changes  in  internal  firm-
organisation as well as for new types of cooperation between.fmns and other institutions (e.g. 
universites  ). 
Why we need a European innovation regime: Disparities in Europe 
Uneven distribution of wealth in the European Community  has its consequences not only for 
the infrastructure in science and technology, but also for innovative potentials in enterprises. 
This leads to  an  uneven distribution of innovative activities and capacities among the EC-
countries.  A  very  common  indicator  of a  nation's  development  level  of science  and 
technology is the amount of money spent on R&D. This figure is composed of all private and 
public sources that contribute (state, private economy, universities) to the nation's R&D.  Its 
share  of the  gross  domestic  product  stands  for  the emphasis  the  country  puts  into  new 
technological  development .. R&D  expenditures  in  relation  to  GNP  demonstrate  that  the 
differences between central and peripheral EC-countries are still quite remarkable. But the 
3  By sustainable development we  understand the definition of The Brundtland Report:  It defines sustainable 
development as a process of change in which the exploitation of resources. the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current 
and future potential to meet the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs.  -"" 
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data also indicate that in all countries expenditures for R&D gain in significance. This allows 
the conclusion that innovation is considered more and more important for competitiveness. 
Fig. 5.6:  R&D expenditures/GNP 
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Growth-rates over the last few years show, that the values of the leading European nations 
are only rising very slowly or stagnating. A remarkable increase can be observed in Spain: 
The average annual growth between 1985 and 1989  was  18.6%. This proves the tendency 
to intensify R&D but it seems too early to consider this as a "catching up" of Spain, because 
the overall amount spent on k&D is still quite low. 
In  the  South  of  Europe  firms  partly  are  struggling  to  catch  up  with  a  minimum  of 
technological  knowledge  while  the  North  aims  towards  scientific  and  technological 
breakthroughs. Interactive links from. North to South are still very poorly developed. To break 
up this  vicious circle it  undoubtedly is necessary to invest money (cohesion fonds) in poorer 198 
regions in order to  provide basic infrastructure to enhance opportunities and attractivity for 
cooperation  between  the  richer  and  the  poorer  countries  of Europe.  This  is  the  main 
precondition, under which these regions can become adequate partners. 
Fig. 5.7:  Average annual change in GERD 
(GERD=gross expenditures on research and development) 
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Inequalities  also  have  their consequences  for  social cohesion within  the  EC.  For a  wider 
Europe this problem is even aggravated by the development in Central and Eastern Europe, 
where ways to new political and economic institutions still have  to be found. Van Zon (1992) 
concludes in  a study about Central Europe: "Creating conditions for technological.progress 
in  the regions of Central  Europe, allowing them to come to an equal footing with the most 
advanced  regions  in  the  world,  requires  much  more  than  the  introduction  of a  market 
economy". This also goes for a number of EC-countries. 
,. • 
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These regional disparities in  Europe call for common strategies which could give national 
endeavours, like the Spanish, emphasis by making more effective use of synergies in the 
diffusion of innovative processes. To achieve this, it is necessary to  provide the platform, 
where collaboration can develop. To reduce disparities, one of the conditions certainly will 
be to put considerable resources into scientific and technological infrastructure. It does not 
become obvious from data, but rather it is common knowledge, that this alone will not bring 
about fundamental changes. Inputs in science and technology  have to  be accompanied by 
organizational elements like building up communication structures and networks. They have 
to  bring  together  endogenous  potentials  (labour,  already  existing  core  industries)  with 
knowledge,  education and training systems. This is where coordinated action and central 
funding all over Europe is necessary 
Why we need a European innovation regime: Structural deficiencies 
In addition to problems arising from numerical evidence (how much money is being spent on 
R&D) there are a number of structural obstacles which may further threaten the technological 
competence of Europe vis a  vis the other Triade poles. One of the strategic questions is, what 
this money is spent on. To answer this we have to look at national  policies concerning the 
distribution of R&D money. Within the EC, particularly France and Great Britain spend a 
considerable amount on core technologies and for defense-orientated research,  which in these 
countries usually  has  little spin-offs on the civil sector
4
•  In  most cases military research 
concentrates on high-tech: quite naturally aerospace and electronics are among the main fields. 
They absorb high-tech, but do not contribute to diffusion and development 
Not only on national but als? on enterprise level, the concentration on core technologies is 
visible. Presuming that companies put most emphasis in fields where they expect the most 
promising markets, the formation of interfirm cooperations and alliances can be an Indicator 
for  the  importance  of particular  technologies.  In  their  analysis  of interfirm  cooperation 
4  In the United States about one million$ p.a. is spent for the "Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency", 
which  fosters  civil use of military research (Kleinschmidt 1992). See also:  Arthur D.  Little International 
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agreements Hagedoom and Schakenraad (1991) show, that over 70% of these alliances are 
made in information technology,  biotechnology and new materials. From this it might be 
concluded, that in fields,  which are considered crucial for future developments, joining of 
forces  already  takes  place (Hagedoorn/Schakenraad  1991:90).  This should be taken as  a 
pattern  also  for  "low-tech"  fields  and especially for  the fusion  among different levels of 
technology. 
Fig. 5.8:  Military R&D expenditures/Public expenditures 
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It remains an open question whether these are the only promising markets. Again the Japanese 
case demonstrates that strategies including private as well as publicly financed research and -
in particular - an efficient management of both leads to  market orientated application of 
different technologies. This also means that the .development of new products combines all . 
"levels" of technology and, if necessary, cuts across different scientific disciplines. This also 
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means  new  thinking  for  European  enterprises,  science  and  industrial  politics  because 
oppottunities have to be searched beyond the limits of individual technologies and branches.
5 
Fig. 5.9:  Distribution of strategic technology alliances (in  %) 
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In Europe, generally, attention to neighbouring fields of research and other branches is rather 
limited.  In  the  long  run  this  will  tum  out  badly  for  future competitiveness  because the 
development of new market segments may thus be neglected. But it can also Qbscure the view . 
for the fact, that technology, combined across the borders of traditional fields and branches 
can contribute to solve e.g. envirotnental problems: To think about mobility not only in terms 
of automobiles, might give  innovative incentives for several industries and services. Here, 
in  particular public  policy is  challenged to  provide an  adequate setting to  make synergies 
easier (or possible).  From  the demand  side public procurement or regulations  (e.g.  in  the 
environmental area) can be an adequate steering instrument. 
s  This argument is elaborated by Fumio Kodama (1991). 202 
The fact, that organizational and structural  obstacles are present in all European countries to 
a higher or lower degree  are shown in a number of examples. All over Europe,  even in the 
wealthy  countries,  resources  become  more  scarce  and  government  programmes  for  the 
development of R&D are reduced. This usually means that individual budgets are shortened, 
without a systematic political decision-making.  Usually national research programmes have 
very little prospective elements and the time that is needed to make fundamental changes in 
one or the other direction is prolonged by bureaucratic structures. 
The research funds of  the German Umweltbundesamt in Berlin have been reduced by about 
one third. Innovation researchers complain that this is parsintony in the wrong place: "Money 
that is put into environmental technology brings nzuch higher returns than money which is 
put into reducing the backlash in microelectronics." (Wirtschaftswoche 1993) 
- The dominance of cyclical rather than continuous innovation processes is  also  true for 
enterprises but sometimes for different reasons.  In  countries  with a low level of R&D 
infrastructure private R&D activites vary according to the availabililty and the· employment 
of public resources. The example demonstrates, that financial contributions alone do not 
lead to the systematic pursuit of innovative strategies, but rather to  a muddling through, 
according to available resources. Research is conducted in fields where bureaucrats think 
should be researched. 
In Greece: "In 1988 the number of  firms with R&D-activities rose to 185;  yet it is interesting. 
that 38 firms which were enganged in R&D activities discontinued these activities in 1988, 
and 109 new jirn1s were found to  have started an R&D activity in that year  .....  Thus R&D 
constitutes a circun1stantial activity for a  nun1b~r of  private firnts and this is related to the 
fact that in 1989 25% of  expenditure in R&D derived from foreign sources (EC-progranzmes) 
and the state". Firn1s engaged in research are concentrated regional/y_and R&D departnzents 
"could hardly be considered well organized research departments capable of engaging  in 
research on new products and other innovations; they are rather trying desperately to keep 
track  of  international  technological  devlopnzents  in  their  industry"  (Petmesidoul 
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- Not only the absence of resources, but also the absence of national R&D policies leaves 
a vacuum to  be filled in several countries. 
In  Britain "public policy for R&D is Fordist in  orientation  - encouraging the use of high 
technology to manufacture stand.ard products at low prices." For a long time, the situation 
was  characterized  by  a  "lack  of strategic  long-ternz  planning for  R&D  and a  lack  of 
institutional  integration  between  research  establishnzents,  industry  and  the  state."  Only 
recently  technology  policy  becomes  aware  of the  necessitiy  of technology  transfer  and 
progranzmes for a m.ore efficient managentent of these questions have been started, though 
endowed 1-vith  relatively scarce resources. (Charles!Charles/Roulstone 1991; Charles 1992) 
- For a long time in many European countries research has been carried .  out in an "ivory 
tower" with no direct connections to application. 
"Generally  speaking,  Portugese  expertise  and  know-how  in  the  field  of nzanufacturing 
autonzation is to be found mainly in universities, research laboratories and institutes. There 
is only a recent tradition (  10 years) of  cooperation with industry ....  The nzain problem seenzs 
to  be found  in  the  division  of fuJzctions  to  be  executed  (such  as  research-application-
nzarketing-renewal) between the various partners." (Kovacs!Moniz/Mateus 1991). 
- There  is  a  tendency  to  confine  innovation  processes  to  technological  research  and 
development.  As  already  mentioned,  mere  technological  feasibility  does  not  do  the 
"innovation ttick". Introduction of advanced manufacturing systems e.g. requires an equally 
careful research process about the use of human work. 
"The  research  policy  pursu~d by  the  Spanish  governement  therefore  shows  significant 
shortcomings with regard to empirical research into socio-economic aspects of  which affect 
the organization of  labour." (Homs!Maiia  1991). 
No doubt, R&D-related policy has changed in recent years. The insight that cooperation on 
all  levels  is  necessary  has  led  to  a  wide  nmnber of national  or EC-wide  programmes  to 
enhance collaborative stt-ategies. The Foutth Framework Programme includes not only new 204 
fields but also new strategies.  The awareness that particular tasks can be carried through much· 
better when synergies are exploited, has increased on the scientific, political as well as on the 
firm  level.  In  nearly  all  relevant  areas  smaller  or larger  steps  have  already  been  taken 
although there are still a lot of loose ends which have to be tied together in a more stringent 
way. The above examples reveal particular strategic bottlenecks: 
The scarcity of resources requires a more rational setting of priorities in the R&D process. 
The above mentioned cyclical character of innovation processes in most Western countries 
has  to  be  replaced  by  a  more  continuous,  more  market  and  more  problem  orientated 
innovation policy by companies as well as by public authorities. 
The promising steps, that have been made on EC level  to  promote research, particularly in 
peripheral countries are only of limited use when R&D  is not embedded in  some kind of 
long-term strategies and ·cooperative arrangements. Experience shows that in particular 
small and medium sized enterprises are not able to catch up with the rapid technological and 
organizational developments by themselves. This is not only true for peripheral countries in 
the EC, but just as well for Central and Eastern Europe. 
Particularly in countries with little traditional connections between research institutions and 
firms (e.g. Britain, France
6
)  such connections should be enforced and further developed. The 
repo1t  to  the  Commission about  European cooperation  between universities  and industry 
(Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften 1992) makes clear that the traditional division 
of labour among universities and industry  have changed. The university is not  so exclusively 
responsible for the creation of knowledge any more, since industry has taken over a good deal 
of research. 
Increase of privately financed research, however, only increases private stocks of knowledge. 
For a European innovation system it is much more desirable to increase the public stock of 
knowledge and to trigger broad diffusion processes. For this purpose a mangement of science 
is  required,  which  organizes  connections  between  science  and  economy,  and  is  flexible 
6  Cf. "Local Systems of Innovation in Europe" (Charbit/Gaffard/Longhi et al. 1991). where the French and the 
British  are contrasted with the Gennan and Italian sy$tem. 205 
enough to  recognize mutual  strengths and weaknesses.To  strengthen cooperation between 
universities and companies not only makes the results more efficient because they gain a more 
market oriented perspective. If research takes place in a precompetitve area, it also reduces 
the danger of monopolizing knowledge from private research.  The innovative "wealth" of a 
nation and within the EC can only be increased, if both research institution and economy join 
forces.  This  is  true for  the the  development of science and technology  as  well as  for  the 
development of human resources 
7
•  Of particular  significance is the mutual further training 
e.g. by means of personnel exchanges between universities and firms. 
Fig. 5.10:  Ratio of government to private R&D 
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The neglect of other than technology orientated strategies in the innovation process has a long 
· tradition,  not  only  in  Spain.The  notion  (paradigm)  that  industrial change only rests  upon 
7  EC-programmes like "Cornett" put  particular emphasis upon common projects  for  training and education 
between economy and  university.  · 206 
advances in  technology is  vanishing only slowly.  It has  to  be replaced by  strategies  that 
understand innovation as problem-induced and that consequently follow several problem 
oriented paths. This encompasses not only the significance of labour and its qualification and 
organizational structures within the enterprises but also social and ecological side-effects
8
• 
Here as well  collaborative patterns  are  necessary,  but:  "recognition of the fact,  that the 
problem-solving strategy must go far beyond the nruTow horizon of the individual firm is not 
yet exactly "the norm  ..  in the industry  .... " (Naschold 1993). 
Because of this "narrow horizon  ..  of individual enterprises politics, on national as well as on 
EC level, politics have to keep an eye on this. Scarce resources, however, have .to confine this 
to  areas that are systematically neglected by private initiatives because e.g.  in other areas 
economies of scale can be exploited much better. If  losses of technological competence and 
markets happen, qualified labour and know-how are affected by it.9 
Why we need a European innovation regime: Geography and logistics of innovation 
So far,  we have mainly  be~n talking  about research and development from a  national or 
supra-national perspective. No doubt, the constitution of the national system of innovation sets 
a lot of benchmarks for the development of regional or local innovation systems. On the other 
side, it is common knowledge that actual innovation processes and research take place in 
firms, universities, and other institutions at the regional level. This argument;· which has been 
confirmed by a number of recent studies (Charbit/Gaffard/Longhi et al.  1991; Hilpert 1992) 
makes clear that  we also  have  to  look  at the regional  level  when  we  have  a  European 
innovative  regime  in  mind.  All  these  studies  have  in  common,  that  they  find  certain 
conditions  and/or  "climates". for  innovation:  "The  mix  between  production  organizations 
(small  and ·large  firms)  and  institutions  (universities,  research  laboratories,  other  public 
institutions, public policies) build an evolutionary dynamic depending on local history, social 
8  Research in  business administration proves that ecologically oriented mangement and production can have 
very positive effects on a finn's results  (Steger 1988). 
9  A good example for such a development can be found in American machine tool industry (Hirsch-Kreinsen 
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as  well as economic (Charbitt/Gaffard/Longhi et al.  1991:20). The studies on "Archipelago 
Europe" similarly identify an innovative structure which is not only by itself a strong center 
of innovation but is also a "knot" in a national or international system. 
Antongst a sntallnuntber of  regions and cities in the Contmunity countries there is a growing 
concentration of  sience and technolgy based industrial developntent. This constitutes "Islands 
of  Innvoation, i.e. localities where high techno-industrial capability and excellence in science 
and know-how  are  concentrated and where firms  and research organisations base  their 
developntent on networks of  cooperation.  These "Islands of  /novation" are able both to retain 
small and medium-sized innovation ft,rn1s and to foster optintal conditions/circumstances and 
networks  that favour  developn1ent,  en1ployment  and ·growth  within  particular  European 
regions.  .  .....  Taken  together,  with  their variety  and their mutual interdependence  these 
islands  consitute  an  ARCHIPElAGO  EUROPE,  which  encompasses  a  range  of high 
technology (Hilpert 1992). 
The studies also conclude, that these particular conditions generate innovative networks in 
very particular locations which are distributed unevenly across Europe and are not necessarily 
connected to  neighbouring and  other regions.  Empirical  evidence  makes clear, that these 
.. islands" are mostly located in the fully industrialized wealthy countries in the community and 
many  of them  have  a  strong  orientation  towards  high  technology.  With  regard  to  the 
peripheral countries, these "islands" so far have little integrative functions: "These (peripheral) 
regions are involved in collaborations with Europe's innovative core only by five to eight 
percent."  (Hilpert  1992:278).  The  example  of  the  ~~Four  Motors  for  Europe"
10 
(Bacavia/Becher/Clavera et al.  1991)  shows,  that cross-regional  cooperation  proves  very 
useful. The authors, however, are reluctant to apply their results to cooperations between more 
and  less  favoured  regions.  The  "valorization  of diversity"  can  only  rely  on  a  profound 
knowledge about other regions' potentials or weaknesses and it is essential that linkages and 
collaborations are founded on existing potentials. This requires infrastructure in research and 
education  as  well  as  inte1mediary  structures  and  last  not least  favourable  attitudes  of all 
cooperation partners. 
10  The four motors arc:  Baden-Wurttcmhcrg. Calalunya. Lombardia, Rhone-Alpcs. 208 
The discussion of these concepts shows that different kinds of nuclei of innovation in Europe 
exist. In view of a European innovation regime the crucial question is, how these regional 
potentials can be made fruitful, not only for the well developed wealthy regions but also for 
the periphery in Europe. The formulation of R&D policies can not do without considerations 
about the regional and local "geography" of innovation in Europe. 
Elements of a new innovation regime 
In  the  beginning  of this  chapter  we  have  pointed  out  that  scientific  and  technological 
competence are among the main factors for different national economic performance.  Now 
that industry in Europe has already lost some of its foreign trade advantages and some of its 
technological competence, it is worth while to think about a European innovation regime, that 
enhances future competitiveness of European industry. 
As we have seen so far,  national policy and regulatory differences, regional disparities and 
cultural  diversity  have  a  number  of consequences  for  the  institutional  environment  of 
innovation in Europe. This environment so far, is still to a considerable degree governed by 
the paradigm that national scientific excellence and top quality research in core technologies 
must be the main (and only) target of a European R&D-policy.  European diversitiy, however, 
can only be stimulating if there is a basic agreement, that national achievements alone are not 
sufficient to remain competitive in a globalizing economic environment. A fruitful  innovative 
climate within the Community needs an organisation of science and technology which starts 
with the assumption that the innovation process because of its complexity and fastness needs 
cooperation  and a high degree of flexiblity since new markets have to be developed quickly. 
The traditional separation of the  European  innovation process into  different disciplines of 
science and  levels of technology''  has  to  be overcon1e  in  a way  that it is  possible to  link 
different fields and levels according to economic, social and ecological development. 
11  Also rcfcrcd to as:  "pure sciences", "transfer sciences", "prOductive sector" (OECD 1992) 209 
Quite obviously the Japanese system of innovation has many advantages, which, of course, 
can not simply be taken over in Europe, but these elements should be carefully checked for 
their applicability to a European innovation regime. 
Japanese  success  in  the  innovation  race  is  mainly  characterized  by  an  incremental 
development and "small scale improvements in both products and processes". Naschold quotes 
experts who have estimated that between 15% and 25% of Japans success can be put down 
to  this  factor  (Naschold  1993).  The figure  below  shows the different starting points  of 
Western vs. Japanese production organization. 
Fig. 5.11:  The Fordist and Toyotist models of industrial governance 
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Japanese "best practice" can teach us a number of lessons: Japanese innovation processes are 
very  closely  related  to  the  tnarket,  i.e.  products  are  not  developed,  because  there  is  a 
technology available. Rather the main thrust are new needs for new products. Technologies 
are  en1ployed  to  create new  or constantly  improve  products.  This requires  a  respective 210 
organization within the firm, stable cooperative networks between firms or firms and research 
institutions.  In  Japan  this  process  is  based  upon  "a harmonious  relationship.~  ..  between 
producti?n, organization, sn·ategic  orientation and  the  mobilisation of resource potentials" 
(Naschold 1993).  An incremental development of innovation requires, as the Japanes example 
shows,  close collaboration of all relevant actors, and the abiltiy to communicate. 
Another lesson to  lerun  from  Japan.  is  the  notion  of technology fusions.  This implies that 
horizontal connection lines between different technologies (and, consequently branches) lead 
to  promising new developments. Kodama (1991) demonstrates this with two examples: the 
"mechatronics revolution  .. and the "optoelectronics revolution"
14
• Both are examples for a very 
successful  development  of  new  products  that  emerge  from  the  combination  of  two 
technologies. 
As  we have seen  the  European  .. web"  of innovative potentials· is very  heterogeneous  and 
therefore requires answers taylored to the European situation. From the results so far we want 
to  show  some  paths,  a  European  innovation  regime  could  go  in  order  to  enhance 
competitiveness of industry in Europe and, at the same time contribute to social cohesion and 
ecological necessities. 
There is no doubt that technological competence and a strong emphasis on top quality science 
and technology are indispensable for competitiveness on a global mru·ket·· Europe~s strong 
orientation towards core technologies and science-based innovation strategies creates a solid 
stock of knowledge which needs, to be complemented by a problem-orientated strategy that 
seeks synergies in tnaking the best possible use of this stock. 
The availablity of top scientjfic and technological knowledge can only be the outset for a 
problem-orientated innovation process. In  a  nmnber of leading industrial
15  countries recent 
studies ·about the future significance of certain technologies have been carried through in order 
14  The case of optoelectronics is also described in  M.  Fransmann (1990). 
15  E.g. USA. Japan, some OECD countries (Fraunhofcr lnstitut fuer Systemtcchnik und Innovationsforschung -
lSI - 1993)  -211 
to concentrate on research activities and direct funds to promising fields. For a new European 
innovation regime, the  idea of the further development of a monitoring system within the 
Community  could be a promising starting point.  The most important property of such a 
monitoring  system  is  very  high  flexibility,  so  that EC  programmes  and  policies  can  be 
redirected  immediately,  if new  needs  let expect  promising  markets.  In  other  words,  the 
monitoring system has to  provide a "feedback loop". 
The same "flexible-response" system can be employed on the regional level. Its main thrust 
should go towards flexible long-tetm strategies, which enable peripheral regions in the long 
run to catch up, either by development of endogenous potentials or by efficient financial input 
to  build  up  infrastructure.  Only  if peripheral regions  gain  a  basis  for communcation and 
cooperation they can be tied up to  the "island" system of European innovation. 
Under this problem-orientated view, innovation processes have a number of  additional aspects: 
* The efficient  organization  of networks  on  all  levels  is crucial for  the  exploitation  of 
synergies.  This  refers  simultaneously  to  R&D-alliances  between  firms,  the  further 
improvement of relationships between research institutions and firms as  well as  between 
public policy and private economy. These networks can be politically launched, promoted 
and moderated. 
* New production technologies require new views on training and education. The significance 
of a  well  trained  workforce  increases.  New  production  systems  need  equally  diligent 
research on the working conditions .and on the technology. 
* The application  of new  technologies  and their conversion into  new  products requires a 
societal consensus which increasingly gets a critical subject (e.g. biotechnology). 
* Ecological consequences ?f new  products and production processes get more and more 
significance.  Change  of  consmner  habits  open  up  chances  for  new  markets.  The 
understanding  that  it is  easier and  more sensible  to  avoid  instead  of remove  pollution 
contributes to  the development of new technologies, but also new mangement principles. 
Communication structures and corporate identity in  firms can change attitudes and start 
learning  processes.  These  processes  can  be  strengthened  by  goal-orientated  public 
procurement and EC-wide regulations. 212 
On  the  European  level,  thus,  it  is  crucial  to  develop  a  problem-oriented new  innovative 
system which not only is able to enhance cohesion within the Community, but at the same 
time makes industry in  Europe a powerful partner for world wide collaboration to enhance 
competitivenes. Part 6 
Industrial Policy: 
Creating a New Framework for. Industry in Europe 214 
Driven  by  fast  change  on  a  global  scope,  industry  in  Europe  ha~ to  master  a  difficult 
transition. It has to regain and secure competitiveness, to further shift to technology-intensive 
and knowledge-based production,  to  attain environmental sustainability and,  above all, to 
develop new markets. A  rapid and far reaching restructuring of firms,  production chaines, 
infrastructures, innovation systems and markets is required. 
This  is  not  a  task  for  industry  and  the  private  sector  alone.  Rather,  strong  support  by 
industrial  policy  is  indispensable.  New  or  improved  infrastructures  are  required.  The 
framework for industry needs to be changed. Market forces have to be reoriented at new aims 
and conditions, and new markets have to be developed. A supportive environment for rapid 
restructuring, flexible adjustment and high innovation has to be created. 
All this points to a wide variety of necessary or supportive activities of industrial policy. The 
danger is  that these activities  are performed in  isolation  or even in competition  and· are 
dominated by  special interests.  Accordingly,  industrial policy could easily turn out to  be 
inefficient  and  misleading.  In  order  to  avoid  this,  differentiated  activities  have  to  be 
developed within a coherent framework. 
For this purpose, industrial policy and industry in Europe should join forces in a European 
project for industrial change. This project compares in importance and scope to  the singe 
market projects.  It can be built up  from a  number of cornerstones which help to  increase 
competitiveness in the short perspective and to develop new markets and attain environmental 
sustainability in the longer perspective. 
A starting point: Labour 
4 
A promising starting point for industrial policy is labour. As already discussed in this report, 
labour  costs  are  an  increasingly  critical  issue.  On  one  hand,  high  labour costs  impede 
competitiveness of industry in Europe. On the other hand, high wages and social welfare are 
important pillars for the survival of the European economy. 215 
In this context we should be aware that development of  efficient welfare systems in Europe 
can not be left to national governments alone. The divirsity of welfare systems is most likely 
to result in exploitation of different social standards for competitiveness of industry. In order 
to  avoid such social dumping, a European social charta is necessary as an adequate social 
framework for a viable industry in Europe. 
Policy recommendation 
Reshaping the welfare state 
The European social charta has to be decided very urgently in order to secure an adequate 
social framework for industrial development. Working conditions should not be applicable as 
a competitive arguement. 
Reducing labour costs  is  only one side· of the coin,  the other is to  make better and more 
efficient use of labour. Adequate measures for tl)is purpose are a fast increase of  productivity 
by enhancing the development of anthropocentric production systems. 
Productivity  can  hardly  be  sufficiently  increased  by  technical  means  alone;  rather,  far 
reaching changes in organization, technology and management in firms and even across fmns 
are necessary. Experience demonstrates tl1at cutTent structures often impede or slow down 
change. 
In order to reach rapid increase of productivity inspite of such impediments, joint action of 
employers, unions and governmental agencies is  required  ..  A good example is the Swedish 
programme  for  "Management,  organization  and  partizipation"  (LOM-programme)  (cf. 
Naschold, 1992). 
Joint efforts of employers  and  unions  to  increase  productivity  are  only  feasible,  if these 
increases are not accompanied by strong job losses. A productivity initiative, therefore, has 
to be linked to strategies for development of new economic ooportunities and new jobs. This 
will be discussed later in  this part. 216 
Policy recommendation 
European initifltives for high productivity 
The Commission ·of the European Communities and governments of the member states of the 
communities should promote a joint initiative of employers and unions to increase 
productivity in European industry. 
Even successful attempts to  reduce labour costs  and increase productivity  will leave the 
advanced countries in Europe with the fact that the cost of labour is much higher than that 
of the surrounding less developed countries, particularly in Eastern Europe and North Africa. 
In view of this,  the  strategy  must  be to  build upon the  high  skills  of the labour force, 
especially in those EC countries where the average skill level is comparatively low.  High 
skills have to be used for development of intelligent production systems. This in turn may 
provide industry  in  Europe with  comparative advantages  concerning innovation,  flexible 
adjustment and customization, shift to technology-intensive and knowledge-based production. 
Moreover, it contributes to  the increase of productivity. 
Policy recommendation 
An initiative for intelligent production systems 
The commission of the European Communities should further enhance development of 
anthropocentric production systems and combine this with a systematic effort to design and 
implement in European industry intelligent production systems with open and flexible 
boundaries. This should be combined with a systematic effort in vocational and professional 
training. 
While suppott of skilled work and development of intelligent production systems is crucial 
for the future of industry in most of Europe, it creates a new problem, namely employment 
and jobs for those with minor chances to acquire high skills. This may end up in of strong 
differences concerning job oppurtunities and income between skilled and unskilled workers 
and related new class-structures. To avoid this, it may be necessary to subsidize low income 
by means of negative income taxes. 217 
At the crossroads: Technology 
As we have demonstrated, technology marks another critical issue for the future of industry 
in  Europe.  AU-in-all,  Europe  still  has  a  high  standard  of science  and  technology.  But 
application, commercialization and exploitation of new technology is often weak. Moreover, 
the  existing  gap  to  Japan  and  the  United  States  in  some  core-technologies,  primarily 
biotechnology and electronics is increasing. 
In a short-term perspective, the aim must be to  improve the application and short time-to-
market in European industry. To a large extent, this is a problem of the organization of .firms 
and production chain, and, hence,  not primarily a concern for industrial policy. However, 
European and national R&D programmes as well as public infrastructures for. R&D often 
contribute to slow application, weak commercialization and long time-to-market. 
Most European  and  national  R&D  programmes  are  oriented  at  so-called  precompetitive 
research and technical development As innovation speeds up and innovation cycles become 
shorter, this is increasinly a mere fiction. Attempts to define precompetitive R&D are more 
and more in vain because we can observe a trend to a covergence of basic research, applied 
research and product development 
R&D policies aiming at high competitiveness of industry have to acknowledge this. So-called 
precompetitive  R&D  should  be  replaced  by  programmes  with  a  clear  orientation  at 
competitiveness. In order to  avoid unfair impacts on competition, the programmes must be 
at  any  time  open for  participation  of firms.  Moreover,  arrangements  for  publication and 
diffusion of R&D results must be made which serve both the participating firms' for closure 
and  the  public  interest for  !1  large  fund  of public  knowledge.  Such  programmes  can  be 
organized in terms of centers of excellence. 
Centers of excellence are particularly important to attain a broad mobilization of knowledge, 
experience and support for fundamental restructuring of industry in yet unsufficiently known 
directions. This involves strong efforts to integrate basic research and applied R&D across 
different fields, often ranging from technology to management and cultural sciences. 218 
Policy recommendation 
Centers of  excellence 
The Commission of the European Communities should establish centers of excellence for 
research which necessitate broad interdisplinary approaches and integration of scientific 
knowledge and practical experience. 
Centers of excellence should be established for a limited period (probably 10 years) and be 
organized as joint ventures of public research institutions and private firms. Private firms 
should be involved by delegating staff and by actively participating in pilot projects. 
Regulations should be made which define intellectual property rights of participants and still 
secure openess to participation at any time. Competing centers of excellence should be 
admitted and even enhanced. 
A particularly interesting case for centers of excellence is development of the virtual factory. 
Since a number of years, the combination of modern process technology and organization has 
gained heavily in importance for competitiveness of industry in Europe. Early activities to 
analyze, design and experimentally apply possible structures for a virtual factory may provide 
Europe with a comparative advantage which carries far into the next century. 
European as well as national programmes for research and technical development often suffer 
from  some  in-built weakness.  They  focus  at  specific  and narrowly  defined  goals.  They 
concentrate on technical problems and neglect important economic and social aspects of tech-
nology. Last not least, they are biased towards existing markets. 
The alternative  is  to  establish  in  widely  defined fields  of technology  networks  of R&D 
institutions, producers and (potential) users with an open range of goals and activities. The 
aim is not primarily to reach a particular technological goal, but to develop structures with 
~ 
a high capacity to identify and solve technological problems. Centers of excellence may be 
used as a core of such networks. 
The important difference is, that the first type of programme leads at best to the desired goal, 
that is a solution which is known in  advance, for example a certain chip. The second type 
aims at a broader development and application of technology, e.g. opto-electronics, and may 219 
reveal a variety of solutions and applications which are not yet known and which give raise 
to new products and markets. Most importantly, it is not biased towards existing markets, but 
enhances development of new products and new markets (Kodama, 1991). 
Policy recommendation 
Reorganizing the Communities RTD policy 
The Community programmes for research and technical development should be forcefully 
shifted to the establishment of networks for fast development and wide application of new 
technologies in widely defined fields. Goals and activities should be openly defined .. 
R&D programmes could center around certain technologies, such as opto-electronics. In this 
case, they should consider the whole technological "food-chain". Programmes could also 
center around certain problems, such as recycling of automobiles, and they should include all 
relevant technologies. 
In such programmes should not only deal with technical, but also with economic and social 
aspects of the relevant technologies or problems. 
Much of the future of industry in Europe depends upon rapid development and application · 
of key technologies.  However,  this  is  often hindered by a  low social acceptance of new 
technology and corresponding legal regulation. In Europe particularly, the social and political 
environment for new technologies is less favourable than in the United States, Japan and in 
newly industrializing countries. 
In order to reduce these impediments, industry calls for deregulation or for less restrictive 
regulations. But this is not a solution to the problem. If trust in the security of technological 
developments and social acceptance of new technology is low, rapid and broad application 
as well as economic success of new technology can hardly be achieved. 
Two corresponding measures are needed. On one hand, a more favourable environment for 
new  technology  has  to  be  created.  This  must  include  more  efficient  regulation  and 
administration.  On  the  other  hand  an  efficient  security  system  for  development  and 
application of new technology which minimizes risk has to be implemented. This system has 
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government and the  relevant social  interests.  All sides  have  to  come together in a  new 
techno-culture. 
Policy recommendation 
Initiating a new teclzno-culture 
In order to improve development and application of new technology, the Commission of the 
European Communities should initiate a society wide discussion on technology. 
The aim of the discussion should be to design efficient regulation and an efficient security 
system for the development of new technologies, particularly of bio-technology. 
The discussion could be organized by intensive hearings of the Commission with industry, 
unions and the relevant social interests. It could be convened by an independent committee. 
The yardstick: Environment 
Environment undoubtedly is a major challenge to the development of industry in Europe. 
Industry in Europe has to  strive towards an environmentally sustainable production. At the 
same  time,  economic  solutions  to  environmental  problems  may  be  the  key  to  new 
employment and growth. The task is to bring these two aspects together and to create new 
economic opportunities by developing an environmentally sustainable industry. 
Dynamic regulation is a promising solution for this task. Usually, environmental regulation 
sets standards according to the current state of technology and adjusts these standards from 
time to time to technological progress. This type of regulation refers to the current state of 
technology, but does not enhance new technological developments. In order to achieve this 
. 
goal,  regulation  should  not translate cun-ent  technological standards  into  rules,  but rather 
define dynamic standards on the basis of technology projections. More specifically, regulation 
sets higher and higher standards which have to be reached within a given period of time.  . 
This provides a clear and stable framework because industry knows well in advance what 
standards have to be reached and thereby may initiate technological developments by creating 
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a  variety of new  solutions.  This,  in  turn,  may lead to development of a ·Variety  of new 
products. 
Policy recommendation 
Introducing dynamic regulation o1z environment 
The Commission of the European Communities and national governments should develop a 
dynamic form of environmental regulation. For a longer period of time, regulation should in 
advance define rising environn1ental standards. This should be continuously perpetuated. The 
basis for the definition of standards should be the projections of technological development. 
Another interesting  approach  to  economic  solution  of environmental problems  is  public 
procurement.  In the European  Community,  governments  spend a  large proportion of the 
national product and have a  high  buying power.  This can be used to  create markets for 
ecological products. Environmentally advanced forms of construction, for example, can be 
supported by implementing rules e.g. that all newly constructed community buildings have 
to  meet with certain environmental standards.  Similar rules are also possible for a  whqle 
range of different products. 
Policy recommendation 
Environmental targeting of  public procurement 
The Commission of the European Communities and national governments should support 
trigger development of capacious markets for environmental products by means of public 
procurement. 
More specifically, European and national regulations should determine that public 
procurement projects have to meet high environmental standards. These standards should be 
dynamic in order to induce a technology push. 
Environment is obviously a global problem, but regulation is usually national. This involves 
a significant problem of competitiveness for industry in Europe. 222 
Higher environmental standards for industrial production in Europe may create a comparative 
advantage in the long run, but cettainly constitutes a comparative disadvantage in the short 
run. Moreover, they cause incentives for industry in Europe to move production which is not 
competible  with  European  standards  to  foreign  countries  and  to  "export"  environmental 
problems. 
Strong efforts  to  increase environmental sustainability of industrial production in Europe 
have, therefore, to be combined with the development of an incentive system, a  system of 
tarifs,  regulation  and  subsidies,  to  protect  industry  in  Europe  against  competition  by 
environmental dumping.  This  creates  considerable  substantial difficulties  and also  raises 
difficult questions concerning international trade. 
In  addition  to  the  strategies  described  so  far,  development  of  economic  solutions  to 
environmental problems must be the  main concern of the European and national  R&D-
programmes. 
Policy recommendation 
A European R&D-programme for an environmental industry 
The Commission of the European Communities should initiate a large-scale R&D programme 
on environmental technology and developn1ent of relevant markets. The programme should 
support networks and centers of excellence focusing at major environmental problems, such 
as recycling and waste reduction for major industrial products. 
A major challenge: Creating new markets 
Throughout  this  report,  we  have  stressed  that  the  future  of industry  in  Europe  and  its 
capability to secure employment and growth strongly depends on fast development of new 
economic opportunities.  Environmental policy may be a  step in  this direction and may be 
used as a catalyst for development of new technologies, new products, new markets and new 
production systems. Policy recommendation 
Three measures to support diversification 
In order to  support diversification of industry to  new activities and new markets, The 
Commission of the European Communities should introduce the following measures: 
1  Financial support for declining industry should only be given under the condition that the 
relevant fim1s  offer a programm for the development of new business and the creation of 
new jobs for the workers. National subsidies should be subject to the same condition. 
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2  Public support for development of technology should be linked to the condition that R&D 
activities are combined with activities for development of new products and new markets. 
3  The Con1mission should create a progrrunme for financial support of development of new 
markets by means of venture capital and long-tem1 loans. Preferably, such a programme 
should be perfom1ed as a joint venture with the European banking industry and thus, 
stimulate development of new banking business. 
As  we  have  explained  in  the  second  part of this  report,  this  is  extremely  difficult  to 
accomplish and is associated with high risk and uncertainty. It often exceeds the capabilities 
and the time horizon of enterprises.  There are a  number of feasible  measures by which 
industrial policy may enhance diversification. 
Policy recommendation 
Networks for socio-technological diversification 
In order to develop new markets and new economic opportunities, The Commission of the 
European Communities should establish networks for socio-technological diversification. 
One type of network should be oriented at development and wide application of core-, 
technologies and should be organized along technological chaines and potentials for 
technology fusion. Particularly important technologies are bio-technology, new materials, 
microstructure technology and communication technology. 
Another type of networks should focus  at economic solutions of environmental and social 
problems and should include actors from  a variety of different fields in knowledge and 
technology. Particularly they should include experts in teclmology, organization and regu-
lation. Major targets should be material flows,  recycling, emmissions and waste. 224 
Other activities to support diversification of industry could be to reorientate and restructure 
industry towards a systematic and long-term effort in diversification and development of new 
markets. For this  purpose~ new  networks should be initiated. 
Networks for the development of new products, activities and markets could become a major 
force  for structural change in  European industry.  Indeed, they could be a key element for 
new policy structures. 
New structures for new policies 
Fast restructuring of industry in Europe can not be accomplished in traditional ways of public 
policy.  In  particular,  it can  not be accomplished with  isolated activities and programmes 
which are strongly influenced by special interests and developed and managed by strongly 
segmented bureaucracies. Rather, initiatives which induce a process of change and mobilize 
broad ·support for this have to be found. 
Under the condition of multifarious change, vanishing of traditional boundaries, and high 
uncertainty, public policy is seriously mislead if it attempts to prescribe unique solutions. It 
is also mislead, if it confines itself to the creation of a favourable environment and leaves all 
the rest up  to the market. 
Collaborative strategies are particularly important for policies of the European Commission 
and governments of the member states for the survival of the SME economy. SMEs should 
be  stimulated  to  form  production  networks  among  themselves  and  together  with  large 
enterprises in order to increase their capabilities and capacities in R&D, marketing, sales and 
services  and  to  cope  with  globalization.  Examples  for  such  strategies  are  the  Danish 
networking  programme  and  the  French  programme  for  collaboration  of small  and  large 
enterprises. 
Subsidiarity, which is a widely discussed topic in the European Community, is predominantly 
discussed  in  terms  of some kind  of division  of labour between  levels  of government and • 
• 
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public administration.  However,  it should  be  understood  as  a  strategic policy  orientation 
which  systematically  uses  proximity  of actors  to  problems  and  related  knowledge  and 
expertise  . 
Policy recommendation 
Initiating collaborative efforts 
The Commission of the European Communities should strongly support collaboration among 
SMEs and SMEs with large enterprises. For this purpose, RTD programmes as well as other 
programmes offering financial assistance to firms  should, if possible, have a rule for 
inclusion and collaboration of SMEs. 
The point, thus, is not so much the division of power among different levels of government 
Rather, the impottant point is to develop  a collaborative structure between different levels 
of  government,  and  between  governmental  and  private  actors.  Similar  to  industrial 
production, public policy has to be shifted to virtual organization rather than be performed 
in formal structures. 
An  illustrative  case  is  regional  disparities  in  social  and  economic  living  conditions. 
Experience shows that it is often difficult to persistently reduce disparities.  Financial and 
infrastructural assistance from outside is rarely sufficient Strategies which aim to build upon 
endogenous  factors,  particularly  on  wage  related  comparative  advantages,  are  often 
ineffective and create undesirable side-effects. 
The solution, thus, must be a combination of endogeneous and exogenous factors.  Such a 
strategy could, for example, attract investments of large enterprises by heavy subsidies and 
build around these investments a suitable infrastructure and network of small and medium 
firms.  Obviously, this can not be achieved by European, national or regional governments 
alone. Rather it requires the collaboration of different levels of government as well as public 
and private actors. 226 
Policy recommendation 
Creation of  nuclei for regional economic expansion 
The European Commission should initiate collaborative networks as a nuclei for the 
development of poor regions. The task of the network should be to design and implement a 
programm which supports investments of large and strong international corporations in 
lagging regions by heavy subsidies and combines this with measures to build an adequate 
infrastructure and a network of domestic Sfvffis around this investment. 
Development  of collaborative  structures  is  a  fundamental  prerequisite  for  a  successful 
management of industrial change in Europe. This applies for the public and the private sector 
and for the relationsship between these sectors. 
Due to change, high ambiguity and uncertainty, it is quite easy to  define a wide range of 
important tasks for industrial policy. The strategic problem, however, is to match tasks with 
capacities and capabilities. This problem can only be solved if industry and industrial policy 
join forces in a European project for industrial revitalization which is based on broad support 
in the European societies. • 
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